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STRUCTURAL DEREGULATION
Jody Freeman∗ & Sharon Jacobs∗∗
Modern critics of the administrative state portray agencies as omnipotent behemoths,
invested with vast delegated powers and largely unaccountable to the political branches of
government. This picture, we argue, understates agency vulnerability to an increasingly
powerful presidency. One source of presidential control over agencies in particular has
been overlooked: the systematic undermining of an agency’s ability to execute its statutory
mandate. This strategy, which we call “structural deregulation,” is a dangerous and
underappreciated aspect of what then-Professor, now-Justice Elena Kagan termed
“presidential administration.”
Structural deregulation attacks the core capacities of the bureaucracy. The phenomenon
encompasses such practices as leaving agencies understaffed and without permanent
leadership; marginalizing agency expertise; reallocating agency resources; occupying an
agency with busywork; and damaging an agency’s reputation. Structural deregulation
differs from traditional “substantive” deregulation, which targets the repeal of particular
agency rules or policies. While substantive deregulation may have serious consequences,
it is relatively transparent, limited in scope, and subject to legal challenge. By contrast,
structural deregulation is stealthier. It is death by a thousand cuts.
We argue that structural deregulation is in tension with constitutional, administrative,
and democratic norms. Nevertheless, public law is remarkably ill-equipped to address it.
Constitutional and administrative law both have blind spots when it comes to presidential
management of the bureaucracy, especially when the President’s mission is incapacitation.
Specific statutes meant to protect the civil service or inoculate agency budgets from
presidential control do not help much either — they are vulnerable to workarounds. These
blind spots and workarounds have allowed structural deregulation to flourish as a method
of presidential control, with serious consequences for the future of the administrative state.
We therefore propose legislative and regulatory reforms that could help to control the risks
of structural deregulation.
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INTRODUCTION
Critics of the modern administrative state characterize the federal
bureaucracy as an imperious and unaccountable behemoth that threatens core principles of democratic governance.1 This portrayal misses
the extent to which agencies are vulnerable to an increasingly powerful
President capable of undermining them in unappreciated ways. This
undermining, what we call “structural deregulation,” targets an agency’s
core capacities. Structural deregulation erodes an agency’s staffing,
leadership, resource base, expertise, and reputation — key determinants
of the agency’s capacity to accomplish its statutory tasks.
Structural deregulation has serious long-term consequences for the
administrative state, and a President committed to it can do lasting damage. The Supreme Court has enabled structural deregulation by simultaneously countenancing a strong presidency while expressing skepticism about the legitimacy of administrative power.2 This combination

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
1 See, e.g., Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 575 U.S. 43, 91 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring
in the judgment) (“We have overseen and sanctioned the growth of an administrative system that
concentrates the power to make laws and the power to enforce them in the hands of a vast and
unaccountable administrative apparatus . . . .”); City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 313 (2013)
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The Framers could hardly have envisioned today’s ‘vast and varied
federal bureaucracy’ and the authority administrative agencies now hold over our economic, social,
and political activities.” (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477,
499 (2010))); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (observing that executive bureaucracies “swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legislative
power and concentrate federal power” and thus that “[m]aybe the time has come to face the behemoth”); PHILIP HAMBURGER, THE ADMINISTRATIVE THREAT 4 (2017) (“Administrative power
is . . . all about the evasion of governance through law, including an evasion of constitutional processes and procedural rights.”); DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY:
HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 19 (1995) (describing delegation to agencies as the phenomenon by which Congress “broadens the federal government’s regulatory jurisdiction over our lives, even while it reduces government’s capacity . . . to protect us from
the harms about which we care the most”); Charles J. Cooper, Confronting the Administrative State,
NAT’L AFFS., Fall 2015, at 96, 97 (“It is fitting that we refer to the administrative state as a ‘state,’
for it has become a sovereign power unto itself, an imperium in imperio regulating virtually every
dimension of our lives.”).
2 See, e.g., Seila L. LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2211 (2020) (holding that the President must
have plenary authority to remove the single head of an executive agency because such removal is a
key component of “the executive Power” delegated to the President in Article II); id. at 2218–19
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (opining that independent agencies are unconstitutional because their heads are shielded from presidential removal); Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct.
2044, 2051–54 (2018) (concluding that administrative law judges at the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) were “Officers” and therefore that their appointment by SEC staff members
was unconstitutional and that they could be appointed only by the President, heads of department,
or the courts). On statements from members of the Court that suggest skepticism about the administrative enterprise, see cases cited supra note 1.
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of enthusiasm for presidential authority and animus toward the administrative state3 helps to create the ideal conditions for structural deregulation to take root.
Structural deregulation is distinct from what we call “substantive”
deregulation, which aims to weaken or rescind particular agency rules
or policies but falls short of a wholesale attack on agency capacity. Substantive deregulation might include regulatory rollbacks that weaken
health, safety, financial, or labor standards;4 shifts in an agency’s enforcement priorities;5 or legal interpretations that shrink an agency’s authority or jurisdiction.6 These decisions typically must comply with
legal procedures requiring transparency and afford opportunities for judicial review, and are thus relatively straightforward for an incoming
administration to reverse. By contrast, structural deregulation tears at
an agency’s foundation and does so largely out of view and beyond legal
redress, causing potentially enduring harm.7
The Trump Administration presents perhaps the most extreme example of structural deregulation in recent history,8 but it is not the only
one. Other Presidents, including both Richard Nixon and Ronald
Reagan, also sought to weaken agencies by undermining their capacity
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
3 Professor Gillian Metzger has observed that this combination of opposition to bureaucracy
and enthusiasm for presidential power is a hallmark of “contemporary anti-administrativism.”
Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court, 2016 Term — Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative
State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3–7 (2017).
4 See, e.g., Tracking Deregulation in the Trump Era, BROOKINGS INST. (Jan. 19, 2021),
https://www.brookings.edu/interactives/tracking-deregulation-in-the-trump-era
[https://perma.cc/H3Q2-48SF] (collecting delayed, repealed, and new rules across environmental,
health, labor, and other categories).
5 Daniel T. Deacon, Note, Deregulation Through Nonenforcement, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 795, 796
(2010).
6 For a treatment of this last approach, see generally William W. Buzbee, Agency Statutory
Abnegation in the Deregulatory Playbook, 68 DUKE L.J. 1509 (2019). Typically, instances of substantive deregulation take the form of notice-and-comment rulemaking, but sometimes they occur
via interpretive rules, guidance, or other policy vehicles.
7 While an extreme campaign of substantive deregulation may converge with structural deregulation at some point, we treat them as conceptually distinct. Structural deregulation is not about
any one, or even a handful, of particular regulatory policies. And it does not include standard policy
differences, or enforcement priorities, which are expected to swing somewhat from administration
to administration. It is concerned rather with steps Presidents can take to incapacitate institutions
and prevent them from fulfilling their statutory mandates.
8 The Trump Administration aggressively pursued both substantive and structural deregulation. It sought to repeal or weaken regulations related to environmental protection, civil rights,
education, health care, and immigration, among other areas. While not the first administration to
employ such tactics, the Trump Administration used them more aggressively, comprehensively, and
in a more coordinated fashion than its predecessors. See sources cited infra notes 29–33 and accompanying text. These instruments are likely to remain appealing to deregulatory Presidents. The
history of regulation shows that new tools, once exercised, tend to remain in the deregulatory arsenal. See, e.g., Bethany A. Davis Noll & Richard L. Revesz, Regulation in Transition, 104 MINN.
L. REV. 1, 64–65 (2019).
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to do their work, through strategies ranging from impoundment to intentional understaffing.9 And while Republican Presidents historically
have been more likely to engage in structural deregulation, that pattern
may not always hold true. The same tools we identify can be used by a
President of any party, who for whatever reasons wishes to destroy the
institutional capacity of particular agencies or of the administrative state
as a whole.
In Part I, we offer a typology of structural deregulation, with examples organized into several broad categories. The examples show that
presidential undermining can be piecemeal and incremental, with the
cumulative impact becoming clear only over time. In essence, it is death
by a thousand cuts.
Our account has several important implications, which we discuss in
Part II. First, structural deregulation exemplifies a different, more troubling side of “presidential administration.” It shows that while Presidents may sometimes embrace agency achievements for political gain —
the trend then-Professor, now-Justice Elena Kagan identified in her
iconic article10 — they also can seek political advantage by undermining
agency capacity. Justice Kagan’s portrayal assumed a good faith chief
executive on the hunt for credit-claiming opportunities that would amplify agency competence and, inevitably, tie the agency tightly to the
President.11 Rather than aligning the President with his agencies, however, structural deregulation drives a wedge between them.12
Second, structural deregulation has repercussions for the separation
of powers. By making it harder for agencies to fulfill their statutory
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
9 See Jeff Gerth, Absent Watchdogs–A Reagan Legacy; Regulators Say 80’s Budget Cuts May
Cost U.S. Billions in 1990’s, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 1989), https://www.
nytimes.com/1989/12/19/us/absent-watchdogs-reagan-legacy-regulators-say-80-s-budget-cuts-maycost-us.html [https://perma.cc/DB48-REW8]; David E. Rosenbaum, The Savings Debacle: A Special
Report: A Financial Disaster with Many Culprits, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 1990), https://www.
nytimes.com/1990/06/06/business/the-savings-debacle-a-special-report-a-financial-disaster-withmany-culprits.html [https://perma.cc/3CDP-H4T5]; infra notes 139–140 and accompanying text
(discussing President Nixon’s impoundment practices).
10 Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV 2245 (2001).
11 See id. at 2252.
12 The literature on presidential control of agencies is both broad and deep. See, e.g., Lisa
Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look
at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 49 (2006) (interviewing agency
officials to develop a portrait of presidential control as more complex and less positive than Justice
Kagan’s account suggests); Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 211, 234–35
(2015) (identifying the President’s ability to pool resources across agencies as a key tool of presidential control); Peter L. Strauss, Foreword, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 704–05 (2007) (concluding that the President should oversee
the bureaucracy but not make decisions on agencies’ behalf unless Congress has assigned that authority to him by statute); Kathryn A. Watts, Controlling Presidential Control, 114 MICH. L. REV.
683, 734–35 (2016) (expressing optimism about the potential for transparency and process to constrain the worst aspects of presidential control).
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mandates, a campaign of structural deregulation can be seen as both an
encroachment on Congress’s lawmaking authority and, arguably, a dereliction of the President’s constitutional duty to faithfully execute the
laws.
Third, structural deregulation’s relative obscurity and informality —
the very qualities that make it appealing to Presidents as a tool of control — mean that it contravenes longstanding administrative law norms
of procedural regularity, transparency, rationality, and accountability. If
these norms continue to represent desirable features of American government, their systematic erosion is troubling.
Finally, structural deregulation can be difficult to undo. It forces a
President’s successor to take time away from governing in order to rebuild what has been torn down. Structural deregulation is thus in tension with democratic norms disfavoring political and policy
entrenchment.
Preventing or remediating structural deregulation presents a considerable challenge — especially when “presidential administration” is at
its apex, courts are unwilling to check executive power, and Congress is
gridlocked.13 To pose the question starkly: If the other branches are
disinclined, who can stop a President from dismantling the administrative state? In Part III, we explore legal strategies for redressing structural deregulation but conclude that existing public law does not offer
much of a foothold.
Constitutional law seems unavailing: even if the President’s constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws includes a commitment to
maintain the core capacities of agencies, it is not clear that there is a
judicial remedy for its violation.14 Existing statutes are similarly unhelpful. In most instances, substantive statutes do not provide the basis
for a lawsuit challenging presidential undermining of agencies. The
various procedural protections in the Pendleton Civil Service Reform
Act,15 Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998,16 and Impoundment
Control Act of 197417 do not effectively block Presidents from manipulating agency resources, despite being designed to do so.18 The
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
13 See, e.g., Sarah A. Binder, Going Nowhere: A Gridlocked Congress, BROOKINGS INST. (Dec.
1, 2000), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/going-nowhere-a-gridlocked-congress [https://perma.
cc/GZJ9-7NP3]; Lisa L. Miller, Too Little Too Late: The Supreme Court as a Check on Executive
Power, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 16, 2006), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2006/02/too-littletoo-late-supreme-court-check-executive-power [https://perma.cc/8PFF-DPVQ].
14 See Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The Protean Take Care Clause, 164 U. PA. L. REV.
1835, 1847 (2016) (arguing courts have understood the Take Care Clause as creating “exclusive
presidential authority to assure government officials’ fidelity to law”).
15 Ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (1883), amended by Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95454, 92 Stat. 1111.
16 5 U.S.C. §§ 3345–3349.
17 2 U.S.C. §§ 601–688.
18 See infra section III.B.2, pp. 644–48.
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Administrative Procedure Act19 (APA) is not much help either. Although Congress defined “agency” broadly in the APA,20 the President is
generally considered exempt from its scope.21 Congress also expressly
exempted from the statute’s rulemaking requirements “matter[s] relating
to agency management or personnel.”22 “[R]ules of agency organization,
procedure, or practice” are exempt from the Act’s notice and comment
requirements as well.23 And while statutes such as the Freedom of
Information Act24 and other “sunshine” laws force some agency transparency,25 these laws are limited in their reach, subject to exemptions,
and can be circumvented.26 The upshot is that Presidents can do a lot
to undermine agencies without incurring significant legal risk.
With legal strategies so limited, the best response to structural deregulation is likely to be political. In Part IV, we suggest tools that Congress
might use to limit structural deregulation, ranging from ex ante statutory safeguards to ex post oversight. All of these potential responses
face serious political hurdles, however, and even if politically viable,
they each bring significant downsides. Nevertheless, we conclude that
the only way to stop a President bent on structural deregulation is for
Congress to push back.
I. 50 WAYS TO KILL AN AGENCY
In this Part, we offer a typology of structural deregulation consisting
of four broad categories. Each category contains separate actions that
a President may use to weaken agencies and which, when deployed simultaneously, can operate synergistically to more powerful, detrimental
effect.27 In the first category are actions that interfere with agency staffing. Examples include intentionally declining to fill open agency
positions at both the leadership and line levels. The second category
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 561–570a, 701–706.
Id. § 551(1).
See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800–01 (1992).
5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2).
Id. § 553(b)(A).
5 U.S.C. § 552.
See, e.g., id. § 552b(b) (requiring that government agencies’ meetings be open to the public);
id. app. §§ 2–12 (Federal Advisory Committee Act).
26 See infra p. 651.
27 In the examples below we ascribe all actions, ultimately, to the President. In most cases, this
line of responsibility is easy to trace. However, we acknowledge that the connections between
presidential policy and agency action are not always transparent. And we do not pretend that the
President makes these decisions personally in all or even most cases. But, in an era of presidential
administration especially, responsibility for executive agency action ultimately lies with the occupant of the Oval Office. In contrast to our approach, in a forthcoming article, Professor David Noll
identifies the agency itself as the key actor when it comes to understaffing and other forms of administrative “sabotage.” David L. Noll, Administrative Sabotage, 120 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming
2022) (manuscript at 1) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
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comprises presidential manipulation of other resources, including substantially reducing an agency’s budget by reallocating funds, making
funding more difficult to spend for particular purposes, and diverting
agency attention from more material statutory responsibilities with
“busywork” or “churn.” Third is undermining the institutional expertise
that is essential to performing congressionally assigned tasks. Fourth
are attacks on agency reputation. When a President or other highranking executive official persistently charges an agency with incompetence, bias, or worse, it can have a corrosive effect. The ensuing harm
to reputation can make it incrementally more difficult for the agency to
secure funding from Congress, influence regulated entities, and even
prevail in the courts.28 There may be other things a President can do
that would contribute to structural deregulation; our list is not exhaustive. The examples also can be thought of as falling along a spectrum,
with the most concerning being those actions that are least transparent,
least vulnerable to legal challenge, and “stickiest” or hardest to undo.
Delegation necessarily affords Presidents some “play in the joints,”
which they can exploit to pursue their policy prerogatives. It can be
difficult to distinguish structural deregulation from so-called “good governance” reforms intended to improve the government’s performance,
cut costs, or streamline cumbersome procedures. In section I.E, we suggest considerations that can help to distinguish legitimate, good governance efforts from structural deregulation. The line is difficult to draw
in the abstract, since it depends on a number of factors that can be
evaluated only in the context of specific examples. Nevertheless, we
argue that there is both a conceptual and practical difference between
the two.
The Trump Administration aggressively pursued both substantive
and structural deregulation. It sought to repeal or weaken regulations

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
28 See, e.g., Elizabeth Guo, Ruling by Repute: Agency Reputation on Judicial Affirmance of
Agency Action, 74 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 379, 382, 399 (2019) (reviewing data on Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) win rates and concluding
that
an
agency’s
reputation
is
positively
correlated
with
better
judicial
outcomes).
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related to environmental protection,29 civil rights,30 education,31 health
care,32 and immigration,33 among other areas. In addition, the
Administration modified agency procedures in ways that would systematically produce deregulatory outcomes.34 In Executive Order 13,771,
for example, the President updated centralized regulatory review procedures.35 That order imposed an Administration-wide regulatory
“budget” that purported to limit the total number of regulations.36 It
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
29 See, e.g., Repeal of the Clean Power Plan; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions
from Existing Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guidelines Implementing
Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520 (July 8, 2019) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (repealing and replacing
the Clean Power Plan with less stringent emission guidelines for greenhouse gases); National
Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam
Generating Units — Reconsideration of Supplemental Finding and Residual Risk and Technology
Review, 85 Fed. Reg. 31,286 (May 22, 2020) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63) (reversing agency finding
that it was “appropriate and necessary” to regulate hazardous air emissions from electric generating
units); Definition of “Waters of the United States” — Recodification of Pre-existing Rules, 84 Fed.
Reg. 56,626 (Oct. 22, 2019) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 338 and scattered sections of 40 C.F.R.) (excluding certain streams, wetlands, and other waters from regulation).
30 See, e.g., Making Admission or Placement Determinations Based on Sex in Facilities Under
Community Planning and Development Housing Programs, 85 Fed. Reg. 44,811 (proposed July 24,
2020) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 576) (proposing to rescind protections for transgender and
gender-nonconforming individuals in HUD-funded shelters); HUD’s Implementation of the Fair
Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 85 Fed. Reg. 60,288 (Sept. 24, 2020) (codified at 24 C.F.R.
pt. 100) (making it more difficult for challengers to show a housing policy or practice is discriminatory).
31 See, e.g., Child Nutrition Programs: Flexibilities for Milk, Whole Grains, and Sodium
Requirements, 83 Fed. Reg. 63,775 (Dec. 12, 2018) (codified at 7 C.F.R. pts. 210, 215, 220, 226)
(relaxing nutritional requirements for school lunch programs); Secretarial Determination to Lower
Head Start Center-Based Duration Requirements, 85 Fed. Reg. 5332 (Jan. 30, 2020) (codified at 45
C.F.R. pt. 1302) (rescinding requirement that Head Start programs provide more in-school hours).
32 See, e.g., Nondiscrimination in Health and Health Education Programs or Activities,
Delegation of Authority, 85 Fed. Reg. 37,160 (June 19, 2020) (codified in scattered sections of 42 and
45 C.F.R.) (loosening antidiscrimination requirements and adopting blanket exemptions for providers on religious grounds); State Relief and Empowerment Waivers, 83 Fed. Reg. 53,575 (Oct. 24,
2018) (codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 33 & 45 C.F.R. pt. 155) (expanding availability of state waivers from
Affordable Care Act mandates).
33 See, e.g., Removal of 30-Day Processing Provision for Asylum Applicant-Related Form I-765
Employment Authorization Applications, 85 Fed. Reg. 37,502 (June 22, 2020) (codified at 8 C.F.R.
pt. 208) (extending timeline for USCIS to adjudicate employment authorization applications);
Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal; Credible Fear and Reasonable Fear Review,
85 Fed. Reg. 80,274 (Dec. 11, 2020) (codified at scattered sections of 8 C.F.R.) (expediting removal
and screenings); Asylum Eligibility and Procedural Modifications, 85 Fed. Reg. 82,260 (Dec. 17,
2020) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 208, 1208) (requiring asylum applicants to apply for protection in a
third country before seeking asylum in the United States).
34 Strengthening Transparency in Pivotal Science Underlying Significant Regulatory Actions
and Influential Scientific Information, 86 Fed. Reg. 469 (Jan. 6, 2021) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 30)
(limiting the studies the EPA may rely on in promulgating regulations); Energy Conservation Program for Appliance Standards: Procedures for Use in New or Revised Energy Conservation Standards and Test Procedures for Consumer Products and Commercial/Industrial Equipment, 85 Fed.
Reg. 8626 (Feb. 14, 2020) (codified at 10 C.F.R. pts. 430–31) (establishing higher threshold before
conservation standard can be tightened).
35 See Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Jan. 30, 2017).
36 See id.
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also commanded agencies to eliminate two rules for every new regulation promulgated.37
However, President Trump went further and deployed a variety of
other strategies to impair agencies — strategies that we call structural
deregulation. While not the first administration to employ such tactics,
the Trump Administration used them more aggressively, comprehensively, and in a more coordinated fashion than its predecessors. These
instruments are likely to remain appealing to deregulatory Presidents.
The history of regulation shows that new tools, once exercised, tend to
remain in the deregulatory arsenal.38
A. Staffing
It should go without saying that the daily operation of the U.S.
government, including the military and law enforcement, and the broad
array of functions assigned by Congress to both executive branch and
independent regulatory agencies, requires an adequate and competent
staff with relevant subject matter expertise.39 Modern administration is
complex, requiring decisionmakers to make judgments about intricate
financial, economic, public health, medical, scientific, technological, security, and other matters. It cannot operate without a civil service of
skilled and dedicated professionals.40 As administrations come and go,
and political appointees cycle through the agencies, the permanent civil
service is a source of stability and continuity. It has been described as
the “cartilage” of the federal government.41
While Congress does not set precise staffing levels for agencies (other
than for agency leadership), it delegates tasks that presuppose adequate
staffing for their fulfillment. The optimal size of the civil service is open
to debate; it may be impossible to pinpoint the precise level of staffing
required by any one agency or set of tasks. Yet there have been instances
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
37
38
39

Id.
See, e.g., Noll & Revesz, supra note 8, at 3–4.
Between 2016 and 2021, nearly half of all federal employees became eligible for retirement,
raising the prospect that the federal government soon could have insufficient personnel to fulfill its
tasks. Recognizing this problem, the Obama Administration made recruiting and retaining millennials a key part of its agenda for strengthening the federal workforce. See Carten Cordell, How the
Obama Administration Shaped the Federal Workforce, FED. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.federaltimes.com/management/2016/12/05/how-the-obama-administration-shaped-the-federal-workforce [https://perma.cc/L2G4-75LB].
40 See generally PAUL R. VERKUIL, VALUING BUREAUCRACY: THE CASE FOR
PROFESSIONAL GOVERNMENT (2017).
41 “[T]he permanent civil service at the federal level and its collective delegated responsibilities
might be considered modern America’s ‘cartilage’ developed over time to maintain continuity and
soften the friction inherent to the country’s constitutional skeleton.” William G. Resh, The
Administrative Presidency and the Degradation of the United States Civil Service, in HANDBOOK
OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 25, 26 (W. Bartley Hildreth et al. eds., 4th ed. 2021).
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where agency staffing, on any fair assessment, has fallen below the requisite minimum.42 Where such shortfalls are the direct or predictably
indirect result of a purposeful presidential policy designed to weaken
the agency, we attribute them to structural deregulation.
Presidents can undermine agency capacity by reducing or otherwise
manipulating staffing, such as by intentionally declining to fill open
agency positions at both the leadership and line level, by inducing staff
departures through demoralization, and by weakening staffing agency
mechanisms.
1. Line-Level Staffing. — Presidents can hinder agencies’ capacity
to do their work by shrinking the size of their workforces. Sometimes
these efforts are overt, sometimes covert. For example, President Trump
made plain his desire to reduce the size of the federal workforce in a
memorandum issued shortly after he assumed office.43 In it, he imposed
a hiring freeze and directed the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), in consultation with the Office of Personnel Management
(OPM), to “recommend a long-term plan to reduce the size of the Federal
Government’s workforce through attrition.”44 Such initiatives are nothing new and are not necessarily aimed at agency incapacitation.
President Reagan, too, announced a federal hiring freeze shortly after
his inauguration;45 President Obama froze pay levels for federal employees for three years.46
As we discuss in more detail below, staff reductions or temporary
caps on pay are not necessarily linked to structural deregulation. But
where those reductions appear designed to marginalize particular
agency programs or operations, or when they cut so deeply that they
may compromise an agency’s ability to fulfill core functions, they ought
to raise red flags. The size of the federal civil service has remained

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
42 For example, a former Inspector General (IG) for the Department of Homeland Security in
the Trump Administration testified in Congress that some offices were “simply too thinly staffed to
be able to even be aware of, much less effectively manage, the significant and varied issues that
face DHS.” Trouble at the Top: Are Vacancies at the Department of Homeland Security
Undermining the Mission? Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 116th Cong. 20 (2019)
[hereinafter Trouble at the Top] (statement of John Roth, Former Inspector General, Department of
Homeland Security).
43 See Hiring Freeze, 82 Fed. Reg. 8493 (Jan. 23, 2017).
44 Id.
45 Joe Davidson, Reagan’s Complicated Legacy for Federal Workforce, WASH. POST (Feb. 8,
2011),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/despite-reagans-actions-government-workforcegrew-in-his-tenure/2011/02/07/ABuzkZF_story.html [https://perma.cc/EJG8-UQHD]. President
Reagan announced that “[i]mposing a freeze now can eventually lead to a significant reduction in
the size of the Federal work force.” Id. However, the federal workforce actually increased in size
during Reagan’s presidency. Id.
46 Cordell, supra note 39.
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relatively constant for the past fifty years,47 but fluctuations within specific agencies matter more than overall numbers, and several agencies
have at times lost a notable amount of key staff.48 For example, in 2018,
the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) staff dropped to its lowest
level in thirty years, and the Agency lost several mission-critical positions.49 Administrations can reduce line staff through attrition simply
by failing to replace departing employees. Even after the hiring freeze
imposed at the start of President Trump’s term was lifted, one Labor
Department official reported that political leadership at the Department
prevented hiring, which left remaining staff “doing the work that four
or five people used to handle.”50 Similarly, due to delays in replacing
departing inspectors, the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration in 2020 had just 761 inspectors — an all-time low.51
While it might be reasonable to expect a modest amount of attrition
in any given administration, a pattern of severe attrition across numerous agencies suggests something is amiss. Especially troubling is the
data on civil service attrition during the Trump Administration showing
that attrition was higher for senior members of the executive service,
who have significant expertise and valuable institutional knowledge,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
47 The federal civil service includes approximately two million employees. Contractors and
grantees increase that number to between seven and nine million. PAUL C. LIGHT, VOLCKER
ALL., THE TRUE SIZE OF GOVERNMENT 1, 3 tbl.1 (2017), https://www.volckeralliance.org/sites/
default/files/attachments/Issue%20Paper_True%20Size%20of%20Government.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F4H9-KD87]. The total size of the workforce decreased under President Obama
by more than two million. Id. However, President Obama increased permanent employees by
68,000 in his first nine months, compared to a net loss of 16,000 in President Trump’s first nine
months. Lisa Rein & Andrew Ba Tran, How the Trump Era Is Changing the Federal Bureaucracy,
WASH. POST (Dec. 30, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/how-the-trump-era-ischanging-the-federal-bureaucracy/2017/12/30/8d5149c6-daa7-11e7-b859-fb0995360725_story.html
[https://perma.cc/684M-BQ36].
48 See Emily Badger et al., The Government Agencies that Became Smaller, and Unhappier,
Under Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/01/upshot/trumpeffect-government-agencies.html [https://perma.cc/CZ2L-8WM2] (showing that the Departments of
Labor, State, Education, Interior, Agriculture, Energy, Health and Human Services, Housing and
Urban Development, Transportation, and Justice, along with the EPA, saw net workforce losses
during the Trump Administration).
49 See Timothy Cama, EPA Staffing Falls to Reagan-Era Levels, THE HILL (Jan. 9, 2018,
11:39 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/368090-epa-staffing-hits-reagan-levels
[https://perma.cc/AH6N-W88J].
50 Rachel M. Cohen, “I Fully Intend to Outlast These People”: 18 Federal Workers on What It’s
Really Like to Work for the Trump Administration, WASHINGTONIAN (Apr. 7, 2019),
https://www.washingtonian.com/2019/04/07/18-federal-workers-what-its-really-like-to-work-forthe-trump-administration [https://perma.cc/C3C2-NEYH].
51 Joe Yerardi & Alexia Fernández Campbell, Fewer Inspectors, More Deaths: The Trump
Administration Rolls Back Workplace Safety Inspections, VOX (Aug. 18, 2020, 5:05 AM),
https://www.vox.com/2020/8/18/21366388/osha-worker-safety-trump
[https://perma.cc/UMD6WYLN]. A former policy adviser to the Agency opined that the Trump Administration was “starving” the Agency of staff and that this was “undermining the effectiveness of the agency.” Id. The
article also details the “human cost” of fewer inspections. Id.
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and who work most closely with an administration’s political
appointees.52
Civil servants are difficult to fire because of civil-service job protections, but an administration can induce them to retire by offering a variety of incentives. In implementing the recommendations of the
National Performance Review under President Clinton, for example, the
government offered federal employees up to $50,000 each to leave their
positions.53 During the Trump Administration, an EPA scientist reported that the Agency bought out several high-level scientist positions
and then designated those jobs as unnecessary.54 While such buyout
programs may be standard fare and even beneficial, the question is
whether, in context, they are part of a larger effort to hollow out the
agency by depleting key staff. When used together with other destaffing
techniques — firing, attrition, relocation, and the like — buyouts can be
evidence of a larger campaign of structural deregulation.
A President or an agency’s political leadership may also seek to dishearten staff to induce them to quit. President Reagan, who memorably
announced that “government is the problem,”55 took an approach to administration that was “deeply demoralizing to federal civil servants and
left a legacy of distrust which has never completely faded.”56 More recently, the president of the National Treasury Employees Union commented in 2017 that “[m]orale has never been lower” and that
“[g]overnment is making itself a lot less attractive as an employer.”57
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) lost at least 129
employees after Mick Mulvaney assumed the position of Acting
Director.58 Political appointees might also demoralize staff by excluding
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
52 See Daniel Lim, Federal Workforce Attrition Under the Trump Administration, GOV’T
EXEC. (Dec. 28, 2020), https://www.govexec.com/management/2020/12/federal-workforce-attritionunder-trump-administration/171045 [https://perma.cc/P49Y-4BH8] (“[B]etween calendar years
2016 and 2017, 1,616 senior executives voluntarily left government service, a year-over-year increase of 799 (98%), or more than twice the 2009 spike. Based solely on separations, many more
experienced civil servants were willing to work through a change of administration under Obama
than under Trump.”).
53 Charles S. Clark, Reinventing Government — Two Decades Later, GOV’T EXEC. (Apr. 26,
2013), https://www.govexec.com/management/2013/04/what-reinvention-wrought/62836 [https://
perma.cc/6JYH-Q7XZ].
54 Cohen, supra note 50.
55 President Ronald Reagan, First Inaugural Address 2 (Jan. 20, 1981) (transcript on file with
the Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and Institute), https://www.reaganfoundation.org/
media/128614/inaguration.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2JC-2M9Q].
56 Davidson, supra note 45 (quoting Linda J. Bilmes, a senior lecturer at the Harvard Kennedy
School).
57 Rein & Tran, supra note 47.
58 Robert O’Harrow Jr. et al., How Trump Appointees Curbed a Consumer Protection Agency
Loathed by the GOP, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
investigations/how-trump-appointees-curbed-a-consumer-protection-agency-loathed-by-thegop/2018/12/04/3cb6cd56-de20-11e8-aa33-53bad9a881e8_story.html [https://perma.cc/5WJH-44WZ].
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them from key decisionmaking.59 A 2019 State Department Inspector
General’s report cited examples of hostile treatment of staff and improper withholding of promotions.60 Finally, career staff who cannot be
fired easily or otherwise prodded to leave might be moved into jobs that
hold no interest for them.61
An administration can also trigger staff departures by relocating certain jobs or entire offices. In summer 2019, for example, the Department
of Agriculture (USDA) moved two of its research agencies — the
Economic Research Service and the National Institute of Food and
Agriculture — from Washington, D.C., to Kansas City, Missouri.62
About two-thirds of affected employees declined their reassignments
and were let go.63 Few of those positions were filled by new hires.64 A
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Some employees blamed these departures on choices made by political leadership, including the
slower pace of enforcement actions and staff micromanagement by political employees. Id. A
Bureau lawyer observed that “[t]hey want everyone to leave.” Id. Employees of other agencies
have reported similar demoralization. An employee at the Defense Department reported that
“[m]orale is pretty low, and I think it has to do with the general lack of respect for civil servants.”
Cohen, supra note 50. An employee at the Treasury Department noted a general lack of respect for
career staff under the Trump Administration. Id.
59 See Juliet Eilperin & Emma Brown, Cabinet Secretaries’ Tough Task: Lack of Funding,
Support for Agency Missions, WASH. POST (July 2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/cabinet-secretaries-tough-task-lack-of-funding-support-for-agency-missions/2017/07/02/
d17279ee-4ad9-11e7-a186-60c031eab644_story.html [https://perma.cc/68F6-R4DX].
60 Rachel Oswald, Trump Appointees Routinely Bullied State Department Staffers, IG Reports,
ROLL CALL (Aug. 16, 2019, 7:27 AM), https://www.rollcall.com/2019/08/16/trump-appointeesroutinely-bullied-state-department-staffers-ig-reports [https://perma.cc/EW4F-ZLBU]. While this
example concerns a nonregulatory agency, it shows that administrations bent on doing so can demoralize agency staff to the point of driving an exodus.
61 The Department of the Interior’s policy analysis head until 2017 described being moved to
the Agency’s Office of Natural Resources Revenue, whose work is to collect royalty payments from
oil and gas companies. Joel Clement, Opinion, I’m a Scientist. I’m Blowing the Whistle on the
Trump Administration, WASH. POST (July 19, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/im-a-scientist-the-trump-administration-reassigned-me-for-speaking-up-about-climatechange/2017/07/19/389b8dce-6b12-11e7-9c15-177740635e83_story.html [https://perma.cc/4LSXUFCC].
62 The reason given for the move was that it would enable the Department to “provide more
streamlined and efficient services.” Ben Guarino, Many USDA Workers to Quit as Research
Agencies Move to Kansas City: “The Brain Drain We All Feared,” WASH. POST (July 18, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/science/2019/07/18/many-usda-workers-quit-research-agenciesmove-kansas-city-brain-drain-we-all-feared [https://perma.cc/M5Y3-XHPU].
63 Id. (quoting Jack Payne, the vice president for agriculture and natural resources at the
University of Florida, as commenting that “[t]his is the brain drain we all feared, possibly a destruction of the agencies”). As one former employee pointed out, even if the Department hired someone
to fill his position, it could take that new employee “years” to get up to speed on the modeling
programs he oversaw. Annie Gowen et al., Science Ranks Grow Thin in Trump Administration,
WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/scienceranks-grow-thin-in-trump-administration/2020/01/23/5d22b522-3172-11ea-a053-dc6d944ba776_
story.html [https://perma.cc/L8KS-ME6D].
64 See Internal USDA Memo Shows Move to KC Left Offices Fallow, KAN. CITY BUS. J. (Feb.
28, 2020, 9:21 AM), https://www.bizjournals.com/kansascity/news/2020/02/28/usda-memo-ers-nifakansas-city-office-emloyment.html [https://perma.cc/66PF-XV43]. These departures created deep
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similar relocation effort by the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of
Land Management prompted more than eighty-seven percent of employees asked to move from Washington, D.C., to Grand Junction,
Colorado, to resign or retire instead.65 In a reverse move, the
Department of Health and Human Services asked employees in its
Administration for Community Living to move from regional offices to
the nation’s capital in order to “improve efficiency.”66 Transferring or
reassigning particular senior officials rather than whole offices may also
be part of an effort to weaken an agency.67
Sometimes, staff vacancies are filled by contractors and other temporary workers — strategies that an administration can embrace as
“cost-saving” but might compromise an agency’s capacity.68 For example, the Trump Administration more than doubled funding previously
spent contracting with temporary employment agencies to fill federal
vacancies,69 a practice OMB defended, in part, as a way to “bridge
staffing shortages.”70 Contracting out a significant share of federal jobs,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
deficits in particular areas, including farm finance, tax, bees and pollination, and trade and international development. See Guarino, supra note 62.
65 Juliet Eilperin, Trump Officials Moved Most Bureau of Land Management Positions out of
D.C. More than 87 Percent Quit Instead., WASH. POST (Jan. 28, 2021, 6:24 PM), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2021/01/28/trump-blm-reorganization
[https://perma.cc/7RBZ-4S2N].
66 Arthur Delaney & Dave Jamieson, The Trump Administration Is Literally Pushing Workers
Around, HUFFPOST (July 1, 2019, 5:45 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/trump-federalworkers-relocation_n_5d166993e4b07f6ca57d12c8 [https://perma.cc/48CQ-VTZ2].
67 For example, a senior EPA lawyer who had worked on high-profile air quality rules, including
the Obama-era Clean Power Plan, was, in the Trump Administration, reassigned from her Associate
General Counsel role to work on “special projects.” Doug Obey, In “Highly Unusual Move,” Trump
EPA Reassigns Top Agency Air Lawyer, INSIDEEPA (Jan. 17, 2018), https://insideepa.com/dailynews/highly-unusual-move-trump-epa-reassigns-top-agency-air-lawyer [https://perma.cc/W9PM7RSL].
68 Hiring temporary workers or contracting with private employees can compromise agency
expertise. CHRIS SCHWARTZ & LAURA PADIN, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, TEMPING OUT THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 1–2 (2019), https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/Policy-BriefTemping-Out-Federal-Government-6-19.pdf [https:/perma.cc/QN6L-3FWK]. Temporary workers
might also prove just as costly as federal employees while providing lower-quality services. Id. at
4. The combination of pervasive outsourcing and extensive reliance on nonexpert “loyalists” in
leadership “has brought about a lack of attention to long-term human capital planning. This, in
turn, leads to a lack of functional expertise and competence . . . and simply a shortage in the number
of professionals needed to capably run the many functions of the federal government.” Resh, supra
note 41, at 35.
69 See SCHWARTZ & PADIN, supra note 68, at 2; Joe Davidson, Trump Is Outsourcing
Government to Temps. Why That Might Not Be Good., WASH. POST (June 19, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-is-outsourcing-government-to-temps-why-thatmight-not-be-good/2019/06/18/8f0fd07e-9212-11e9-b570-6416efdc0803_story.html [https://perma.
cc/YZM3-596M]. Most of the increase in outsourcing comes from efforts to privatize federal
government–provided healthcare. Id.
70 Davidson, supra note 69.
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including military functions, is a long-term trend, but it reached new
levels in the Trump Administration.71
We recognize that Presidents may wish to rely more heavily on political appointees than career staff in some instances because they believe those political appointees will be more aligned with their agendas.
Likewise, they may wish to reassign staff whom they believe do not
support, or might undermine, their priorities. And physically relocating
offices may in some cases be entirely legitimate. We grow concerned,
however, when efforts to reduce, reassign, relocate, or demoralize career
staff are so expansive that they evince something more reckless or destructive, or when they cut so deeply that they may prevent an agency
from fulfilling its congressionally assigned mission.
2. Officers. — Presidents can also seek to disable agencies by failing
to nominate leadership. The Constitution states that the President shall
nominate, and the Senate shall confirm, all “Officers of the United
States.”72 The Supreme Court has interpreted this language to mean
that the Senate must confirm “principal” officers, including the heads of
executive departments and independent commissions.73 There are more
than 1,100 such positions in the federal government.74 However,
Presidents do not always nominate, nor does the Senate always confirm,
candidates for these positions in a timely manner.75 By April 2018, fifteen months into his presidency, President Trump had nominated 589
candidates for key positions, compared with 734 by that same point under President Obama, 746 under President George W. Bush, and 734
under President Clinton.76 Halfway through President Trump’s presidency, sixty-three nominees had withdrawn their candidacies or seen

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
71 For example, the Department of Defense has increasingly relied on contractors. See, e.g.,
MARK F. CANCIAN, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD., U.S. MILITARY FORCES IN FY 2020:
SOF, CIVILIANS, CONTRACTORS, AND NUKES 9–10 (2019), https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/191024_Cancian_FY2020_OtherForces_v2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KG4A-RFN3].
72 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
73 While the Court has never defined the category of “principal” officers precisely, it has suggested that the category includes those not subject to removal by higher executive branch officials
(other than the President), who exercise broad duties and whose tenure is not temporary. See Free
Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 510 (2010); Edmond v. United States,
520 U.S. 651, 662–63 (1997); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671–72 (1988).
74 Anne Joseph O’Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency Positions, 82 S. CAL.
L. REV. 913, 917 (2009).
75 It is important not to conflate presidential failures to nominate with Senate failures to confirm.
76 Press Release, Senate Democrats, Special Report: How the Trump Administration and
Senate Republicans Are Responsible for Trump Administration Dysfunction (Apr. 25, 2018),
https://www.democrats.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SPECIAL%20REPORT%20How%20the
%20Trump%20Administration%20and%20Senate%20Republicans%20are%20Responsible%20for%20Trump%20Administration%20Dysfunction.pdf [https://perma.cc/H7B3-TWYF].
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their nominations pulled before confirmation — almost double the figure for the Obama Administration by the same point.77 As with staffing
shortages, it is not the failure to nominate in any one instance that matters, but its strategic and systematic use to weaken agency capacity.
Here, we discuss two effects of the failure to appoint: relying for extended periods on “acting” heads of executive branch agencies and depriving independent regulatory commissions of a quorum.
(a) Acting Officials. — When vacancies arise at executive agencies,78
Presidents may appoint acting officials pending the nomination and confirmation of more permanent officers.79 Presidents have increasingly
relied on acting officials to head agencies for at least some period of
time, but President Trump’s use of acting officials “has been far more
extensive and controversial than his predecessors’.”80 By early 2020,
acting officials in the Trump Administration had already served more
days, combined, than had acting officials in all eight years of the Obama
Administration, and by a significant margin.81
Substituting an acting official for one who is Senate confirmed is
sometimes necessary, of course. The Vacancies Act of 1868,82 most recently amended by the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, contemplates that vacancies will occur in high-level government posts and that
it can be beneficial to fill those posts on a temporary basis while waiting

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
77 Michael Collins, Donald Trump’s Picks for Administration Jobs Keep Dropping Out with John
Ratcliffe Latest to Go, USA TODAY (Aug. 2, 2019, 11:17 PM), https://www.
usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/06/17/from-heather-nauert-to-herman-cain-trumps-jobcandidates-keep-quitting/3758484002 [https://perma.cc/YX98-3UE6].
78 The Vacancies Act of 1868 does not apply to multimember commissions. 5 U.S.C. § 3349c(1).
79 Id. §§ 3345–3349d.
80 Anne Joseph O’Connell, Actings, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 613, 623 (2020).
81 See Aaron Blake, Trump’s Government Full of Temps, WASH. POST (Feb. 21, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/02/21/trump-has-had-an-acting-official-cabinetlevel-job-1-out-every-9-days [https://perma.cc/T3Z2-C6QS]; see also W. James Antle III, Opinion,
Trump’s Acting Troupe, WASH. EXAMINER (Apr. 26, 2019, 12:00 AM), https://www.
washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/trumps-acting-troupe [https://perma.cc/WA9N-JTQ3]. President
Trump emphasized that “I like acting because I can move so quickly. It gives me more flexibility.”
Brett Samuels, Trump Learns to Love Acting Officials, THE HILL (Apr. 14, 2019, 10:30 AM),
https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/438660-trump-learns-to-love-acting-officials
[https://perma.cc/8A9U-CJLN]; see also KATHRYN DUNN TENPAS, BROOKINGS INST.,
TRACKING TURNOVER IN THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION (2021), https://www.
brookings.edu/research/tracking-turnover-in-the-trump-administration
[https://perma.cc/PLA58KFC]. The Trump Administration has also had higher levels of turnover in cabinet-level posts
than any first-term elected administration in the past 100 years. Tamara Keith, Trump Cabinet
Turnover Sets Record Going Back 100 Years, NPR (Mar. 29, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://
www.npr.org/2018/03/19/594164065/trump-cabinet-turnover-sets-record-going-back-100-years
[https://perma.cc/W9GB-HZU3].
82 Act of July 23, 1868, ch. 227, 15 Stat. 168 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 3345–3349).
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for presidential nomination and Senate confirmation of a permanent replacement.83 During such vacancies, Presidents may generally assign
the responsibilities of the office to a senior officer or employee of the
same agency or to a Senate-confirmed officer serving in a different governmental position, subject to certain limitations.84 Acting officials can
have salutary effects — rejuvenating an agency after scandal or mismanagement, keeping an agency on track through presidential transition periods, or caretaking the agency when a senior official suddenly
must resign.85 Assigning leadership responsibilities to career civil servants during nomination or confirmation delays might also enhance
agency expertise.86
Yet, the President’s power to appoint acting officials also can be
abused to prevent the agency from executing its statutory duties. The
Vacancies Act does not contemplate acting officials remaining in place
perennially, yet Presidents sometimes press the statute’s limits.87
Agencies may function less well under acting officials for a variety of
reasons, including uncertainty about how long they will remain.88 While
some acting officials may have considerable sway with the White House,
not all will. Temporary heads may lack the “stature” to push back on
controversial actions by the White House, which is sometimes necessary
to defend the agency’s pursuit of its statutory obligations.89 The inferior
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
83 O’Connell, supra note 80, at 695, 700–01 (noting the potential benefits of continuity for agency
action, morale, stability, and stature).
84 Vacancies Act § 3345. There is a 210-day time limit on service as an acting officer, but that
period can be extended if there are nominations for the office pending before the Senate. Id. § 3346.
85 Professor Anne O’Connell argues that “[t]he costs of gaps in confirmed leadership may not be
as dire as the conventional wisdom suggests,” and she concludes that acting officials continue to
make important decisions and provide stability and continuity at the agency. O’Connell, supra note
80, at 699–702.
86 See Nina A. Mendelson, The Uncertain Effects of Senate Confirmation Delays in the
Agencies, 64 DUKE L.J. 1571, 1596–97 (2015); O’Connell, supra note 80, at 702.
87 See VALERIE C. BRANNON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44997, THE VACANCIES ACT: A
LEGAL OVERVIEW 13–14 (2021). For examples of the Trump Administration’s use of acting officials and the legal questions these uses raised, see L.M.-M. v. Cuccinelli, 442 F. Supp. 3d 1, 24–25
(D.D.C. 2020) (holding that President Trump’s appointment of Acting Director of United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services violated the text, structure, and purpose of the Federal
Vacancies Reform Act), judgment entered, No. CV 19-2676, 2020 WL 1905063 (D.D.C. Apr. 16,
2020), appeal dismissed, No. 20-5141, 2020 WL 5358686 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 25, 2020); Becca Damante,
At Least 15 Trump Officials Do Not Hold Their Positions Lawfully, JUST SEC. (Sept. 17, 2020),
https://www.justsecurity.org/72456/at-least-15-trump-officials-do-not-hold-their-positions-lawfully
[https://perma.cc/WDM9-SFN2]; Joel Rose, How Trump Has Filled High-Level Jobs Without
Senate Confirmation Votes, NPR (Mar. 9, 2020, 5:04 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/03/09/
813577462/how-trump-has-filled-high-level-jobs-without-senate-confirmation
[https://perma.cc/
8V8G-PJPN].
88 See O’Connell, supra note 80, at 698 & n.461 (citing PAUL C. LIGHT, BROOKINGS INST., A
CASCADE OF FAILURES: WHY GOVERNMENT FAILS, AND HOW TO STOP IT 16–19 (2014)) (observing that “vacancies and delays” contributed to eight of forty-one examples of agency failure studied).
89 Id. at 696–97 (citing example of Pentagon acting head’s failure to push back on Trump
Administration’s holdup of aid to Ukraine); see also Wesley Morgan, Trump’s Ukraine Holdup Hit
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designation of “acting” also may undermine the ability of these officials
to drive the agency’s agenda forward in Congress and influence important interagency and cabinet-level debates.
The former Inspector General (IG) of the Department of Homeland
Security identified the shortcomings of temporary “actings” when he testified before Congress in 2019 that “the nature and extent of senior leadership vacancies in the Department . . . significantly hamper the
Department’s ability to carry out its all-important mission.”90 He noted
that acting officials “are simply in a caretaker role and are justifiably
hesitant to make decisions that would tie the hands of the individual
ultimately appointed to that position” and that presidential appointees
are “better able to represent the Department’s interests in interagency
coordination” because they are seen as more legitimate.91
As with all of our examples, any one instance of failing to nominate
agency leadership and relying on acting officials for a time might easily
be explained. But a persistent failure to name critical officers to key
agency posts across the government for extended periods of time is more
troubling and suggests something is awry. A President might rely on
acting officials temporarily to energize or reform agencies, but it seems
more likely that a President wanting agencies to actively pursue their
statutory mandates would try to equip them with Senate-confirmed
leaders.
(b) Commission Vacancies. — Nearly all of the so-called independent agencies in the federal government are headed by commissions or
boards rather than single individuals.92 While there are multiple features that make agencies more or less independent from White House
influence, the primary feature identified by scholars is whether agency
heads are removable at will by the President.93 The President lacks the
ability to remove independent commissioners without cause, but he may
nominate new members to fill vacancies, and he generally names the
commission chair.94
In some cases, Presidents may be slow to fill these vacancies, which
can interfere with agency operations to the extent that commissions require a quorum to act. Quorum requirements vary by commission. For
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
a Rudderless Pentagon, POLITICO (Sept. 25, 2019, 6:24 PM), https://www.
politico.com/news/2019/09/25/trump-ukraine-military-aid-pentagon-000679
[https://perma.cc/
LNT5-CWSF].
90 Trouble at the Top, supra note 42, at 1 (statement of John Roth, Former Inspector General,
Department of Homeland Security).
91 Id. at 4–5.
92 Seila L. LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2201–02 (2020).
93 See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design,
89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 15 (2010) (noting that discussions of independent agencies hinge on this factor
as well as their multimember structure and their exemption from centralized regulatory review).
94 See Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE L.J. 257, 265.
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example, the Federal Election Commission (FEC) needs at least four
commissioners for most policymaking and enforcement actions.95 The
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) may issue decisions
with three of its five members.96 A few commissions can operate with
smaller quorums.97
For the first time in its history, FERC operated without a quorum
for six months in 2017.98 The FEC, whose duties include investigating
allegations of campaign finance violations, was also without a quorum
from September 2019 until May 2020.99 The Senate surely bears some
responsibility for this problem, since President Trump had nominated
one commissioner, Trey Trainor, in September 2017. However, the
President had nominated no other candidates.100 Thus, even after
Trainor’s confirmation in May 2020, when another FEC commissioner
resigned in June, the Commission was again without power to act.
Commissions with multiple vacancies are also more likely to lose
their quorums if a commissioner must recuse herself from a particular
decision. For example, FERC, which oversees wholesale electricity
markets, was unable to vote on a controversial regulatory filing by a
regional grid operator in August 2019 because two of its four members
had recused themselves.101 Commissions can take some steps to protect
decisionmaking authority in the event of a loss of quorum by redefining
quorum rules or delegating particular decisions to staff, but these authorities are limited.102
The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) is another example of an agency that has been disabled by Presidents failing
to nominate appointees. The independent agency — established in 2004
by the 9/11 Commission to help ensure that the executive branch’s coun–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
95 52 U.S.C. § 30106(c); see also CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45160, FEDERAL ELECTION
COMMISSION: MEMBERSHIP AND POLICYMAKING QUORUM, IN BRIEF 7 (2020).
96 42 U.S.C. § 7171(e).
97 The SEC amended its quorum requirements by regulation in the 1990s to allow fewer than
three members to constitute a quorum if there are fewer than three members in office. 17 C.F.R.
§ 200.41 (2019).
98 Devin Henry, Energy Commission Swears in New Members, Regains Quorum, THE HILL
(Aug. 10, 2017, 12:10 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/346048-ferc-swears-innew-members-regains-quorum [https://perma.cc/RX4M-C7TK].
99 See Kate Ackley, FEC Set to Lose Its Quorum Again, ROLL CALL (June 26, 2020, 3:31 PM),
https://www.rollcall.com/2020/06/26/fec-set-to-lose-its-quorum-again
[https://perma.cc/32YKPVXQ]; Dave Levinthal, Prepare to Be Shocked! Trump’s One Weird Trick to Avoid a Campaign
Investigation., CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Jan. 13, 2020), https://publicintegrity.org/
politics/trump-fec-campaign-election-quorum-pascrell [https://perma.cc/TNK6-3ZBQ].
100 Ackley, supra note 99.
101 Rod Kuckro, Lack of FERC Quorum Prompts Market Changes, E&E NEWS (Aug. 7, 2019),
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060870495 [https://perma.cc/L89Z-NPDS].
102 See Ryan J. Levan, Note, Do We Have a Quorum?: Anticipating Agency Vacancies and the
Prospect for Judicial Remedy, 48 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 181, 219–20 (2015).
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terterrorism efforts consider individual rights — reviews national security legislation, regulations, and policy; advises the executive branch;
and compels agencies to produce documents and undergo investigation.103 President Obama took nearly two years to name nominees, despite the statutory requirement that the President appoint members in a
timely manner.104 The PCLOB did not begin work until August 2012
and became fully operational only the following May when a Chair was
confirmed.105
PCLOB’s operational status was short lived; the Chair unexpectedly
resigned in 2016, and three part-time members resigned.106 The
PCLOB President Trump inherited had only one member by March
2017, far short of the full-time Chair and four additional members required by the Agency’s enabling statute.107 Without the statutory
quorum of three members, the PCLOB could not initiate new investigations, offer formal advice to the intelligence community, submit reports
to Congress, or hold public meetings.108 Since even public reports require majority approval to be released, the PCLOB could not release
information from concluded investigations, such as the long-awaited
study of surveillance and intelligence powers authorized by the Reaganera Executive Order 12,333.109 That report was not released until April
2021 — six years after the study began.110 Additionally, PCLOB was
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
103 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee(c)–(d); David P. Fidler, Is the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight
Board Back in Business?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. BLOG (Sept. 11, 2017, 10:53 AM),
https://www.cfr.org/blog/privacy-and-civil-liberties-oversight-board-back-business
[https://perma.cc/5MLU-VVFF]; see also Declan McCullagh, Obama Privacy Board Gets Members
After Two Years, CNET (Dec. 16, 2010, 3:57 PM), https://www.cnet.com/tech/services-andsoftware/obama-privacy-board-gets-members-after-two-years [https://perma.cc/UQJ8-M6XL]; Jay
Stanley, What Powers Does the Civil Liberties Oversight Board Have?, ACLU (Nov. 4, 2013, 9:28
AM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/privacy-and-surveillance/what-powers-doescivil-liberties-oversight-board [https://perma.cc/77F7-FT8U].
104 See Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 11053, § 801, 121 Stat. 266, 357; Andrea Peterson, Key Government Privacy Watchdog Muzzled During
Surveillance Debate, SLATE (June 26, 2017, 7:30 AM), https://slate.com/technology/2017/06/trumphasnt-appointed-anyone-to-a-privacy-oversight-board.html [https://perma.cc/3P93-3VHW]; see
also McCullagh, supra note 103.
105 See Fidler, supra note 103.
106 See id.; Jenna McLaughlin, Top Privacy Watchdog Suddenly Resigns, THE INTERCEPT
(Mar. 29, 2016, 11:14 AM), https://www.theintercept.com/2016/03/29/top-privacy-watchdogsuddenly-resigns [https://perma.cc/6547-JFYP].
107 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee(h)(1).
108 Jenna McLaughlin, The U.S. Government’s Privacy Watchdog Is Basically Dead, Emails
Reveal, THE INTERCEPT (Mar. 3, 2017, 2:24 PM), https://theintercept.com/2017/03/03/thegovernments-privacy-watchdog-is-basically-dead-emails-reveal [https://perma.cc/D25V-JCEV].
109 Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981); see also Peterson, supra note 104.
110 Jacob Schulz, PCLOB Releases Public Report on Executive Order 12333, LAWFARE (Apr. 5,
2021, 11:17 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/pclob-releases-public-report-executive-order-12333
[https://perma.cc/26F7-5XMW].
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unable to hire any new staff since only the Chair had hiring
authority.111
President Trump’s failure to fill PCLOB vacancies stymied the
Agency’s ability to contribute promptly to the surveillance debate and
left it “essentially paralyzed.”112 The delay prevented timely release of
the Executive Order 12,333 report, debilitated the Agency from serving
as a watchdog on the country’s counterterrorism operations, and frustrated privacy protections related to European and U.S. data.113
President Trump did not nominate a chair until September 2017114 or
announce nominations for two part-time vacancies until August of the
following year.115 Intentionally opting not to staff the Agency may have
done enduring damage, tarnishing the PCLOB’s reputation as a “credible evaluator of key surveillance programs.”116
Certainly, Presidents enjoy virtually unconstrained latitude under
the Appointments Clause to nominate their preferred appointees, and
the order and timing of those nominations, we recognize, must be managed by a busy White House. Yet persistent failures to nominate that
in fact prevent an agency from doing the business assigned to it by statute do seem to thwart congressional design. So, while periodic and temporary staffing shortfalls seem to us both inevitable and relatively innocuous, intentionally failing to staff as a strategy of incapacitation is
something altogether different.117
3. Structural Changes to Staffing Mechanisms. — Presidents can
impede an agency’s ability to hire or backfill staff by weakening the
agencies responsible for overseeing the staffing process. With over 1,000
federal positions requiring nomination and confirmation and over two
million full-time federal employees, Presidents cannot single-handedly
manage federal employment. Instead, they rely on agencies for support.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
111
112
113

Peterson, supra note 104.
Id. (quoting Senator Ron Wyden, Democrat of Oregon).
See Cameron F. Kerry, It’s Time for the Senate to Act on PCLOB Nominations, LAWFARE
(Aug. 27, 2018, 9:08 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/its-time-senate-act-pclob-nominations
[https://perma.cc/FNV7-W9FK]. Democratic members of the House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence implored President Trump to nominate candidates to fill the open seats. Press
Release, U.S. House of Reps. Permanent Select Comm. on Intel., Intelligence Committee Democrats
Send Letter to President Asking for Nomination of PCLOB Members (July 28, 2017), https://
intelligence.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=255
[https://perma.cc/333QQTCJ]. The European Commission called for the “swift appointment of . . . missing members,”
with the European Parliament also weighing in. Kerry, supra.
114 See David Hoffman & Riccardo Masucci, One PCLOB Nomination to Applaud and Three
More to Urge, LAWFARE (Sept. 14, 2017, 3:49 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/one-pclobnomination-applaud-and-three-more-urge [https://perma.cc/ATK5-TAFE].
115 See Kerry, supra note 113.
116 Id. (quoting Adam Klein, Chairman nominee, PCLOB).
117 To be clear, our argument applies regardless of how we might personally feel about the value
of an agency’s work. As long as Congress has created it and assigned it regulatory tasks, the
President should not be able to prevent it from functioning through a wholesale failure to nominate.
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The Presidential Personnel Office (PPO) sources potential nominees
and conducts background diligence.118 The Office of Personnel
Management recruits, hires, and manages federal employees.119 A third
agency, the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), hears employee
appeals.120 Weakening these agencies can therefore indirectly weaken
staffing across government.
At the start of the Trump Administration, the PPO employed just
thirty staff — less than one-third the level of prior administrations. In
addition, most of the office’s employees were inexperienced, again in
contrast to earlier administrations.121 While there may be alternative
explanations for this understaffing — for example, that the incoming
Administration did not believe it would win the presidential election —
the possibility remains that destaffing was a conscious strategy.
President Trump sought to eliminate the OPM entirely and scatter its
employees among other agencies.122 When this effort failed, the

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
118 The PPO recruits and vets candidates for thousands of federal government jobs, including
those requiring Senate confirmation. Robert O’Harrow Jr. & Shawn Boburg, Behind the Chaos:
Office that Vets Trump Appointees Plagued by Inexperience, WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/behind-the-chaos-office-that-vets-trumpappointees-plagued-by-inexperience/2018/03/30/cde31a1a-28a3-11e8-ab19-06a445a08c94_
story.html [https://perma.cc/JY8J-X557].
119 About, U.S. OFF. OF PERS. MGMT., https://www.opm.gov/about-us [https://perma.cc/X6SS7UT6].
120 About MSPB, U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., https://www.mspb.gov/About/about.htm
[https://perma.cc/48A7-K29Y].
121 Professor James Pfiffner at George Mason University reports that, in the past, the PPO has
been staffed by senior officials with relevant experience. O’Harrow & Boburg, supra note 118. In
February 2020, the Administration hired a college senior to serve as the PPO’s director of operations. Daniel Lippman & Meridith McGraw, A New Senior Leader at the White House Personnel
Office: A College Senior, POLITICO (Feb. 25, 2020, 10:55 PM), https://www.
politico.com/news/2020/02/25/college-senior-white-house-personnel-office-117493 [https://perma.cc/
JT8Z-ZU7E].
122 Lisa Rein, Trump Wants to Kill This Federal Agency. Democrats Blasted the Idea., WASH.
POST (May 21, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-wants-to-kill-this-federalagency-democrats-blasted-the-idea/2019/05/21/67f6b978-7b18-11e9-a5b3-34f3edf1351e_story.html
[https://perma.cc/6BMB-8R6J]. Congress opposed the elimination of the Agency, which would have
required legislation. This example demonstrates not only the occasional success of congressional
backstop authority in checking structural deregulation but also the fact that Presidents stymied by
Congress in their efforts to shrink the bureaucracy may turn to the alternative strategies laid out in
this Part to achieve their goal.
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Administration outsourced OPM’s tasks to other agencies through interagency agreements,123 and an acting head led the OPM for more than
half of President Trump’s term.124
Presidents can also hasten staff departures by weakening civil service protections. In 2019, the MSPB was left without a single member.125 Before that, the Board had operated with one member, and
therefore without a quorum, since January 2017.126 President Trump
did not nominate any new candidates to serve on the Board until
2018.127 By the end of 2019, thousands of cases were pending before the
Board.128 Compounding the problem, the Trump Administration took
the position that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Lucia v. SEC129 makes
the decisions of the administrative judges who staff the Board reversible.130 Because there are no Board members in place to cure any procedural defects in these judges’ appointments, the cases they hear
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
123 See Adam Mazmanian, What if Congress Doesn’t Want to Move OPM?, FED. COMPUT. WK.
(May 15, 2019), https://www.fcw.com/articles/2019/05/15/opm-reorg-congress-plans.aspx [https://
perma.cc/NTA9-4GYU] (citing the OPM’s acting head Margaret Weichert’s comments that if a
legislative solution could not be found, OPM could enter into interagency agreements to outsource
work to the General Services Administration and other agencies).
124 See Jessie Bur, Government Personnel Office Abruptly Loses Its Top Official, FED. TIMES
(Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.federaltimes.com/management/leadership/2020/03/17/governmentpersonnel-office-abruptly-loses-its-top-official [https://perma.cc/5WFN-2VMY]. A report by the
National Academy of Public Administration cited the absence of sustained leadership as an impediment to execution of OPM’s mission. JANET HALE ET AL., NAT’ L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN.,
ELEVATING HUMAN CAPITAL: REFRAMING THE U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MANAGEMENT’S
LEADERSHIP
IMPERATIVE
20
(2021),
https://s3.us-west-2.
amazonaws.com/napa-2021/studies/united-states-office-of-personnel-management-independentassessment/OPM-Final-Report-National-Academy-of-Public-Administration.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8269-T42D].
125 Ben L. Erdreich & Steven L. Katz, Opinion, The Federal Merit System Keeps Our Democracy
Safe. Trump and the Senate Are Killing Its Guardian., WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-federal-merit-system-keeps-our-democracy-safe-trumpand-the-senate-are-killing-its-guardian/2019/02/12/d1984726-2f0e-11e9-8ad3-9a5b113ecd3c_story.html
[https://perma.cc/GKF4-5JMJ]. President Trump had appointed the sole remaining member of the
Board to a secondary role as acting general counsel to OPM in late 2018, a step some described as
creating a conflict of interest between OPM and the Board, which reviews OPM rules. See id.
126 See id.
127 Nicole Ogrysko, Trump Names Long-Awaited Second Member to MSPB, FED. NEWS
NETWORK (Mar. 6, 2018, 6:21 PM), https://federalnewsnetwork.com/all-news/2018/03/trumpnames-long-awaited-second-member-to-mspb [https://perma.cc/EE5Y-Y9LW].
128 Nicole Ogrysko, Lack of Quorum Hits 3-Year Mark at MSPB, with No Clear End in Sight,
FED. NEWS NETWORK (Jan. 24, 2020, 11:31 AM), https://federalnewsnetwork.com/
workforce/2020/01/lack-of-quorum-hits-3-year-mark-at-mspb-with-no-clear-end-in-sight [https://
perma.cc/7F3Y-3ZAB].
129 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).
130 See Eric Katz, New Trump Administration Strategy Leaves Fired Feds Seeking Recourse in
Indefinite Purgatory, GOV’T EXEC. (Sept. 2, 2020), https://www.govexec.com/
workforce/2020/09/new-trump-administration-strategy-leaves-fired-feds-seeking-recourseindefinite-purgatory/168201 [https://perma.cc/Z9SX-LHXW]. In Lucia, the Court held that the
SEC’s administrative law judges (ALJs) were inferior officers subject to appointment by the President, the courts of law, or the heads of department. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2049. Because they had
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remain open to retrospective challenge. The decline of the MSPB will,
at best, create insecurity among federal employees.131 At worst, it will
allow unlawful thinning of their ranks.
Manipulating agency staff is an appealing tool of structural deregulation because Presidents can do it quite informally, without much legal
procedure, and outside of the normal and transparent budget process in
which Congress sets agency funding levels. In some cases, these presidential maneuvers will attract public scrutiny, but not always. Weakening an agency’s staff can be highly effective because it can impair the
agency’s ability to act across many policy domains simultaneously. And
because it is harder to rebuild than to destroy agency capacity, these
steps can be “sticky” and quite burdensome to reverse.
B. Other Resources
Agencies require other forms of support beyond staffing, including
office space, technology, and supplies.
The General Services
Administration (GSA), a little-known but powerful agency, is responsible for procurement and real estate for the federal government.132 There
have been some complaints about procurement policy in past administrations.133 In theory, a President could try to starve agencies of these
resources or create hurdles to procuring what they need.
Most important, however, is an agency’s budget. Much of the budget
process is highly transparent. The President proposes an annual budget,
which Congress considers when appropriating agency funding. Yet even
when Congress rejects the President’s budget proposals, he can manipulate agency budgets outside of the normal appropriations process.
Professor Eloise Pasachoff identifies several “levers” by which the
President controls agency spending of allocated funds.134 First, OMB
can limit what portion of their appropriations agencies can spend by
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
not been so appointed, their decisions could be overturned. Id. at 2055. The SEC subsequently
cured the procedural defect by formally appointing all of their ALJs. See In re: Pending Administrative Proceedings, Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 10,440, Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Release No. 82,178, Investment Advisers Act of 1940 Release No. 4816, Investment Company Act
of 1940 Release No. 32,929, 2017 SEC LEXIS 3724 (Nov. 30, 2017).
131 See Erdreich & Katz, supra note 125 (“If federal employees can’t trust that they’ll get jobs
based on their qualifications or be able to do their work impartially, they may leave government,
or even decline to pursue federal jobs in the first place.”).
132 U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., 2018 AGENCY FINAL REPORT 14–15 (2018),
https://www.gsa.gov/cdnstatic/2018-GSA_AFR-508_v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/M76F-GX2S].
133 See Maria Ernita T. Joaquin, Agency Strategy, Strength, and Adaptation: Implementation of
the Bush Administration’s Competitive Sourcing Policy 174 (July 1, 2007) (Ph.D. dissertation,
Northern Illinois University) (ProQuest).
134 Indeed, one of Pasachoff’s recommendations is that the President exert greater control over
the Resource Management Offices’ activities through executive orders, “thereby claiming ownership of it,” in order to enhance transparency about their operations. Eloise Pasachoff, The
President’s Budget as a Source of Agency Policy Control, 125 YALE L.J. 2182, 2193 (2016).
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time period or by project.135 OMB may attach conditions to spending
on particular projects in “apportionment footnotes.”136 Finally, OMB
may also block requests by an agency to transfer appropriated funds
between programs (which requires congressional approval).137 These
behind-the-scenes controls can be used to starve particular programs of
funds appropriated by Congress.
Of course, once Congress appropriates money for an agency or particular agency programs, Presidents generally may not refuse outright to
spend that money for the specified purpose. The Congressional Budget
and Impoundment Control Act of 1974,138 promulgated in the wake of
perceived agency spending abuse by President Nixon, prohibits refusals
to spend unless certain conditions are met.139 Nixon was not the first
President to impound a share of congressional appropriations, but he
took the practice to new levels, refusing to spend a greater share of allocated funds than prior Presidents, and with the express aim of terminating programs he did not support and frustrating congressional policy
goals with which he disagreed.140
While Congress has tried to curb such practices, Presidents continue
to push the limits of their authority.141 Where Congress has not limited
appropriations with adequate specificity, for example, a President may

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
135 Id. at 2228. This limitation is consistent with the Antideficiency Act requirement that agencies spread out appropriated funds over time. See 31 U.S.C. § 1512(a).
136 Pasachoff, supra note 134, at 2229. One example Pasachoff cites is requiring agencies to
answer lengthy questionnaires before OMB releases quarterly apportionments to the agency. Id. at
2229 n.209 (citing SHELLEY LYNNE TOMKIN, INSIDE OMB: POLITICS AND PROCESS IN THE
PRESIDENT’S BUDGET OFFICE 187 (1998)).
137 Id. at 2231.
138 Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 and 31 U.S.C.).
139 Id. § 1012, 88 Stat. at 334 (allowing Presidents to defer spending until the end of a fiscal year
provided that they submit a special deferral notice to Congress identifying the amount and duration
of, and reasons for, the proposed deferral).
140 See LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER 175–201 (2015) (discussing
President Nixon’s impoundment tactics); Nixon Impounds Pollution Funds: Withholds 3-Billion
Allocated for Treatment of Waste–Cites Inflation Peril, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1974, at A1. President
Nixon claimed that Presidents possess the constitutional authority not to spend congressional appropriations “when the spending of money would mean either increasing prices or increasing taxes
for all the people.” See Impoundment: Changes During the Nixon Administration, LAW LIBR.:
AM. L. & LEGAL INFO., https://law.jrank.org/pages/7517/Impoundment-Changes-During-NixonAdministration.html [https://perma.cc/3ED6-EPGN].
141 See infra section III.B, pp. 642–48.
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have a plausible argument that such monies are fungible.142 And enforcement of the Impoundment Control Act is difficult.143
Presidents may also exploit their discretion to transfer appropriations
to preferred programs. Under the Constitution, “[n]o Money shall be
Drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made
by law.”144 Again, however, Presidents can seek ways around this limitation. For example, the Trump Administration diverted billions of dollars from Defense Department programs in order to fund construction
of a border wall between the United States and Mexico.145 This action
redirected funding from the Department of Defense’s Overseas
Contingency Operations, from the Army’s budget for tactical and support vehicles, from the Navy’s combat aircraft and amphibious ships
budgets, from the Air Force’s aircraft program, and from the National
Guard’s reserve equipment funds.146 The Ninth Circuit ruled the funding transfers unconstitutional, but a Supreme Court stay allowed the
construction to proceed.147 In another example, the Administration diverted close to $10 million in funds from the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) to fund U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) operations.148 Major redirections of funds do not
suffer from some of the same problems of transparency or accountability
that accompany other forms of structural deregulation. Nevertheless,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
142 See, e.g., Zachary Price, Can President Trump Defund the WHO?, AM. CONST. SOC’Y (June
1, 2020), https://www.acslaw.org/expertforum/can-president-trump-defund-the-who [https://perma.
cc/M36K-K3LP] (arguing that, because Congress appropriated money in a lump sum for dues payments to international organizations, the Trump Administration could lawfully cease to pay World
Health Organization dues).
143 See Wm. Bradford Middlekauff, Note, Twisting the President’s Arm: The Impoundment
Control Act as a Tool for Enforcing the Principle of Appropriation Expenditure, 100 YALE L.J. 209,
216–17, 220, 223 (1990).
144 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
145 The Administration was required to notify Congress of this diversion, which it did, observing
that the diversion was for “higher priority items” related to “Counter-Drug Activity” and was “necessary in the national interest.” DEP’T OF DEF., NO. FY 20-01 RA, SUPPORT FOR DHS
COUNTER-DRUG ACTIVITY REPROGRAMMING ACTION (Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.
documentcloud.org/documents/6776019-FY-20–01-RA-Support-for-DHS-Counter-DrugActivity.html [https://perma.cc/2RCW-J8B8].
146 Id. To do so, the President declared a national emergency at the southern border and argued
that this justified use of the funds to block drug smuggling corridors. Proclamation No. 9844, 84
Fed. Reg. 4949 (Feb. 15, 2019); Fact Sheets: President Donald J. Trump Stands by His Declaration
of a National Emergency on Our Southern Border, THE WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 15, 2019),
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-standsdeclaration-national-emergency-southern-border [https://perma.cc/ANA3-H2U2].
147 See Trump v. Sierra Club, 140 S. Ct. 2620, 2620 (2020).
148 Isaac Stanley-Becker, Trump Administration Diverted Nearly $10 Million from FEMA to ICE
Detention Program, According to DHS Document, WASH. POST (Sept. 12, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2018/09/12/document-shows-the-trumpadministration-diverted-nearly-10-million-from-fema-to-ice-detention-program [https://perma.cc/
B2DK-6C8E].
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redirection can be used to starve programs of resources in ways that are
time-consuming to reverse.
There are, in sum, several ways a President can at least temporarily
deprive agencies of appropriated funds, divert those funds, and create
obstacles to agencies accessing resources allocated to them. These approaches may be more or less transparent, and some may even be subject to judicial review. When taken together, however, they demonstrate
how much discretion the President retains over agency budgets. That
discretion can be used not only to bolster preferred agencies and programs but also to deny disfavored agencies and programs the funds necessary to accomplish their delegated tasks. Inadequate budgets can operate in tandem with other techniques of structural deregulation,
undermining agency morale, for example, or weakening agency capacity
to provide important services.149
Presidents and their political appointees can also divert existing
agency resources from core responsibilities by creating busywork to occupy agency staff. This is an even subtler form of structural deregulation, one that is hard to track and virtually impossible to challenge. This
“overtasking” can sap an agency’s limited resources. Professor Cass
Sunstein has argued that the federal government should audit and mitigate what he calls “sludge” — paperwork and other burdens that can
reduce the public’s access to important government goods such as licenses and benefits.150 But the government is burdened with “sludge”
too.
Agencies must comply with a wide variety of statutory paperwork
requirements, including, for example, responding to requests for information under the Freedom of Information Act.151 They must also produce reports, analysis, and testimony in response to congressional oversight requests. And they routinely generate information for various
White House offices — including Legislative Affairs, the National
Economic Council, the Press Office, and OMB, among others — as
needed, to support the administration’s pursuit of its legislative and regulatory agenda, and to explain and defend their policy actions.152 But
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
149 See Jory Heckman, Ahead of Filing Season, Decade of IRS Budget Cuts “Taking a Toll” on
Workforce Morale, FED. NEWS NETWORK (Jan. 24, 2020, 1:21 PM), https://www.
federalnewsnetwork.com/workforce/2020/01/ahead-of-filing-season-decade-of-irs-budget-cutstaking-a-toll-on-workforce-morale [https://perma.cc/NU58-R6XY].
150 See Cass R. Sunstein, Sludge and Ordeals, 16 DUKE L.J. 1843, 1847 (2019).
151 See, e.g., David E. Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act,
165 U. PA. L. REV. 1097, 1124 (2017) (noting that FOIA imposes “diversion costs” in that it distracts
employees from focusing on an agency’s substantive mission).
152 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 710(a) (requiring the Commissioner of the Rehabilitation Services
Administration to submit reports to the President); id. § 781(a)(3), (8), (b)(1)–(2) (outlining the duties
of the National Council on Disability to advise and report to the President); H.R. 3126, 111th Cong.
§ 117(a) (2009) (requiring the Consumer Financial Protection Agency to prepare and submit reports
to the Congress). Agencies must also furnish their plans for both short- and long-term regulatory
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on top of these routine requirements, Presidents and their appointees
can heap additional burdens on agencies that can overwhelm them and
distract them from legitimate regulatory work.
First, moving offices and reassigning personnel, in addition to potentially inducing resignations of key staff, as discussed above, also creates
busywork for remaining agency staff. Interfering with agency budgets
(also mentioned above) likewise consumes scarce agency resources, requiring agency officials to spend time protesting to OMB, other senior
White House officials, or members of Congress, to have their funds
restored.
In addition, the White House can use centralized regulatory oversight to impose substantial analytic burdens on agencies that are not
required by their statutes, and which sometimes appear to conflict with
them.153 White House review of agency regulatory proposals under
Executive Order 12,866 and related executive orders can involve repeated demands for additional analysis to support an agency’s alreadydetailed regulatory impact analysis, in what can feel to agency officials
like an endless loop of information requests.154 Likewise, the requirement that agencies retrospectively review their old rules to evaluate their
continued relevance and effectiveness, while sensible-sounding on its
face, in practice can distract agencies from more immediate priorities,
including statutory and court-imposed deadlines.155 These burdens can
create significant additional work for agencies, with only questionable
incremental value.
There is a robust and longstanding debate about the practical and
political value of such regulatory review requirements, and it can be
difficult to distinguish between instances when they exemplify “good
governance” and when they may cross the line into tools of delay and
obstruction. Yet the voluminous literature on the regulatory review process, which covers both Democratic and Republican administrations,

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
actions to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, which annually publishes a Unified
Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions, which lists the planned actions by agency. See
About the Unified Agenda, OFF. OF INFO. & REGUL. AFFS., https://www.reginfo.gov/
public/jsp/eAgenda/UA_About.myjsp [https://perma.cc/D5PM-Q998].
153 For example, under Executive Order 12,866, the EPA must produce a cost-benefit analysis of
Clean Air Act provisions that the Supreme Court has held prohibit consideration of cost. Whitman
v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 471 (2001).
154 See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, Inside EPA: A Former Insider’s Reflections on the Relationship
Between the Obama EPA and the Obama White House, 31 PACE ENV’T L. REV. 325, 340, 359, 361
(2014).
155 See, e.g., Press Release, Delaney Parrish, Ctr. for Effective Gov’t, Federal Agencies Release
Retrospective Reviews: Preliminary Plans Appear Reasonable, But Proof Will Be Final Product
(May 26, 2011), https://www.foreffectivegov.org/node/11683 [http://perma.cc/T3Z2-ZV8R] (“[T]he
more agencies look back the less they will be able to look forward.”).
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makes clear that the line can be crossed.156 In the hands of a determined
President, centralized review undoubtedly could be used to stymie
agency action to a sufficient extent that we would consider it evidence
of structural deregulation.
A final example of busywork consists of ministerial tasks that appear
to serve little purpose other than chewing up agency time. To offer one
example, during the Trump Administration, Acting Director Mick
Mulvaney required a new name and seal for the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau; the Bureau’s new name was to be the “Bureau for
Consumer Financial Protection.”157 The Agency already had spent tens
of millions of dollars promoting its previous acronym.158 Nevertheless,
Acting Director Mulvaney insisted upon the change and tasked about a
dozen staffers with serving on a “Name Correction Working Group.”159
We are not suggesting that an agency name change is always busywork;
when the General Accounting Office became the Government
Accountability Office (GAO), there was a rationale, which was to align
the name of the Agency with the full set of professional tasks it performs,
which go beyond accounting — and in any event, Congress ordered that
change.160 But Acting Director Mulvaney’s proffered reason for simply
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
156 Compare Heinzerling, supra note 154, at 325–27 (criticizing the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) for stalling EPA policymaking), with Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary,
The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838,
1840 (2013) (defending OIRA). See also Christina Reichert, Debate over OIRA’s Virtues and Vices
Continues, REGUL. REV. (June 26, 2013), https://www.theregreview.org/2013/06/26/26-reichertoira-virtues-vices [https://perma.cc/9Z7Y-8WTR] (summarizing the larger debate).
157 See O’Harrow et al., supra note 58.
158 Id. One report projected that the name change could cost the Agency up to $19 million.
Sylvan Lane, Consumer Bureau Name Change Could Cost Firms $300 Million, THE HILL (Dec. 3,
2018, 4:44 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/finance/419527-exclusive-consumer-bureau-analysis-saysname-change-could-cost-firms-300 [https://perma.cc/58HY-JSML].
159 O’Harrow et al., supra note 58.
160 See GAO Human Capital Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-271, 118 Stat. 811 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code); Government Accountability Office: What’s in a
Name?, WATCHBLOG (Apr. 4, 2014), https://www.gao.gov/blog/2014/04/04/governmentaccountability-office-whats-in-a-name [https://perma.cc/47AK-WBHR] (explaining the motivation
behind the name change). Similarly, early in his presidency, Joe Biden signed an executive order
establishing his climate change and environmental protection policies broadly, which, among other
things, directed the Attorney General to consider changing the name of its existing Environment
and Natural Resources Division to the Environmental Justice and Natural Resources Division.
Exec. Order No. 14,008, 86 Fed. Reg. 7619, 7631 (Jan. 27, 2021); see also Ellen M. Gilmer, Biden
Bolsters DOJ Focus on Environmental Justice, Climate (3), BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 27, 2021, 3:53
PM), https://www.news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-and-energy/biden-bolsters-doj-focus-onenvironmental-justice-climate [https://perma.cc/6XQU-F7J3] (describing the executive order). The
purpose of the request, as the executive order made clear, was to signal the importance of environmental justice to the Administration, which had pledged to prioritize enforcing environmental
protection laws in minority communities that (as has been empirically shown) have suffered disproportionate environmental harms. The same executive order also directed the Attorney General to
consider adding an office “to coordinate environmental justice activities among Department of
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reordering the words in the CFPB’s name — aligning the Bureau’s
name more closely with the one used in its authorizing legislation —
strikes us as more suspect since the statute, in fact, uses both names.161
Officials at the CFPB during the Trump Administration also complained about being “bogged down with what they considered makework” more broadly, including being directed to author detailed memos
to justify their cases and programs, which took hundreds of hours to
complete.162 Naturally, some work of this kind is unavoidable in any
bureaucracy — as anyone who has worked in an agency will attest.
New administrations are entitled to ask agency staff for explanatory
memos, certainly. Yet there is a point at which such exercises, on any
fair measure, are overkill, and serve no other purpose than chewing up
time that could otherwise be devoted to statutory tasks.
We
acknowledge that this determination is something one can assess only
by taking the full context into account, but it ought to be possible to do
so. Such efforts to bog agencies down may occasionally come to light,
as with the CFPB name change incident, but many other examples
might evade public scrutiny. And while assigning busywork may be
relatively easy for an incoming President to stop doing, the lost time
cannot be recouped.
C. Agency Expertise
A key premise of our argument, as noted above, is that some questions assigned by Congress to administrative agencies require expertise
and technocractic knowledge, which nonexpert political appointees typically do not possess. While we recognize that most agency decisions
are the product of policy preference as well as expertise, the fact remains
that agencies must make expert judgments of various kinds in order to
execute statutory commands. Agencies simply cannot set air pollution
limits “requisite to protect the public health,” for instance, without the
support of epidemiologists;163 regulate energy markets to ensure rates
are “just and reasonable” without detailed economic analyses;164 or approve new drugs to ensure they are “safe and effective” without evaluating data from clinical trials.165 Moreover, established precedent
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Justice components and United States Attorneys’ Offices nationwide,” and established an interagency working group on environmental justice and a White House advisory group on environmental justice. See Exec. Order No. 14,008, 86 Fed. Reg. at 7629–31.
161 See O’Harrow et al., supra note 58.
162 Id.
163 See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1).
164 See 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a).
165 See 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(2)(B). While critics of delegation may bemoan Congress’s unwillingness to set numerical standards itself in such cases, delegations both broad and narrow are a fact of
modern governance and one we do not contest here.

616

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 135:585

requires that agencies conform their actions to available evidence.166
Statutes often explicitly require agencies to perform specific analyses or
assessments that assume the availability of relevant expertise.167
As discussed above, manipulating agency staffing levels is an important tool of presidential control. So too are steps a President can take
to undermine the agency expertise that is foundational to the modern
regulatory enterprise.168 A President is entitled to disagree with experts
about how to weigh “incommensurables under conditions of uncertainty,”169 and certainly may introduce policy considerations into regulatory decisionmaking where a statute so allows,170 but it is fundamentally different to disable the agency’s capacity to reduce uncertainty and
calibrate the relevant tradeoffs in its assigned domain, especially when
the agency’s authorizing statute contemplates that the agency will develop and bring to bear scientific and technical expertise.171
Presidents can undermine expertise by reducing the absolute numbers of expert staff below levels necessary to perform the agency’s functions, interfering with expert staff’s ability to collect and use relevant
information, sidelining experts in the agency decisionmaking process,
and making it difficult for the agency to access external expertise.
Perhaps the most prominent example of how Presidents can undermine agency capacity by eroding expertise is their treatment of science
in agencies that rely heavily on scientific data to develop the foundation
for their rules or policy actions. Marginalizing agency science can take
several forms. First, the staffing cuts described above can be targeted
to eliminate certain scientific expertise. Such targeting appears to have
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
166 Cf. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 519 (2009) (“It is one thing to set aside
agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act because of failure to adduce empirical data
that can readily be obtained. . . . It is something else to insist upon obtaining the unobtainable.”).
Presidents should not be able to convert testable propositions into untestable ones simply by draining agency resources.
167 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1363(a)–(b) (creating the Water Pollution Control Advisory Board to help
implement the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and provide the Administrator with advice and
consultation); 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (establishing the interagency decisionmaking and review process for
environmental impact assessments under the National Environmental Policy Act); id.
§ 7409(d)(2)(A) (establishing an independent scientific review committee under the Clean Air Act to
review and revise national ambient air quality standards).
168 Agency staff is commonly thought to fall into two categories: political appointees on the one
hand and career staff on the other. But the latter category especially is diverse. As Professors
Elizabeth Magill and Adrian Vermeule put it: “Agencies [a]re a ‘they,’ not an ‘it.’” Elizabeth Magill
& Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032, 1036 (2011) (capitalization omitted).
169 Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2571 (2019) (noting that while the Secretary of
Commerce was entitled to weigh “incommensurables under conditions of uncertainty,” he was still
“required to consider the evidence”).
170 See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
171 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (requiring the Secretaries of Commerce and Interior to
make endangered species listing decisions “solely on the basis of the best scientific and commercial
data available”).
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happened at the EPA, where 700 scientists left the Agency between
January 2017 and January 2020, and only 350 replacements were hired
in the same time period.172 In another example of scientific drain, the
Trump Administration eliminated most of the staff at the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) who were working on health
security in China.173 Professors Thomas McGarity and Wendy Wagner
have called attention to the manipulation of agency science as an aid to
substantive deregulation, meaning that it plays a role in weakening particular rules.174 Many of the same techniques they discuss, including
reassigning agency personnel, also contribute to structural deregulation,
because of their potentially disabling effect on agency capacity over the
longer term.175
Presidents can shift resources away from supporting agency expertise
to other things. For example, the Trump Administration diverted resources from science-based programs within the CDC to security and
disaster-response initiatives.176 They can also diminish resources outright. For example, the Administration directed all agencies to cut the
number of their advisory committees, which provide expert advice to
regulators, by one-third — a fairly arbitrary proportion lacking an adequate rationale.177 In addition, the EPA issued a rule barring membership on expert advisory committees for scientists who had received an
agency grant.178 Although facially neutral, this move had the effect of
limiting advisory committee membership for academic scientists with
relevant subject matter expertise (many of whom at one time or another
received an agency grant) while leaving industry membership
unaffected.179
Administration officials can also undermine expertise by dismissing,
ignoring, or overriding expert views without sufficient process or explanation. The Trump Administration removed climate change resources
from agency websites and suppressed climate-related research.180
President Trump himself dismissed the National Climate Assessment
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
172
173

Gowen et al., supra note 63.
Christopher Sellers et al., An Embattled Landscape Series, Part 2a: Coronavirus and the
Three-Year Trump Quest to Slash Science at the CDC, ENV’T DATA & GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE
(Mar. 23, 2020), https://envirodatagov.org/an-embattled-landscape-series-part-2a-coronavirus-andthe-three-year-trump-quest-to-slash-science-at-the-cdc [https://perma.cc/AX5L-6H63].
174 See Thomas O. McGarity & Wendy E. Wagner, Deregulation Using Stealth “Science”
Strategies, 68 DUKE L.J. 1719, 1722 (2019).
175 See id. at 1747–56.
176 Sellers et al., supra note 173.
177 Exec. Order No. 13,875, § 1(b), 84 Fed. Reg. 28,711, 28,711 (June 19, 2019).
178 See Physicians for Soc. Resp. v. Wheeler, 956 F.3d 634, 638 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
179 See id. at 640–41.
180 See Press Release, Rep. Don Beyer, Safe Climate Caucus Members Urge Trump to Halt
“Systematic Effort” to Reduce Public Access to Climate Change Resources (Feb. 28, 2018),
https://beyer.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?documentid=768 [https://perma.cc/CWT4-FN6Q].
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produced by thirteen of his executive agencies, declaring, “I don’t believe it.”181 He later removed the scientist in charge of overseeing the
Assessment, the executive director of the Global Change Research
Program, and replaced him with someone known as a climate change
skeptic.182 One EPA scientist chose to retire after an Agency spokesperson publicly attacked a study the Agency had funded on the long-term
effects of exposure to soot and smog.183 Another long-serving EPA scientist put it this way: “Since Trump was elected, the palpable sense is
just that they don’t like what we do. That’s really the bottom line.”184
This treatment was not limited to the EPA. Scientists and experts
at the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the CDC
faced similar challenges. During the COVID-19 pandemic, politically
appointed HHS communications staff sought to review, revise, and dilute the CDC’s weekly scientific reports.185 HHS Assistant Secretary
Michael Caputo’s communications team delayed the publication of various CDC reports related to the pandemic, including one addressing the
use and effectiveness of hydroxychloroquine, which had become controversial after the President touted its benefits without evidence.186 It also
came to light that a CDC report on testing guidance had been released
to the public over the serious objection of agency scientists.187
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
181 Emily Holden, Trump on Own Administration’s Climate Report: “I Don’t Believe It”, THE
GUARDIAN (Nov. 26, 2018, 4:13 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/nov/26/trumpnational-climate-assessment-dont-believe [https://perma.cc/T8TY-RKWF].
182 Christopher Flavelle et al., Trump Administration Removes Scientist in Charge of Assessing
Climate, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/09/climate/michaelkuperberg-climate-assessment.html [https://perma.cc/G7B5-ZE4K]; Andrew Freedman et al.,
Trump Administration Official Who Questions Global Warming Will Run Key Climate Program,
WASH. POST (Nov. 11, 2020, 8:32 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/weather/2020/11/11/
climate-science-office-david-legates [https://perma.cc/XSW9-MPPQ]. Meddling with agency science and trying to control the public remarks of agency scientists is not limited to the Trump
Administration. The George W. Bush White House also reportedly interfered with EPA scientific
reports on climate change, and the President himself expressed disdain for government research on
the topic. See Jody Freeman, The Environmental Protection Agency’s Role in U.S. Climate
Policy — A Fifty Year Appraisal, 31 DUKE ENV’T L. & POL’Y F. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript
at 41–42) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). The George H.W. Bush White House was
also accused of muzzling scientists. See id. (manuscript at 23).
183 Gowen et al., supra note 63.
184 Cohen, supra note 50.
185 See Dan Diamond, Trump Officials Interfered with CDC Reports on Covid-19, POLITICO
(Sept. 12, 2020, 11:11 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/09/11/exclusive-trump-officialsinterfered-with-cdc-reports-on-covid-19-412809 [https://perma.cc/5S33-MQ5E].
186 See id.; see also Annie Karni & Katie Thomas, Trump Says He’s Taking Hydroxychloroquine,
Prompting Warnings from Health Experts, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2020), https://www.
nytimes.com/2020/05/18/us/politics/trump-hydroxychloroquine-covid-coronavirus.html
[https://perma.cc/K2DL-QLK9].
187 Apoorva Mandavilli, C.D.C. Testing Guidance Was Published Against Scientists’ Objections,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/17/health/coronavirus-testingcdc.html [https://perma.cc/D37D-XR2N].
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Presidents might also interfere with agency expertise by diminishing
an agency’s capacity to collect or produce essential information. For
example, a rule finalized in January 2021 prevents the EPA from relying
on scientific studies unless the data underlying those studies is publicly
available.188 The rule made no exception for confidential medical records, on which many key epidemiological studies supporting the EPA’s
work rely.189 An administration might also bar agencies from collecting
information that they require to enforce statutory mandates. For example, in 2017, the OMB blocked an Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) effort to collect employer data on race, ethnicity,
and gender in order to identify potential discrimination.190 The Trump
Administration also restricted agency efforts to communicate essential
information in peer-reviewed publications: in July 2018, political appointees at the USDA ordered its research agencies, including the
Economic Research Service, to include a disclaimer on USDA scientist
peer-reviewed research stating that all findings were “preliminary” and
“should not be construed to represent any agency determination or policy.”191 In 2019, after serious criticism from scientists and academics,
the USDA rescinded this direction.192
The Trump Administration’s widespread suppression of, and interference with, agency scientific work is perhaps most starkly reflected in
a 2018 survey from the EPA Office of Inspector General, in which almost 400 EPA science employees reported that they had experienced
“potential violations of the EPA’s scientific integrity policy.”193 More
than 250 employees were concerned that a “manager or senior
leader . . . [had] possibly interfered with science,” and 175 employees
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
188 Strengthening Transparency in Pivotal Science Underlying Significant Regulatory Actions
and Influential Scientific Information, 86 Fed. Reg. 469, 469–70 (Jan. 6, 2021) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R pt. 30).
189 Lisa Friedman, E.P.A. to Limit Science Used to Write Public Health Rules, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/11/climate/epa-science-trump.html [https://
perma.cc/7WUM-HQKD].
190 Trump Administration Stops Collection of Data that Could Reveal Pay Discrimination
Practices, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Mar. 6, 2020), https://www.ucsusa.org/
resources/attacks-on-science/administration-stops-collecting-data-could-reveal-pay-discrimination
[https://perma.cc/5P2C-V88J].
191 Ben Guarino, USDA Orders Scientists to Say Published Research Is “Preliminary,” WASH.
POST (Apr. 19, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/science/2019/04/19/usda-orders-scientistssay-published-research-is-preliminary [https://perma.cc/KU3A-X5R4].
192 Ben Guarino, After Outcry, USDA Will No Longer Require Scientists to Label Research
POST
(May
10,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/
“Preliminary,”
WASH.
science/2019/05/10/after-outcry-usda-will-no-longer-require-scientists-label-research-preliminary
[https://perma.cc/3DSP-83F6].
193 Rachel Frazin, EPA Employees Allege Leadership Interference with Science in Watchdog
Survey, THE HILL (May 20, 2020, 3:59 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/498808epa-employees-allege-leadership-interference-with-science-in [https://perma.cc/WU43-FW5A].
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said they had experienced “suppression or delay of release of [a] scientific
report or information.”194
Presidents know they can weaken agencies by constraining their
ability to build the analytic, economic, and technical foundation necessary for policymaking. Yet it is true that a President might reject expertise for reasons other than wanting to dismantle the administrative
state. There is ample evidence, for example, that President Trump eschewed expertise for ideological or temperamental reasons, even when
embracing it might have helped him to accomplish his substantive deregulatory agenda.195 Certainly rules or policies adopted without sufficient expert foundation are more likely to falter upon judicial review.
However, even if sapping agency expertise stymies particular efforts to
repeal rules in the short term, it will have a pronounced antiregulatory
effect in the longer term by undermining the agency’s capacity to promulgate new regulations and fulfill other statutory tasks.
D. Reputation
When a President or other high-ranking executive officials persistently charge an agency with incompetence, bias, or worse, it can have
a corrosive effect. The ensuing harm to reputation can make it incrementally more difficult for the agency to secure funding from Congress,
influence regulated entities, and even prevail in the courts.196 An
agency’s reputation is an intangible asset, but one that scholars have
identified as vital to the agency’s success. Professors Daniel Carpenter
and George Krause define organizational reputation “as a set of beliefs
about an organization’s capacities, intentions, history, and mission that
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
194
195

Id.
See, e.g., Fred Barbash & Deanna Paul, The Real Reason the Trump Administration Is
POST
(Mar.
19,
2019),
https://www.
Constantly
Losing
in
Court,
WASH.
washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-real-reason-president-trump-is-constantly-losingin-court/2019/03/19/f5ffb056-33a8-11e9-af5b-b51b7ff322e9_story.html
[https://perma.cc/MSL8SE86] (noting that President Trump’s losing streak for legal challenges to his agenda suggests a
“remarkable portrait of a government rushing to implement far-reaching changes in policy without
regard for long-standing rules against arbitrary and capricious behavior”); Bethany A. Davis Noll
& Christine Pries, Opinion, The Administration’s Record in the Courts, THE HILL (Nov. 3, 2020,
11:30 AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/white-house/524016-tired-of-winning-trumps-record-in-thecourts [https://perma.cc/LY2T-Z3JD] (noting that President Trump’s overall win rate for legal challenges to his Administration’s actions was seventeen percent, compared to past administrations’
roughly seventy percent win rate, in areas such as immigration, environment, housing, and public
assistance); David J. Hayes, “Tired of Winning” Yet?, STATE ENERGY & ENV’T IMPACT CTR.,
NYU SCH. OF L. (July 23, 2020), https://www.law.nyu.edu/centers/state-impact/presspublications/center-commentary/tired-of-winning-yet [https://perma.cc/F2SU-8RCL] (describing
two major losses the Trump Administration suffered in its attempt to roll back regulations in the
energy and climate space).
196 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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are embedded in a network of multiple audiences.”197 These audiences — including Congress, other agencies, regulated entities, and the
public more broadly — use reputation as an antidote to cognitive limitations that prevent the efficient processing of large amounts of information about the agency.198 Reputation is thus a heuristic, or shortcut,
to evaluate agency behavior.199
A positive reputation allows agencies to enjoy autonomy and a “protective shield” in the face of opposition.200 Agencies with good reputations are better able to set policy.201 They are also less likely to suffer
constraints on their appropriations.202 Each of these benefits facilitates
agency implementation of statutory policy. While there continues to be
lively debate between those who favor strong bureaucratic autonomy
and those who prefer legislative dominance, some autonomy and credibility is essential for agencies to interact effectively with the public. As
Professor Carpenter observes in his exhaustive study of the FDA’s reputation and power over time: “Reputations can intimidate or embolden
the subjects of government and, in so doing, reputations can complicate
an agency’s tasks or render them facile.”203 More broadly, he argues,
public confidence in regulatory agencies is a basic precondition for the
success of the regulatory project.204
Consider the erosion of the CDC’s reputation during the initial stages
of the COVID-19 pandemic. Alleged politicization of the Agency’s scientific work has produced a significant “loss of institutional credibility.”205 President Trump at one point described the Agency’s head as
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
197 Daniel P. Carpenter & George A. Krause, Reputation and Public Administration, 72 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 26, 26 (2012) (citing DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER:
ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA 33 (2010)).
198 Id. at 31.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 26; see also DANIEL CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY
4 (2001).
201 See Carpenter & Krause, supra note 197, at 30 (arguing that the Department of Agriculture
and Post Office from the 1860s to the 1920s had strong enough reputations to develop autonomy
and “sway the wishes of executive officials on particular matters of policy and to secure deference
from these elected officials,” while the Reclamation Service of the Department of Interior did not).
202 See id. (citing Jason A. MacDonald & William W. Franko, Jr., Bureaucratic Capacity and
Bureaucratic Discretion: Does Congress Tie Policy Authority to Performance?, 35 AM. POL. RSCH.
790, 790–807 (2007), for the proposition that poor reputation as measured by grades in the Federal
Performance Project produced more appropriations riders).
203 CARPENTER, supra note 197, at 33 (“Audiences such as firms and regulated individuals can
convey power by obeying the regulator’s rules and suggestions, or contest power by challenging
those precepts.”).
204 Id. at 44 (“A facilitating condition for the creation of regulation in modern democratic societies
is for the attentive public (and legislators in particular) to believe that whatever problems exist will
be capably addressed and solved by a particular agency.”).
205 Lena H. Sun & Joel Achenbach, CDC’s Credibility Is Eroded by Internal Blunders and
External Attacks as Coronavirus Vaccine Campaigns Loom, WASH. POST (Sept. 28, 2020),
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“confused.”206 The loss of reputation came at a crucial point in the pandemic when the public’s confidence in emerging vaccines would strongly
influence the success of innoculation programs in controlling the disease.
Establishing a good reputation is difficult for agencies under the best
of circumstances. It is even more difficult when that reputation is actively undermined by an agency’s own administration, and especially by
the President personally, with his singular bully pulpit.207 As noted
above, President Reagan declared government to be “the problem,” not
the solution for the country’s ills.208 Some of President Reagan’s cabinet
officials, including EPA Administrator Ann Gorsuch, sought to operationalize that sentiment. Gorsuch advocated in Congress for drastic
budget cuts, weakened enforcement, and reduced staff levels to such an
extent that one former Assistant Administrator complained that she had
“demolish[ed] the nation’s environmental management capacity.”209 Yet
simply by relying on rhetoric, Presidents can damage agency
reputation.210
Of course, it is appropriate for political leaders to admit and take
responsibility for agency failure. We should not expect Presidents to be

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/09/28/cdc-under-attack
[https://perma.cc/6RE67SXW].
206 Id.
207 President Trump regularly belittled agencies during his term in office. He called his intelligence agencies “passive and naive” about the threat posed by Iran. Mark Landler, An Angry Trump
Pushes Back Against His Own “Naive” Intelligence Officials, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/30/us/politics/trump-intelligence-agencies.html [https://perma.cc/
HXU2-6SUB]. He repeatedly implied that a number of “deep state” agency operatives — presumably members of the civil service that he perceived as insufficiently loyal to his Administration —
actively opposed him. See, e.g., Trump Says Without Proof that FDA “Deep State” Slowing COVID
Trials, REUTERS (Aug. 22, 2020, 12:42 PM), https://reut.rs/3l9lUj5 [https://perma.cc/SRE8-4TEV].
208 Reagan, supra note 55, at 2.
209 Joanna Brenner, Neil Gorsuch’s Late Mother Almost Annihilated the EPA. Is History
Repeating Itself?, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 1, 2017, 2:20 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/anne-gorsuchnew-bill-abolish-epa-551382 [https://perma.cc/CJ22-ZY97] (alteration in original) (quoting former
EPA Assistant Administrator William Drayton); see also Philip Shabecoff, U.S. Environmental
Agency Making Deep Staffing Cuts, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 1982), https://www.
nytimes.com/1982/01/03/us/us-environmental-agency-making-deep-staffing-cuts.html
[https://
perma.cc/7KMU-TQGL]. Gorsuch’s impact on EPA career staff morale was satirized famously in
a Doonesbury comic strip in January 1982, which featured an agency employee sitting out on a
ledge and threatening to jump unless the Administrator “publicly agrees that the purpose of the
Environmental Protection Agency is to protect the environment.” Gary Trudeau, Morale at EPA,
(Jan.
28,
1982),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/doonesbury/strip/
DOONESBURY
archive/1982/01/28 [https://perma.cc/E9UE-M7EG].
210 For example, President Reagan’s “rhetorical assaults . . . undermined the legitimacy of liberal
government while simultaneously generating lasting norms within the existing institutional arrangements that favored his preferred ends.”
WILLIAM G. RESH, RETHINKING THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PRESIDENCY 26 (2015) (citing STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, PRESIDENTIAL
LEADERSHIP IN POLITICAL TIME: REPRISE AND REAPPRAISAL 97–98 (2008)).
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cheerleaders for inept agencies.211 Yet sustained attacks can do damage
to an agency’s reputation and morale. As one Department of Justice
employee complained: “The President and his appointees say these terrible things about the DOJ, and then the political leadership of the department doesn’t push back at all.”212
E. Distinguishing Structural Deregulation from Good Governance
We recognize that it can be difficult to distinguish structural deregulation from so-called “good governance” reforms intended to improve
the government’s performance, cut costs, or streamline cumbersome
procedures. The line is difficult to draw in the abstract, since it depends
on a number of factors that can be evaluated only in the context of specific examples. Nevertheless, we argue that there is both a conceptual
and practical difference between the two.
Not all changes to agency staffing or resource levels qualify as structural deregulation. Government efficiency is a laudable goal, and nearly
every President in the last several decades has encouraged the bureaucracy to do more with less. Nor do all assignments of additional bureaucratic responsibility constitute busywork. And, as noted above,
presidential criticism of the bureaucracy can be warranted. Indeed, accountability sometimes demands that “heads roll.” We do contend, however, that there is a point at which promoting efficiency shades into pursuing disability, assigning legitimate tasks shades into busywork, and
offering fair critique shades into intentional undermining. Reasonable
minds might differ about when this point is reached. But conceptually,
and in many cases practically, it is possible to distinguish between efforts
to reform and efforts to subvert.
But how can we tell? Some of the same tools courts have used to
assess pretext can be helpful in distinguishing instances of likely structural deregulation from more innocent reforms. The process we suggest
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
211 Although sometimes they do play that role. For example, despite his disastrous performance,
President George W. Bush praised Michael Brown, his FEMA Administrator, in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina, declaring “Brownie, you’re doing a heck of a job.” Elizabeth Chuck, Where Is
Disgraced Former FEMA Chief Michael Brown Now?, NBC NEWS (Aug. 27, 2015, 3:59 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/hurricane-katrina-anniversary/heck-job-brownie-wheredisgraced-fema-head-now-n400436 [https://perma.cc/PQ2W-MLXW].
212 Cohen, supra note 50. In some cases, agency leaders make comments disparaging their own
subordinates. Attorney General William Barr explained, for example, that lower-level Department
officials do not make policy for the Department because while that “might be a good philosophy for
a Montessori preschool . . . it is no way to run a federal agency.” Katelyn Polantz & Christina
Carrega, Barr Says Calls for Coronavirus Lockdown Are the “Greatest Intrusion on Civil Liberties”
Other than Slavery in US History, CNN POL. (Sept. 16, 2020, 11:35 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/16/politics/barr-justice-department-speech/index.html
[https://
perma.cc/KY6T-T3HU]; see also Phillip J. Cooper, The Duty to Take Care: President Obama, Public
Administration, and the Capacity to Govern, 71 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 7, 13 (2011) (describing the
effects of rhetoric on employee morale, recruitment, and retention).
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is similar to the judicial test for whether a defendant’s proffered motivations are pretextual. In such cases, courts rely on contextual evidence
to elucidate motive.213 Moreover, while the courts are more reticent to
inquire into hidden motivation in reviewing actions by coordinate
branches of government, four members of the Supreme Court have suggested that even in such cases “openly available data,”214 including public statements by the individuals responsible for government action, are
relevant to determining the purpose of that action.215 In Department of
Commerce v. New York,216 for example, the Court relied on extra-record
evidence to conclude that an agency’s justification for adding a question
to the census was pretextual.217 The Court explained that, while courts
would not normally inquire into the mental processes of administrative
decisionmakers, such an inquiry might be appropriate if there are
“strong showing[s] of bad faith or improper behavior.”218 In this case,
the Court continued, extra-record discovery revealed that the
Secretary’s purported justification for adding the census question was
not the true rationale.219
Courts will also examine the fit between an action and its justification. In employment discrimination cases, evidence that a purported
justification is internally inconsistent or otherwise not believable can
establish pretext.220 While courts defer to an employer’s business judgments in such cases,221 the Tenth Circuit has held that “[t]here may be
circumstances in which a claimed business judgment is so idiosyncratic
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
213 For example, in Beaird v. Seagate Technology, Inc., 145 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir. 1998), the plaintiff
offered evidence that her employer had manipulated her final performance evaluation to make it
appear that her performance was subpar before terminating her employment. Id. at 1169–70.
214 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2438 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
215 See id. at 2442 (chastising the majority for “utterly fail[ing]” to consider statements by the
President suggesting that a presidential Proclamation limiting immigration from specified countries
was a product of anti-Muslim animus); id. at 2433 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Justice
Sotomayor that the President’s statements help form a “sufficient basis to set the Proclamation
aside”). The majority did not disagree that extra-record evidence could be considered, but found
that because rational basis review required only a relationship to legitimate state interests, and
because such a relation could be shown between the President’s decision to impose entry restrictions
on immigrants from certain enumerated countries and the national security interests of the United
States, extra-record evidence suggesting that religious animus may have motivated the action was
insufficient to invalidate it. Id. at 2420–21 (majority opinion).
216 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019).
217 Id. at 2574–76.
218 Id. at 2574 (quoting Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971)).
219 Id. at 2575.
220 See Beaird v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 145 F.3d 1159, 1168 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating that “a plaintiff
can demonstrate pretext” by showing that her termination was inconsistent with her employer’s
reduction-in-force criteria or by showing that the employer sought to use such reduction-in-force
criteria “to replace a number of [terminated] employees with new hires”).
221 See id. at 1169 (asserting that, even where a plaintiff is able to establish the existence of “a
better tool of performance evaluation,” the court “will not disturb [the] exercise of [a] defendant’s
business judgment”).

2021]

STRUCTURAL DEREGULATION

625

or questionable that a factfinder could reasonably find that it is a pretext for illegal discrimination.”222 Similarly, in cases challenging legislative or executive action, courts look to whether there is a sufficient connection between the explanation an agency offers for its action and the
decision made.223 In Romer v. Evans,224 for example, the Supreme
Court found a state constitutional amendment prohibiting all state and
local protections for persons based on their homosexuality “so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it” that it was “inexplicable by anything but animus.”225
In line with judicial concern about fit between proffered justification
and the action taken, we imagine three categories of evidence that
should lead an observer to consider deregulatory motivations for actions
that appear to weaken an agency’s capacity: evidence from context, evidence of circumvention, and evidence of conflict.
First, an action’s context can suggest deregulatory rather than good
governance motives. Taking context into account might mean considering whether a group of actions, taken together, establishes a pattern
that suggests a larger strategy to undermine agency capacity. Firing one
inspector general might be justified by the idiosyncratic behavior of that
official. Removing multiple IGs within a short time frame, however,
may indicate a broader effort to disable internal administrative oversight mechanisms.
Evaluating context might also mean considering whether the circumstances surrounding an action seem consistent with its proffered justification. Consider the ostensible reason for moving the Bureau of Land
Management’s (BLM) headquarters from Washington, D.C., to Grand
Junction, Colorado. The BLM manages approximately 250 million
acres of federal public land, mostly in the western United States, and
the Agency asserted that its headquarters should be geographically
closer to those lands and the people who use them.226 However, as a
GAO report subsequently observed, 97% of the BLM’s career staff were
already located in the field.227 If the reasons offered by an an agency’s
political leadership can be impeached so easily, it seems fair to call their
good faith into question.
Finally, looking to context might involve assessing previous statements by administration officials and preceding events to see if they
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
222
223

Id.
See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); see
also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a).
224 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
225 Id. at 632.
226 See Kirk Siegler, BLM Acting Director Defends Agency’s Controversial Move to Colorado,
NPR (Feb. 18, 2020, 11:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/02/18/806783253/blm-acting-directordefends-agencys-controversial-move-to-colorado [https://perma.cc/8LXK-LLBD].
227 ANNE-MARIE FENNELL & FRANK RUSCO, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO20-397R, BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT: AGENCY’S REORGANIZATION EFFORTS DID
NOT SUBSTANTIALLY ADDRESS KEY PRACTICES FOR EFFECTIVE REFORMS 5 (2020).
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offer clues to motivation. For example, if an administration punishes
an agency employee for decisions or statements made in service of the
agency’s mission and consistent with their job responsibilities, it is reasonable to ask whether the move is retaliatory. Likewise, when an administration reassigns or relocates economists and scientists who make
statements or publish findings inconsistent with its official positions,
those decisions merit closer scrutiny. When IGs who criticize the
President are subsequently fired for reasons ostensibly unrelated to their
public criticism, those firings, too, ought to raise eyebrows. A persistent
pattern of such behavior suggests that an administration is seeking to
do something other than improve the government and might perhaps be
working to disable it.
Public statements by Presidents and senior administration leadership
may also reveal deregulatory motives. Sometimes the statements are so
transparent, they leave no room for doubt, as when President Trump
promised that, when it came to the size of the federal government, he
would “cut so much your head will spin.”228 Trump’s chief strategist,
Steven Bannon, announced that the President would select cabinet
members who would pursue “deconstruction of the administrative
state.”229 Individual nominees confirmed to lead major federal agencies
spoke openly of their desires to see those agencies eliminated. Mick
Mulvaney, who was appointed Acting Director of the CFPB, stated in
a congressional hearing that he would like to “get rid of” the Agency.230
He had earlier called it a “sick, sad joke.”231 Such statements might be
dismissed as political rhetoric only, not to be taken seriously as policy
proposals. But when officials expressing such deep animus toward the
agencies they run later portray significant reforms as “good government”
measures, observers are entitled to be skeptical.
Second, circumventing established procedures for developing policy — especially procedures requiring consultation with career staff, experts, and other stakeholders — can be evidence of a deregulatory motive. For example, a GAO report concluded that the Department of the
Interior failed to consult employees in planning to move the Agency’s
headquarters to Grand Junction.232 Similarly, the EPA initially bypassed notice-and-comment rulemaking when establishing who could
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
228
229

Rein & Tran, supra note 47.
David Z. Morris, Steve Bannon Says Trump’s Cabinet Picks Are Intended to “Deconstruct”
Regulation and Agencies, FORTUNE (Feb. 25, 2017, 2:35 PM), https://fortune.com/2017/02/25/
bannon-trump-cabinet-cpac [https://perma.cc/2EKV-4924].
230 Kelsey Ramírez, CFPB Acting Director Mulvaney Says He Still Believes Bureau Shouldn’t
Exist, HOUSINGWIRE (Apr. 11, 2018, 12:22 PM), https://www.housingwire.com/articles/43077cfpb-acting-director-mulvaney-says-he-still-believes-bureau-shouldnt-exist
[https://perma.cc/
39L4-WJ5Z].
231 Id.
232 FENNELL & RUSCO, supra note 227, at 6.
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serve as expert advisors, over the objections of many members of the
Agency’s scientific advisory board.233 We recognize that there may be
good reasons why agencies sometimes use informal policy instruments,
like guidance documents, or take internal steps to improve efficiency,
without soliciting stakeholder feedback. But a persistent pattern of
avoiding input specifically for those policy shifts that appear to reduce
agency capacity or marginalize internal and external expertise may also
be evidence of a deregulatory purpose.
Finally, we look for conflict between those agency officials pursuing
certain reforms and other experts within the administration who raise
objections to them. Perfect agreement is unattainable in any administration, and there will always be internal dissent over the direction of
agency policy. Yet when dissent becomes an outcry, or when credible
experts — especially political allies — question an administration’s motives, it ought to raise red flags. Consider the Trump Administration’s
early efforts to cut the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) budget.234 At his
confirmation hearing, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said he was
“very concerned” about IRS staffing reductions and technology deficits
and called for increasing the Agency’s budget to enable it to perform its
assigned duties.235 When members of an administration’s inner circle
with credible subject matter expertise risk the President’s wrath to suggest that his favored reforms might compromise government capacity,
we think it appropriate to pay attention.
Our reliance on context, circumvention, and conflict is not the only
way to ferret out structural deregulation. While those categories may
be imperfect, they provide helpful clues. The real question is whether,
considering all of the surrounding evidence, agency reforms that have
potential to reduce functional capacity appear to have been taken in
good faith with a purpose other than weakening the agency’s ability to
perform its legislative tasks.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
233 See, e.g., Sean Reilly et al., EPA Science Advisers Slammed the Agency for Ignoring Science.
Here Is What They Said, SCIENCE (Jan. 2, 2020, 2:50 PM), https://www.
sciencemag.org/news/2020/01/epa-science-advisers-slammed-agency-ignoring-science-here-whatthey-said [https://perma.cc/6MEG-ZATL]. A federal judge remanded the rule to the EPA after the
Agency conceded that it was a substantive rather than procedural rule that should have gone
through the APA’s notice-and-comment process. Env’t Def. Fund v. EPA, No. 21-cv-00003, 2021
WL 402824, at *1 (D. Mont. Feb. 1, 2021).
234 These efforts continued a trend begun in 2010 during the Obama Administration. BRANDON
DEBOT ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, TRUMP BUDGET CONTINUES
MULTI-YEAR ASSAULT ON IRS FUNDING DESPITE MNUCHIN’ S CALL FOR MORE
RESOURCES 3 (2017).
235 Id. at 1. The Administration proposed a modest effective increase to the IRS budget in 2020.
Courtney Bublé, Trump’s Budget Seeks to Increase Funding for the Internal Revenue Service,
GOV’T EXEC. (Feb. 12, 2020), https://www.govexec.com/management/2020/02/trumps-budgetseeks-increase-funding-internal-revenue-service/163087 [https://perma.cc/XPN2-YZUJ].
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II. IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL,
ADMINISTRATIVE, AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES
Structural deregulation is underexplored terrain in the struggle between the President and Congress for control of the administrative state.
Presidents increasingly have found ways to make the bureaucracy work
in service of their domestic and foreign policy aims to burnish their political reputations. Even “deregulatory” Presidents target particular areas of government for deregulation while bolstering and promoting
agency capacity in other domains they favor.
This story of “presidential administration,” described by thenProfessor Kagan two decades ago, overlooks the possibility of structural
deregulation. Justice Kagan recounted how President Clinton expanded
presidential administration by “making the regulatory activity of the executive branch agencies more and more an extension of the President’s
own policy and political agenda.”236 He did so by exerting control over
agency agendas237 and through formal directives,238 centralized White
House review of proposed regulations,239 informal monitoring and influencing of agencies by White House staff,240 and appropriation of regulatory action in his public communications.241
In general, Justice Kagan applauded increased presidential control
of administration. She observed that such control made bureaucracy
“more transparent and responsive to the public, while also better promoting important kinds of regulatory competence and dynamism.”242
This praise extended even to deregulatory actions. Citing President
Reagan’s deregulatory impulses, she noted that they provided “a single,
coherent direction” characteristic of the President’s relative “energy” as
compared with an intransigent legislature and in the face of administrative ossification.243 Justice Kagan published her article at the apogee of
faith in a strong technocratic presidency, and her account of presidential
administration assumes a good faith chief executive committed to maintaining the authority and legitimacy of the bureaucracy.244 She argued
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
236
237
238
239
240
241

Kagan, supra note 10, at 2248.
Id.
Id. at 2249.
Id.
Id. at 2302.
Id. at 2249. President Clinton would unveil agency action himself, sometimes even before it
was finalized, and claim public ownership of that action. Id. at 2299–301.
242 Id. at 2252.
243 Id. at 2344–45. Justice Kagan acknowledged that presidential involvement in administration
can be problematic. This concern is especially true when Presidents interfere with administrative
adjudication, which should be safeguarded from political influence. Id. at 2363.
244 Justice Kagan noted that presidential decisions to reverse technical agency actions are uncommon. Id. at 2356.
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that Presidents “have a stake in build[ing] an institutional capacity for
effective governance.”245
Structural deregulation complicates Justice Kagan’s narrative by
showing that not all Presidents are committed to maintaining the institutional capacity of the bureaucracy.246 A President might embrace
structural deregulation either as a complement to the more targeted project of substantive deregulation (that is, repealing certain rules and policies), or as a substitute for it, or both. For example, undermining agency
capacity through destaffing and resource deprivation can advance the
project of substantive deregulation by enabling agencies to claim,
credibly, that they lack the resources necessary to implement or enforce
statutes.247 Or, structural deregulation might be an alternative to substantive deregulation when efforts to rescind or weaken regulations
encounter resistance, whether in the bureaucracy itself or in Congress,248
or if they become mired in litigation.249
As we described in Part I and discuss further below, Presidents can
undermine agency capacity with little formality or transparency in most
cases. These features, as well as structural deregulation’s incremental
nature, make it unlikely that either Congress or the courts will interfere.
An additional benefit of structural deregulation for a President intent
on undercutting regulatory action is that it is time-consuming for a successor to reverse.
Structural deregulation flourishes in a climate of extreme “antiadministrativism,”250 which characterizes the current political moment,
when members of Congress, governors, and other influential political
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
245
246

Id. at 2355.
Professor Michael Sant’Ambrogio has accused President Trump of “presidential maladministration,” pointing to a broad array of actions, including the weakening of congressional controls
over agency leadership, favoring regulated interests over congressional mandates and public preferences, as well as some of the capacity weakening that we identify here. See Michael
Sant’Ambrogio, Presidential Maladministration, 46 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 459, 460 (2020).
247 See infra pp. 651–52 and note 382.
248 On the potential for internal executive branch resistance, see generally Rebecca Ingber,
Bureaucratic Resistance and the National Security State, 104 IOWA L. REV. 139 (2018) (charting a
middle course between fear of a “deep state,” id. at 142, and total embrace of “bureaucratic resistance,” id. at 143, and underscoring the essential role of the civil service in the modern separation
of powers); Jon D. Michaels, The American Deep State, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1653 (2018)
(arguing that American bureaucracy presents none of the threats identified in regimes abroad but
that civil servants perform a salutary role in checking the chief executive); Jennifer Nou, Civil
Servant Disobedience, 94 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 349 (2019) (offering a taxonomy of resistance and
identifying the prerequisites for legitimate civil-servant disobedience); Bijal Shah, Civil Servant
Alarm, 94 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 627 (2019) (arguing that civil-servant resistance should alert
Congress to potential problems of law execution).
249 Of course, as noted above, it is also possible that structural deregulation could work against
a President’s substantive deregulatory agenda in the short term, by draining agencies of the requisite expertise to rescind and weaken existing rules in a legally defensible manner.
250 Metzger, supra note 3, at 4.
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leaders heap scorn upon government and deride civil servants.251 The
Supreme Court has contributed to this climate too, by embracing an
expansive view of the President’s power to control agencies and suggesting that, absent such pervasive executive control, the constitutional legitimacy of administrative governance is in doubt.252 At the same time,
the Court has consistently rebuked agencies for what it views as regulatory overreach, faulting them for, among other things, reading their statutory authority expansively and failing to account adequately for cost,
but almost never finding them to have fallen short through “underreach” — that is by failing to act when their mission arguably demands they do so.253 This combination — indulging broad presidential
power while suggesting agencies err primarily by overregulating — sows
fertile ground for structural deregulation to take root.
However, the same aspects of structural deregulation that make it so
alluring to a President also make it antithetical to long-established principles of constitutional, administrative, and democratic governance.
First, structural deregulation is in tension with constitutional separation
of powers principles, including the principle of legislative supremacy
and the President’s obligation to “take Care that the Laws [are] faithfully executed.”254 Second, structural deregulation’s informality and
opacity conflict with administrative norms favoring process, reasongiving, accountability, and transparency. Third, structural deregulation’s stickiness binds successors in a version of what Professors Daryl
Levinson and Benjamin Sachs have called “functional political entrenchment.”255 The remainder of this Part will address these tensions
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
251 See, e.g., R. Sam Garrett et al., Assessing the Impact of Bureaucracy Bashing by Electoral
Campaigns, 66 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 228, 229–31, 236–37 (2006); Adam Butler & Ross Gianfortune,
Bureaucrat-Bashing at the Highest Levels of Government, GOV’T EXEC. (Feb. 27, 2020),
https://www.govexec.com/workforce/2020/02/govexec-daily-bureaucrat-bashing-high-levelsgovernment/163357 [https://perma.cc/D7XB-DZCL]; Ken Thomas, Opinion, The Way We View
Public Servants in This Country Is a Disgrace, THE HILL (May 10, 2019, 7:30 AM),
https://thehill.com/opinion/civil-rights/443003-the-way-we-view-public-servants-in-this-country-isa-disgrace [https://perma.cc/C473-QDHS].
252 See, e.g., Seila L. LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2197 (2020) (finding that the for-cause removal protection for the CFPB’s director was an unconstitutional limitation on the President’s
executive power); Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2057 (2018) (holding that ALJs at the SEC were
inferior officers and therefore must be appointed by the President, department heads, or the courts).
While Lucia was ostensibly about appointment mechanics, its holding will tend to increase presidential
power over agency adjudications by limiting ALJ independence.
253 See e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 751 (2015) (striking down agency interpretation at
Chevron Step 2 citing failure to consider cost); Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 320–24
(2014) (striking down agency legal interpretation at Chevron Step 2, citing major questions canon
and agency overreach); Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 63 (2004) (declining to compel agency action unless discrete and mandatory).
254 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
255 Daryl Levinson & Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 125 YALE L.J.
400, 454–56 (2015) (describing efforts by political incumbents to bind successors without formal rule
changes).
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in more detail. To be clear, our argument applies regardless of how we
might personally feel about the value of an agency’s work. As long as
Congress has created an agency and assigned it regulatory tasks, the
President should not be able to prevent it from functioning through
structural deregulation.
A. Tensions with the Separation of Powers
While current constitutional law doctrine seems to allow a President
to engage in structural deregulation largely unimpeded,256 we think a
President’s efforts to destroy administrative capacity sit uncomfortably
with important constitutional values. First, structural deregulation
seems to encroach on Congress’s Article I powers in violation of the
separation of powers. Congress is constitutionally entitled to create federal agencies, pass statutes delegating to them a variety of duties, and
appropriate money to accomplish congressional goals.257 By contrast,
the Constitution carefully circumscribes the President’s role in lawmaking.258 Presidents are charged with signing or vetoing bills passed by
both houses of Congress.259 They may also propose legislation for
Congress’s consideration260 or call Congress into session.261 However,
the President is not a lawmaker in the conventional sense262 and may
not dispense with duly enacted laws, even those he finds
inconvenient.263
The view that Congress retains the primary lawmaking role continues to be held by both conservative and liberal jurists. Justice Gorsuch
has argued, for example, that failing to enforce the nondelegation doc–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
256
257

See infra section III.A, pp. 638–41.
Because the President is also assigned a constitutional role in legislation, structural deregulation allows a President to invalidate the legislative work of his predecessor or, in cases where legislation was enacted over his own veto, to nullify that veto override through subsequent inaction.
258 Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 689
(2014) (describing the President’s role in proposing legislation and in signing or vetoing bills passed
by both houses of Congress).
259 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
260 Id. art. II, § 3.
261 Id.
262 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952). In Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, the Supreme Court flatly rejected “the idea that [the President] is
to be a lawmaker.” Id. at 587.
263 Price, supra note 258, at 674–75 (grounding the antidispensation principle in the constitutional
text and historical practice); see also Prioritizing and Deferring Removal of Certain Aliens
Unlawfully Present in the United States, 38 Op. O.L.C. 39, 46 (2014) (“[T]he Executive cannot,
under the guise of exercising enforcement discretion, attempt to effectively rewrite the laws to match
its policy preferences.”). But see Michael Sant’Ambrogio, The Extra-Legislative Veto, 102 GEO.
L.J. 351, 401–04 (2014) (supporting presidential refusals to defend challenged statutes in court, exercise enforcement discretion, and check statutory implementation through centralized regulatory
review as long as sufficient mechanisms are in place to ensure transparency).
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trine would “serve only to accelerate the flight of power from the legislative to the executive branch.”264 Similarly, Justices Thomas and
Rehnquist have asserted that Congress must make the “hard choices”
about policy.265 Without endorsing these Justices’ apparent embrace of
a revived nondelegation doctrine, we take such statements as supporting
the idea that, whatever degree of control the President has or should
have over agencies, allowing him to thwart their congressionally mandated mission would usurp congressional authority.
Second, structural deregulation is in tension with the President’s
duty to faithfully execute duly enacted law under the Take Care Clause
of Article II.266 That clause, which simultaneously prescribes and circumscribes presidential power, can be read to prohibit presidential undermining of the essential capacities of administrative agencies. Indeed,
some have argued that the clause is “not a statement of powers of office,
but the first, and in many respects most fundamental, legal obligation
of the president.”267
The clause’s “simple but delphic terms”268 have been read to limit
presidential powers in important ways. Crucially, the Court has interpreted the Take Care Clause to impose an affirmative obligation on the
President to enforce the laws Congress passes. In the early days of the
Republic, a Postmaster General refused to honor an Act of Congress
requiring him to pay a certain sum to a contractor. The Supreme Court
found in Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes269 that the Take Care
Clause prevented the President, as head of the executive branch, from
ignoring duly authorized statutes.270 It therefore held that the outstanding sum must be paid.271 The opinion underscored that the Constitution
did not grant the President a “dispensing power” — the power to suspend the operation of a statute or rule in the interest of justice.272 The
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
264
265

Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2142 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 687 (1980) (Rehnquist,
J., concurring in the judgment) (“When fundamental policy decisions underlying important legislation about to be enacted are to be made, the buck stops with Congress and the President insofar as
he exercises his constitutional role in the legislative process.”); see also Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of
Am. R.Rs., 575 U.S. 43, 85 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (criticizing the Court
for allowing “the Executive to decide which policy goals it wants to pursue”).
266 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
267 Philip J. Cooper, The Duty to Take Care: President Obama, Public Administration, and the
Capacity to Govern, 71 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 7, 8 (2011).
268 Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 14, at 1836.
269 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
270 See id. at 613.
271 Id.
272 Id. This concept would have been more familiar in the 1800s as a former royal prerogative
of the King of England to exempt individuals from application of the criminal law. Note, The
Power of Dispensation in Administrative Law: A Critical Survey, 87 U. PA. L. REV. 201, 203 (1938).
The concept appears to have originated in Catholicism with the Pope’s power to dispense with
temporal laws in his edicts. Id. at 204.
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Kendall Court stressed that the President had no “power to forbid [the
laws’] execution.”273 Citing Kendall, Professor Zachary Price argues
that neither the Take Care Clause specifically nor the Constitution as a
whole allows the President to categorically suspend particular laws or
parts of laws.274
Moreover, the obligation to see that the laws are “faithfully” executed
implies an obligation to implement legislative edicts dutifully.
Professors John Manning and Jack Goldsmith note that one of the leading dictionaries of the Founding era, Dr. Johnson’s, “defines ‘faithfully’
to mean ‘strict adherence to duty and allegiance’ and ‘[w]ithout failure
of performance; honestly; exactly.’”275 While the clause does not specify
faithfulness “to what,”276 in combination with the Oath Clause, it
“point[s] toward a general obligation of good faith” and a presidential
obligation “to ensure that the laws are implemented honestly, effectively,
and without failure of performance.”277
Others have described this obligation as a duty to superintend the
operations of the executive branch. Emphasizing the responsibility of
faithful execution, Professor Gillian Metzger describes the duty imposed
on Presidents by the Take Care Clause as “a duty to supervise.”278 While
the courts have been largely silent on the existence of such a duty, the
Supreme Court in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board279 did find that the President was subject to a nondelegable duty to “active[ly] . . . supervise” the administration.280 Importantly, Metzger’s duty to supervise is meant to ensure effective as
well as accountable government.281 Metzger leaves to the courts where
to draw the line between permissible and impermissible presidential involvement in the work of the bureaucracy, but she stresses that presidential engagement always must operate within “proper bounds.”282
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
273
274

37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 613.
Price, supra note 258, at 675–77, 696. Nor may agencies themselves decline to implement
statutes. See, e.g., Buzbee, supra note 6, at 1579 (“The first and most essential element of agency
political accountability is rooted in legislative supremacy.”).
275 Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 14, at 1857 (alteration in original) (citing 1 SAMUEL
JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, J.F. & C. Rivington et al.
6th ed. 1785)).
276 Id.
277 Id. at 1857–58.
278 Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836, 1877 (2015)
(“[T]he mandatory character of the Take Care Clause is worth underscoring in its own right.”).
279 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
280 Id. at 496 (quoting Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 712–13 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in the
judgment)); see id. at 478–79 (finding that removal restrictions protecting members of the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board were an unconstitutional infringement on presidential authority); see also Metzger, supra note 278, at 1863.
281 Metzger, supra note 278, at 1886.
282 Id. at 1925.
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The President operates outside of these bounds, we argue, when he seeks
systematically to undermine agency capacity.
Ultimately, the Take Care Clause conveys authority to protect, not
destroy. Professor Henry Monaghan associated the clause with such a
“protective power” to “protect and defend the personnel, property, and
instrumentalities of the United States from harm,” offering as an example the assignment of a U.S. Marshal to protect the life of a federal
judge.283 Goldsmith and Manning similarly have identified a “completion power,” which they define as “the President’s authority to prescribe
incidental details needed to carry into execution a legislative scheme,
even in the absence of any congressional authorization to complete that
scheme.”284 Our own view is that the duties to superintend and to protect assigned to the President in Article II imply a commensurate duty
not to destroy.
B. Tensions with Administrative Law Values
The Administrative Procedure Act,285 as well as administrative
jurisprudence and scholarship, emphasizes formality, transparency, rationality, and accountability as core values.286 We expect government
agencies to “do things by the book” — operate openly, follow prescribed
procedures, and give sound reasons for their decisions. Procedural regularity and substantive rationality are the basic minimum requirements
for administrative legitimacy.
Yet structural deregulation does not reflect such values. First, it is
largely informal. A President invoking the tools of structural deregulation acts unilaterally, without convincing Congress to pass legislation
altering an agency’s structure or resources. Presidents also can largely
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
283
284

Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 11 (1993).
Jack Goldsmith & John Manning, The President’s Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J. 2280,
2282 (2006); see also Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 14, at 1837–38 (citing Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 67–68 (1890), for the proposition that the Take Care Clause provides “inherent
presidential authority to take acts necessary to protect the operations of the federal government,
even in cases in which no statute provides explicit authority to do so”).
285 Consider the Act’s restrictions on “arbitrary” or “capricious” decisionmaking, APA § 706(2)(A),
and its emphasis on the transparency of administrative decisionmaking in §§ 552, 552a, and 552b.
286 See, e.g., Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1909 (2020)
(observing that the prohibition on consideration of post hoc agency reasoning serves important
administrative law values including accountability and contemporaneous reason-giving); Lisa
Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative
State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 494–95 (2003) (identifying nonarbitrariness as key to agency legitimacy); Kevin M. Stack, An Administrative Jurisprudence: The Rule of Law in the Administrative
State, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1985, 1987–89 (2015) (specifying the rule of law’s demands on administrative government and identifying authorization, notice, justification, coherence, and procedural
fairness as the most relevant); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Morality of Administrative
Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1924, 1929 (2018) (arguing that administrative law doctrine, as well as
modern criticisms of that doctrine, can be understood in the context of Professor Lon Fuller’s eight
elements of a moral system of laws).
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avoid the public notice-and-comment process that is required to rescind
agency regulations. Instead, structural deregulation occurs by executive
order or, more frequently, as the result of informal communications from
the White House to agency officials. Those officials then implement
policies internally. Structural deregulation can thus be accomplished
through internal agency memoranda and orders that require neither
publication nor explanation.
A few examples may help to illustrate the point. Failing to nominate
agency officers or hire expert staff requires no more than the President
instructing agency leadership. Political appointees can demoralize staff
in myriad informal ways. They can reassign staff and relocate offices
with minimal procedure and without public deliberation.287
Overtasking agencies with busywork may occasionally involve some
formal direction (for example executive orders imposing on agencies new
analytic burdens), but it may also occur less formally, as in the example
of the CFPB name-change task force discussed above. Finally, reputational undermining, which tends to take the form of public statements
from high-ranking officials, is the height of informal action.
These informal actions may be more or less transparent. It is not
possible to hide office relocations, for example. By contrast, staff demoralization might take place entirely within the agency. Of course,
even structural changes shielded from public view may be exposed by
the media. However, to the extent that these disclosures occur after the
actions have already produced effects or when the wheels of change are
already in motion, they provide limited opportunity for public engagement and oversight.
Informal structural deregulatory actions’ lack of transparency
undermines two related administrative law values: accountability and
reason giving. To the extent that some of these efforts remain hidden,
voters may have more trouble assessing agency performance than they
would if deregulatory efforts were undertaken through rule repeals,
publicly announced policy changes, and the like. Even if particular
structural deregulatory moves are publicized, moreover, because such
decisions are generally less formal, they do not require the articulation
of reasons that can then be scrutinized in court, by Congress, or by ordinary voters.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
287 The BLM’s move to Grand Junction, for example, was documented in a so-called “Secretary’s
Order.” Sec’y of the Interior, Order No. 3382, Establishment of the Bureau of Land Management’s
Headquarters in Grand Junction, Colorado (Aug. 10, 2020), https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/
elips/documents/so-order-3382-508-compliant.pdf [https://perma.cc/R5NT-ZD25]. As authority for
the order, the Secretary cited Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1950, which located general management
authorities in the Secretary. See id. § 2.
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C. Tensions with Democratic Values
A final concern about structural deregulation is that its effects can
be more challenging to undo than the individual regulatory rollbacks
that characterize substantive deregulation. It is thus a useful tool for
Presidents who seek to insulate their policy preferences from reversal by
successors. Presidents have an obvious incentive to make their programs durable. But this durability fits uncomfortably with the core
democratic principle that politicians should not be bound to the policies
of their predecessors.288 Scholars have argued that such entrenchment
frustrates the will of the present majority.289 It has been described as
an “intergenerational power grab,”290 or, more poetically, “the dead hand
problem.”291
Structural deregulation can be seen as another tool of entrenchment,
used in this case to ensconce an underresourced bureaucracy rather than
political actors or particular policies. Saddling future Presidents with a
damaged bureaucracy can be even more durable than substantive deregulation: there is an established pathway for reinstituting rules and
policies repealed by a predecessor administration but no clear route to
rebuilding the staff, resources, expertise, and reputation that enable
agencies to perform their tasks well. Remedying structural deregulation
can be complicated and time-consuming. Restoring an agency’s workforce requires a sustained recruiting and hiring process that can itself
deplete an agency’s resources.292 Experienced employees may be reluctant to return or undergo a competitive process to reclaim their old
jobs.293 Developing new talent can take time. Similarly, rebuilding an
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
288 See, e.g., Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and
Retroactivity, 1987 AM. BAR FOUND. RSCH. J. 379, 404–05. The literature on entrenchment describes many instruments incumbent politicians can use to insulate their personnel and policies
against change, mostly in the context of passing legislation. Daryl Levinson and Benjamin Sachs
argue that entrenchment strategies are ubiquitous and can be achieved both formally and informally. See Levinson & Sachs, supra note 255, at 407. “[W]e see parties, politicians, and prevailing
coalitions continually strategizing to lock in their gains, battening down their offices and policies
against the winds of political change.” Id. at 402.
289 See Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO.
L.J. 491, 497 (1997); Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment Through Private Law: Binding Local
Governments, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 879, 881, 886 (2011). While most commentators have criticized
entrenchment, Professors Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule have deemed legislative entrenchment
strategies “no more objectionable” than other policy instruments that “shape the legal and institutional environment of future legislation.” Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative
Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665, 1666 (2002). But cf. Levinson & Sachs, supra
note 255, at 457 n.234 (noting that Posner and Vermeule are outliers in their defense of entrenchment).
290 See Serkin, supra note 289, at 945.
291 See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 289, at 497–98 (discussing the question of legislative entrenchment and proposing an “anti-entrenchment” theory of judicial review).
292 See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GGD-90-105, FEDERAL RECRUITING AND HIRING 21 (1990).
293 Under existing rules, the federal government may rehire former employees noncompetitively
at the same grade level. However, agencies must still expend resources on the reinstatement process
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agency’s reputation is a slow process that relies on trust and requires
repairing relationships. Structural deregulation thus forces an incoming
administration to add the task of rebuilding to that of governance.
D. Responding to Critics
At first blush, critics of the administrative state might be skeptical
of our argument that structural deregulation conflicts with core constitutional, administrative, and democratic principles. As noted in the
Introduction, these critics, including several members of the contemporary Supreme Court, view agencies as undemocratic and unaccountable,
and they worry that a robust administrative state contravenes the
system of checks and balances designed to protect the people against
arbitrary power.294 From this perspective, shielding agencies from presidential control, even to protect against the risk of administrative dismantling, only exacerbates the problem of unchecked agency power.
The appropriate check on presidential mismanagement of the bureaucracy, these critics might argue, is political.295
We do not agree with the strongest criticisms advanced by the skeptics, believing that agencies, generally, are amply constrained by both
political and legal oversight and internal safeguards. Thus, we do not
support the revival of the nondelegation doctrine, or subscribe to a formalist understanding of the appointment and removal power, or wish to
inter the Chevron doctrine.
In any event though, our argument does not depend on these debates.
Our point is simply that agencies have two political masters: Congress
and the President. The proper remedy for concerns about the value of
administrative agencies is legislative. If critics cannot muster sufficient
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
for each eligible employee. See Policy, Data, Oversight: Hiring Information, U.S. OFF. OF PERS.
MGMT., https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/hiring-information/reinstatement [https://
perma.cc/K8UQ-33W4].
294 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 499 (2010) (“The growth
of the Executive Branch, which now wields vast power and touches almost every aspect of daily
life, heightens the concern that it may slip from the Executive’s control, and thus from that of the
people.”).
295 See Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2203 (2020) (“The resulting
constitutional strategy is straightforward: divide power everywhere except for the Presidency, and
render the President directly accountable to the people through regular elections.”); Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (footnote omitted) (“A change in administration brought about by the
people casting their votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an executive agency’s reappraisal of the
costs and benefits of its programs and regulations. As long as the agency remains within the bounds
established by Congress, it is entitled to assess administrative records and evaluate priorities in light
of the philosophy of the administration.”). Such concerns might be heightened for defenders of a
“unitary” conception of executive power, in which the President is seen as having sole control over
the executive branch. See generally STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE
UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008) (undertaking historical and legal survey of unitary executive theory).
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support in Congress to repeal the statutes creating agencies or assigning
them particular tasks, the President should not be able to accomplish
the same goal through structural deregulation.
Even Justices skeptical of the administrative bureaucracy concede
that the Constitution designates Congress as the lawmaking body. An
agency may be “entitled to . . . evaluate priorities in light of the philosophy of the administration,” but it must do so “within the bounds established by Congress.”296 To the extent structural deregulation thwarts
this core element of constitutional design by frustrating agency implementation of statutory mandates, it must be confronted.
Additionally, at the most basic level, relying on electoral accountability to remedy the excesses of the President seems wholly inadequate
when those excesses — by muzzling internal dissent, sidelining experts,
relying on unconfirmed “acting” officials, and improperly redirecting appropriated funds — weaken the very mechanisms by which he might be
held accountable. Because structural deregulation is often opaque, it
may be all too easy for Presidents to evade blame for its costs. There is
something especially pernicious about a President doing his utmost to
debilitate agencies and then faulting them for being ineffectual while
taking no responsibility for their deficiencies. In the face of structural
deregulation, therefore, it is no answer for critics of the administrative
state to maintain that presidential control is the answer to administrative tyranny. That formulation overlooks the destructive potential of
presidential control.
III. PUBLIC LAW RESPONSES TO STRUCTURAL DEREGULATION
This Part argues that public law as a whole is ill-equipped to respond
to the challenges posed by structural deregulation because courts are
reluctant to oversee interbranch interactions, Presidents have grown
adept at circumventing statutory limitations on executive overreach,
and administrative law has a blind spot when it comes to internal
agency action.
The Constitution, statutory law, and administrative law, for the most
part, assume that the President will act in good faith in managing agencies. And the legislative and judicial branches of government have been
reluctant to interfere with executive management for fear of
overstepping their constitutional roles. The judiciary in particular has
also exhibited concern about its relative competence to decide managerial questions. The result is a legal blind spot when it comes to potential
presidential undermining of the bureaucracy.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
296

State Farm, 463 U.S. at 59 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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A. The Constitutional Blind Spot
As discussed in the previous Part, Presidents who engage in structural deregulation act at odds with the principle of legislative supremacy
and arguably betray the President’s duty of faithful execution under the
Take Care Clause — at least in the most egregious cases. Yet we think
it highly unlikely that courts would find any specific instance of structural deregulation to be a constitutional violation. They might even
refuse to hear such a challenge.
One problem is that it is hard to identify precisely when agency incapacitation has gone “too far.” When does priority in execution shade
into nullification? Courts and commentators have wrestled with this
line in the context of nonenforcement.297 The Supreme Court has confirmed the executive’s broad discretion to select from among competing
enforcement priorities.298 While federal courts have specified that this
discretion is not unlimited,299 and that the executive branch may not
nullify statutory commands through inaction,300 courts remain reluctant
to interfere with executive enforcement discretion.301 Using structural
deregulation to nullify statutory commands should raise concerns akin
to those raised by blanket nonenforcement decisions. But we think
courts would be similarly reluctant to intervene.
Similarly, it is far from clear what precisely the Take Care Clause
requires a President to do to maintain a requisite level of bureaucratic
infrastructure.302 How much undermining is too much? What test
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
297 Articles discussing the problem of nonenforcement include Patricia L. Bellia, Faithful
Execution and Enforcement Discretion, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1753, 1757 (2016) (identifying cases of
categorical enforcement discretion as those most likely to conflict with a good-faith interpretation
of the underlying statute); Aaron L. Nielson, How Agencies Choose Whether to Enforce the Law: A
Preliminary Investigation, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1517, 1520–21 (2018) (distinguishing nonenforcement that is consistent with statutory purpose from nonenforcement designed to achieve ends
that fall outside an agency’s statutory authority); and Price, supra note 258, at 674 (concluding that
executive enforcement discretion is limited and defeasible).
298 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837–38 (1985) (establishing a presumption of unreviewability
for agency decisions not to take enforcement action).
299 See id. at 833 (“Congress did not set agencies free to disregard legislative direction in the
statutory scheme that the agency administers.”); Ass’n of Civilian Technicians v. Fed. Lab. Rels.
Auth., 283 F.3d 339, 344 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (recognizing the exception to enforcement discretion for
policies of nonenforcement); Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (refusing to
defer to an agency’s adoption of general nonenforcement policy); see also Jentry Lanza, Note,
Agency Underenforcement as Reviewable Abdication, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1171, 1175–76 (2018)
(suggesting that “severe underenforcement” is an abdication of executive duty).
300 See infra section III.C.3, pp. 651–52.
301 See Deacon, supra note 5, at 804 (observing that it is difficult for plaintiffs to prove that a
pattern of nonenforcement exists).
302 We recognize that the Take Care Clause has also been read to prohibit limitations on and
interference with the President’s ordering of the executive branch. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v.
Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492–93 (2010) (concluding that the President could not
satisfy his obligations under the Take Care Clause if the double removal protections of the Board
were left in place); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 122 (1926) (observing that the power to
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might the Court use? One commentator suggests that the President
must do “what is necessary to ensure that the executive branch has the
capacity to implement and administer the policies created by legislation,
administrative rules, or presidential directives.”303 How might that
amorphous standard be operationalized concretely by a reviewing court?
We expect that several sitting Supreme Court Justices would be extremely skeptical of any litigant advancing such a standard, and that a
majority of the Court would resist adopting a test that would be so hard
to administer in practice.
Courts might also dismiss challenges to structural deregulation for
prudential reasons. Challengers would first struggle to establish constitutional or prudential standing.304 The Supreme Court has found that
“programmatic” challenges to government action raise “obvious difficulties insofar as proof of causation or redressability is concerned.”305
Challenges to the government inaction that produces structural deregulation, such as failures to appoint, would seem to exacerbate these concerns, especially in the absence of a statutory procedural right to challenge these choices. Even where structural deregulation presents as
action, as in the case of policy changes that deprive an agency of expert
input, it can be hard to link those changes to specific concrete injuries
that plaintiffs will suffer.306

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
remove executive branch officials is crucial to the President’s ability to take care that the laws are
faithfully executed); see also Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 14, at 1839–53 (compiling examples
from the case law). The clause has also been invoked to defend executive branch orders against
legal challenge by limiting private individuals’ standing to seek judicial review of particular administrative arrangements or decisions. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992)
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3) (opining that permitting members of the public to enforce an
undifferentiated public interest would be in tension with the President’s duty to “take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed”); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 761 (1984) (same). And it has been
used to defend prosecutorial discretion by executive branch officials. See United States v.
Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996); Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832. But these protections are consistent
with our argument that the clause implies a duty to preserve and protect administrative capacity.
303 Cooper, supra note 212, at 7.
304 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
305 Id. at 568 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 571 (arguing that the plaintiffs had failed to prove
that eliminating the fraction of funding provided by the agencies would cause the projects at issue
to “either be suspended, or [to] do less harm to listed species”); Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org.,
426 U.S. 26, 42–43 (1976) (finding it “purely speculative whether the denials of service specified in
the complaint fairly can be traced to [the challenged IRS revenue ruling] or instead result from
decisions made by the hospitals without regard to the tax implications”); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410
U.S. 614, 618 (1973).
306 The Court clarified in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016), that procedural injury
in itself can sometimes satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement, so long as the particular procedural
violation entails “a degree of risk sufficient to meet the concreteness requirement.” Id. at 1550.
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Even if plaintiffs could establish the core elements of Article III
standing, courts may decline to hear challenges to structural deregulation on other prudential grounds.307 The courts grant “widest latitude”
to the government “in the ‘dispatch of its own internal affairs.’”308
Thus, in Allen v. Wright,309 the Supreme Court denied standing to parents of Black children challenging the IRS’s alleged grant of tax exemptions to racially discriminatory private schools.310 In declaring that the
plaintiffs lacked standing, the Court held that “[t]he Constitution . . . assigns to the Executive Branch, and not to the Judicial Branch, the duty
to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’”311 The Supreme
Court has called into question at least some aspects of prudential standing doctrine, leaving its contours in doubt.312 Nevertheless, a court confronted with a Take Care challenge alleging improper maintenance of
agency capacity may well follow Allen’s lead and decline to hear the
case out of deference to executive managerial discretion.313
And even if these hurdles might be overcome,314 the courts still may
invoke the political question doctrine to bar challenges to structural deregulation. That doctrine cautions courts to avoid interference in questions “best suited for resolution by the political branches.”315 Executive
branch undermining of agency capacity may be precisely the sort of
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
307 Federal courts have historically adopted an additional “prudential” test for standing, asking
for example whether the grievance is more appropriately resolved by another branch of government
or whether the harms suffered by plaintiffs alleging statutory violations are within the “zone of
interests” that the statute sought to address. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components,
Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 126 (2014).
308 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 761 (1984) (quoting Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378–79 (1976)).
309 468 U.S. 737.
310 Id. at 739–40.
311 Id. at 761 (quoting U.S. CONST. art II, § 3). Although Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court
in Lexmark International framed the prudential inquiry as primarily or exclusively an exercise in
statutory interpretation, it is unclear how that opinion will affect the other prongs of the prudential
analysis, if at all. See Ernest A. Young, Prudential Standing After Lexmark International, Inc. v.
Static Control Components, Inc., 10 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 149, 152–53 (2014).
312 See Lexmark Int’l, 572 U.S. at 125–28.
313 Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 14, at 1847 (arguing the Supreme Court has understood
the Take Care Clause as creating “exclusive presidential authority to assure government officials’
fidelity to law”).
314 Some have argued, for example, that members of Congress might have standing to challenge
presidential nonenforcement. See Bethany R. Pickett, Note, Will the Real Lawmakers Please Stand
Up: Congressional Standing in Instances of Presidential Nonenforcement, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 439,
452–61 (2016).
315 Li-Shou v. United States, 777 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2015) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
210–11 (1962)). Two of the key factors in this analysis are whether an issue has been textually
committed to a coordinate branch of government and whether “judicially . . . manageable standards” for resolution of the matter exist. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 195
(2012) (quoting Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993)) (emphasizing these two factors in
finding that a citizenship challenge was justiciable). For the full list of six factors that govern
political question analysis, see Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
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question courts feel ill-equipped to address unless the interference involves a straightforward question of statutory interpretation.316
B. Statutory Constraints on Structural Deregulation
Existing statutes creating agencies or specifying their structures offer
few avenues for challenging structural deregulation. To argue successfully that structural deregulation violates a statute, challengers must
point to specific statutory provisions that conflict with particular deregulatory moves. However, current statutes that delegate substantive, affirmative responsibilities for agencies tend to outline agency structure
and resources in highly general terms.
More promising are suits under “trans-substantive statutes,” which
are not agency specific but instead establish procedural requirements
that apply across the administrative state.317 However, even these statutes cannot reach all of the categories of structural deregulation we identify above. There is no statute prohibiting reputational undermining of
agencies by the President, for example, nor would such restrictions be
consistent with the First Amendment guarantee of free speech.318 Only
removing the speaker from office through the political process can blunt
the force of such criticisms — an admittedly extreme remedy for a
President disparaging government bureaucrats.
1. Substantive Statutes. — As discussed above, courts are reluctant
to intervene in the day-to-day resource-allocation decisions agencies
make in the course of implementing statutes. Courts normally afford
agencies significant deference in cases where plaintiffs challenge agency
inaction,319 for example, or the exercise of enforcement discretion.320 In
theory, there are limits — the Supreme Court has expressed skepticism
about cases that demonstrate an agency’s “abdication of its statutory
responsibilities”321 — but in practice, there are few.
Courts would be readier to intervene if structural deregulation violated discrete statutory provisions. However, Congress does not typically specify precise agency staffing and resource levels in the so-called
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
316 See, e.g., Population Inst. v. McPherson, 797 F.2d 1062, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (finding the
question of whether the Administrator of USAID withheld program funds in violation of statutory
earmark to be justiciable).
317 This section will deal with both substantive and procedural statutes but leave discussion of
the Administrative Procedure Act for the following section on potential administrative law remedies.
318 Moreover, Presidents enjoy broad immunity from suit for actions related to their official
duties. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 755–56 (1982) (recognizing absolute presidential
immunity from damages liability for actions within even the “outer perimeter” of his official responsibility, id. at 756).
319 See, e.g., Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 66–67 (2004).
320 See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837–38 (1985).
321 Am. Horse Prot. Ass’n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting Heckler, 470 U.S. at
833 n.4).
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enabling acts creating particular agencies. These statutes do specify an
agency’s leadership structure by either prescribing that the agency shall
be headed by a single secretary or creating a multimember commission.322 They may also create subsidiary leadership positions within the
agency.323 But when it comes to general staffing, agency enabling acts
are largely silent. Instead, agency heads are delegated authority to hire
additional staff as they deem necessary.324
Occasionally a statute will offer more detail. For example, the
Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977325 (DOE Act) limits the
number of staff positions that can be exempt from civil service laws to
311.326 It does not, however, specify the total or minimum number of
staff in the department. Statutes might also reference, either directly or
obliquely, the type of employees that should be hired. The DOE Act
references “scientific, engineering, professional, and administrative personnel,” for example, in the same section on exempt-staff provisions.327
While the provision does not explicitly require that scientific and engineering professionals be hired, it could be read as anticipating that they
will be part of the department’s staff.
Most statutes are similarly vague when it comes to the number and
location of an agency’s offices. A few specify the location of an agency’s
headquarters. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,328 for example,
establishes that “[t]he principal office of the Administrator shall be in

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
322 See, e.g., Department of Transportation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-670, § 3, 80 Stat. 931, 931
(codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 102(b)); Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63203, § 1, 38 Stat. 717, 717–18 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 41).
323 See, e.g., Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-13, § 207, 40 Stat. 20, 22 (creating the Bureau of the Budget in the Treasury Department as well as a Director and an Assistant
Director); Department of Transportation Act § 3(b)–(c) (creating an Under Secretary of the
Department, four Assistant Secretaries and a General Counsel); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1011(b)(5), 124 Stat. 1376, 1964 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5491(b)(5)) (establishing a Deputy Director of the new CFPB).
324 Typical is the authority granted to the Secretary of Energy in the Department of Energy
Organization Act of 1977 (DOE Act), Pub. L. No. 95-91, § 621(a), 91 Stat. 565, 596 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7231). That Act allows the Secretary to “appoint and fix the compensation
of such officers and employees, including attorneys, as may be necessary to carry out [his] functions.”
Id. Similarly, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 authorizes an Administrator of the Wage and
Hour Division of the Department of Labor to “appoint such employees as he deems necessary to
carry out his functions and duties under this chapter.” 29 U.S.C. § 204(b). The Department of
Transportation Act of 1966 empowers Department leadership “to select, appoint, employ, and fix
the compensation of such officers and employees, including investigators, attorneys, and hearing
examiners, as are necessary to carry out the provisions” of the Act “and to prescribe their authority
and duties.” § 9(a), 80 Stat. at 944.
325 Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
326 42 U.S.C. § 7231(b)(1).
327 Id.
328 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219.
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the District of Columbia.”329 The Mine Safety and Health Review
Commission’s enabling act also places its headquarters in the District.330
Additionally, annual appropriations bills generally do not impose
specific requirements on agencies for staffing or resources. Amounts for
salaries and expenses are instead typically provided in a lump sum.
Appropriations may be directed specifically to certain administrative
projects — for example modernizing an agency’s infrastructure technology — though again, typically without specifying particular staffing or
resource quantities.331 Because appropriations language is so general, it
would be difficult to base a suit challenging the elimination of a given
number of staff positions, for example, on congressional intent (as embodied in appropriations) to maintain staffing levels.
2. Non-APA Procedural Statutes. — Challenging structural deregulation under procedural statutes is a piecemeal affair, with the relative
odds of success dependent on the precise action taken and the particular
statute at issue. Sometimes statutes enlarge the scope of agency authority to manage their own affairs. The Federal Housekeeping Statute,332
for example, the modern version of which was passed in 1966, gives the
head of an executive department authority to “prescribe regulations for
the government of his department, the conduct of its employees, the distribution and performance of its business, and the custody, use, and
preservation of its records, papers, and property.”333 Other statutes,
however, constrain the ability of the President and his political appointees to interfere with agency operations. These statutes offer possible
avenues to challenge structural deregulation. However, their scope is
limited, and entrepreneurial chief executives increasingly have identified
ways to sidestep their strictures.
(a) Civil Service Protections. — Notably, many of the statutes governing staffing of the federal executive branch emerged in response to
perceived presidential abuses of discretion. Congress passed the
Pendleton Act, the dominant statute providing civil servants with salary
and job protection, to curb the “spoils system” — perfected under
President Jackson and continued after the Civil War — under which
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
329 Id. § 204(c). The Dodd-Frank Act also places the CFPB’s principal office in the District of
Columbia. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(e).
330 30 U.S.C. § 823a (“The principal office of the Commission shall be in the District of Columbia.”).
331 See Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-94, 133 Stat. 2534, 2550
(2019) (appropriating $25 million for modernization of Department of Labor centralized infrastructure technology investments).
332 5 U.S.C. § 301.
333 Id. The EPA recently invoked this statute as legal justification for its final rule limiting the
use of scientific studies in agency rulemaking. Strengthening Transparency in Pivotal Science
Underlying Significant Regulatory Actions and Influential Scientific Information, 86 Fed. Reg. 469,
471 (Jan. 6, 2021) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 30).
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Presidents would reward their allies by placing them in plum administrative posts.334
The Pendleton Act established protections for civil service employees
in the federal government.335 The U.S. Civil Service Commission originally oversaw the law’s enforcement. Today, several newer agencies
perform the same role. These include the Office of Personnel
Management, the Merit Systems Protection Board, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, the Federal Labor Relations
Authority, and the Office of Special Counsel.336 The MSPB and EEOC
hear appeals in unlawful termination cases and thus stand as bulwarks
against wrongful termination of federal employees.337
Therefore, civil service laws can be used to challenge agency staff
terminations. But the structural deregulatory mechanisms identified in
Part I largely circumvent these protections. Cutting staff through attrition relies on voluntary or incentivized retirements rather than terminations. Hiring freezes do not run afoul of the Pendleton Act, nor do office
relocations that lead federal employees to quit en masse.338 In addition,
Presidents have found novel ways to circumvent the protections afforded by these laws, for example, by reclassifying federal employees.
President Carter supported the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978339 in
part because it created a Senior Executive Service whose members were

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
334 See
Pendleton
Act
(1883),
OUR
DOCUMENTS,
https://www.
ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=48 [https://perma.cc/4ZSJ-Z325]. The immediate impetus for the Act was the assassination of President Garfield by a disgruntled and deluded federal
job seeker who believed the President owed him a job in the administration in exchange for alleged
help provided to his election campaign. See Gilbert King, The Stalking of the President,
SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Jan. 17, 2012), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/the-stalking-ofthe-president-20724161 [https://perma.cc/GQ7Z-4RFC].
335 Pub. L. No. 47-27, § 2, 22 Stat. 403, 403–04 (1883). The Pendleton Act has been updated
several times, notably by the Civil Service Reform Act in 1978. Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111.
336 Andrew Glass, Pendleton Act Inaugurates U.S. Civil Service System, Jan. 16, 1883,
POLITICO (Jan. 16, 2018, 12:00 AM), https://politico.com/story/2018/01/16/pendleton-act-inaugurates-us-civil-service-system-jan-16-1883-340488 [https://perma.cc/H27K-5S6N]; see also U.S.
GEN. ACCT. OFF., FPCD-80-38, CIVIL SERVICE REFORM — WHERE IT STANDS TODAY 2–3
(1980).
337 See Policy, Data, Oversight: Employee Relations, U.S. OFF. OF PERS. MGMT.,
https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/employee-relations/employee-rights-appeals/#url=
EmployeeCoverage [https://perma.cc/2E8F-FKFL].
338 Former White House Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney reportedly cheered the Department of
Agriculture’s move to Kansas City as a method for thinning the Agency’s workforce, noting: “[I]t’s
nearly impossible to fire a federal worker. I know that because a lot of them work for me, and I’ve
tried. You can’t do it.” Paul Bedard, Mulvaney Cheers for More Federal Workers to Quit,
“Wonderful Way” to Drain Swamp, WASH. EXAM’R (Aug. 3, 2019, 8:10 AM), https://
washingtonexaminer.com/washington-secrets/mulvaney-cheers-for-more-federal-workers-to-quitwonderful-way-to-drain-swamp [https://perma.cc/LN3F-BAC9].
339 Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111.
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subject to fewer job protections than the rest of the civil service.340
President Reagan expanded the number of noncareer political appointees within agencies in an effort to exert more control over agency
decisionmaking.341
President Trump issued an executive order in October 2020 purporting to create a new category of federal employees with no protection
from adverse personnel actions.342 Citing the need for the President to
“have appropriate management oversight,” the executive order mandated that the new “Schedule F” employees would be exempt from competitive service requirements and preremoval procedural protections.343
The order covered all federal civil service employees in “positions of a
confidential, policy-determining, policy-making, or policy-advocating
character that are not normally subject to change as a result of a
Presidential transition.”344 President Biden revoked the order, but it
illustrates yet another way that a determined President can try to exert
greater control over the civil service.345
(b) The Federal Vacancies Reform Act. — The Federal Vacancies
Reform Act similarly tries to restrict presidential authority over agency
personnel. It does so by limiting the amount of time that Presidents can
staff vacant agency leadership posts with acting officials.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
340 See Mark W. Huddleston, The Carter Civil Service Reforms: Some Implications for Political
Theory and Public Administration, 96 POL. SCI. Q. 607, 617–18 (1981–1982); Stuart E. Eizenstat,
Jimmy Carter and Civil Service Reform 6 (Ctr. for the Study of the Admin. State, Working Paper
No. 19-16, 2019). The Act also consolidated authority over federal personnel in the OPM, giving
the President greater oversight over functions previously exercised by the bipartisan Civil Service
Commission. See Huddleston, supra, at 607.
341 See Steven D. Stehr, Top Bureaucrats and the Distribution of Influence in Reagan’s Executive
Branch, 57 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 75, 75 (1997); see also Political Appointees in Federal Agencies:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civ. Serv. of the H. Comm. on Post Off. & Civ. Serv., 101st Cong.
5 (1989) (summary of statement of Bernard L. Ungar, director of federal human resource management issues, United States General Accounting Office) (providing data on the increases in noncareer
staff).
342 Exec. Order No. 13,957, 85 Fed. Reg. 67,631 (Oct. 21, 2020).
343 Id. at 67,631; see id. at 67,632.
344 Id. at 67,632. The order was immediately challenged, see Complaint at 2, Nat’l Treasury
Emps. Union v. Trump, No. 20-3078 (D.D.C. Oct. 26, 2020) (citing law’s limitation of exemptions
from civil service to cases when exemption is “necessary” or “as conditions of good administration
warrant” (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 3302)), and the incoming Biden Administration repealed it as one of
its first acts in office, see Exec. Order No. 14,003, 86 Fed. Reg. 7,231 (Jan. 22, 2021).
345 Cf. Erich Wagner, The Legal Theories at the Heart of Trump’s Order Politicizing the Civil
Service, GOV’T EXEC. (Nov. 3, 2020), https://www.govexec.com/management/2020/11/legaltheories-heart-trumps-order-politicizing-civil-service/169765 [https://perma.cc/C588-RTHK] (noting that President Trump undid more than a century of civil service law “with the stroke of a pen,”
resulting in “swift and nearly unanimous” backlash).
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Early versions of the Act specified time limits for acting officials that
Congress hoped would induce Presidents to nominate replacements expeditiously.346 However, Presidents continued to make broad use of acting officials.347 Moreover, the Department of Justice opined after the
passage of the 1988 amendments to the Act that agency heads possessed
independent authority to fill offices temporarily.348
In the 1998 Federal Vacancies Reform Act, Congress again sought to
specify the manner in which temporary executive branch appointments
could be made.349 The Act’s legislative history underscores Congress’s
view that “[t]he selection of officers is not a presidential power,”350 and
that the President “lacks any inherent appointment authority for government officers” beyond the nomination duties specified in the
Constitution.351
There are three problems with congressional efforts to limit presidential power to appoint acting agency officials. First, the White House
has asserted that Presidents are not bound by the 1998 Act’s efforts to
constrain it, at least where an agency’s specific statutes contain conflicting provisions.352 Second, Presidents have tried to circumvent the Act’s
limitations by having agency heads delegate responsibilities to subordinates before vacating their offices.353 Finally, the Act permits acting
officials to stay in their roles for long periods,354 and Presidents often
wait until near the end of that period to send a nomination to the
Senate.355
(c) The Impoundment Control Act of 1974. — The Impoundment
Control Act, too, was passed in response to executive excess. The Act
sought “to resolve disagreement between the Executive and Legislative
branches over which has ultimate control of government program and
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
346 An early version of the Act limited acting officials to ten day periods in many cases. See
O’Connell, supra note 80, at 626 (citing Act of July 23, 1868, ch. 227, 15 Stat. 168). Amendments
in 1988 extended that period and offered even longer extensions if the President submitted a nominee for Senate consideration. S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 4 (1998).
347 O’Connell, supra note 80, at 626.
348 Id.; see also S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 4.
349 See S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 4.
350 Id. at 4.
351 Id. at 5.
352 See O’Connell, supra note 80, at 667–71 (examining the cases of the CFPB and the
Department of Justice).
353 See id. at 635 (“Presidents can strategically use delegation to keep their preferred officials in
control of certain administrative functions long past the Vacancies Act’s time limits.”); Nina A.
Mendelson, The Permissibility of Acting Officials: May the President Work Around Senate
Confirmation?, 72 ADMIN. L. REV. 533, 560 (2020) (observing that Congress sought to eliminate
delegation as a tool of circumvention in the 1998 Act).
354 While the statute limits acting officials to 210 days in office in most cases, the clock starts
over in the case of a failed nomination for the position. O’Connell, supra note 80, at 630–31.
355 See id. at 724.
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fiscal spending policies.”356 President Nixon had refused to spend large
amounts of funds appropriated by Congress, and he did so in a way that
weakened legislative programs with which President Nixon disagreed.357 The Act obligates Presidents to spend money appropriated by
Congress for particular purposes.358 If a President plans to withhold
spending on a permanent basis, he must notify Congress and must receive approval for that withholding from both Houses within forty-five
days.359 If he fails to do so, that failure is subject to challenge in court.360
The Impoundment Control Act did stop the kind of egregious withholding seen during the Nixon Administration. However, while the Act
prohibits refusals to spend, it does not affect the reprogramming of appropriated funds within a single account. As discussed above, the
President can exert control over agency reprogramming because OMB
acts as a gatekeeper between the agency and the relevant congressional
committee that must approve any such requests.361
***
In sum, statutes designed to limit presidential flexibility to remove
civil servants and replace them with loyalists, to fill vacancies with acting officials rather than submit nominees for Senate confirmation, and
to hijack appropriated agency funds have been only partially successful.
As the next section will show, the APA has similarly failed to constrain
presidential discretion to unmake the bureaucracy.
C. The Administrative Law Blind Spot
Administrative law also offers an unsatisfying response to structural
deregulation. The APA, sometimes referred to as the “statutory constitution of administrative government,”362 does not lend itself to challenging structural deregulation. This incompatibility is in part due to the
language and exclusions of the Act itself, and in part due to the judicial
gloss given to its provisions over time.
The first problem with using the APA to challenge structural deregulation is that the Act is generally understood not to apply directly to
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
356
357

Dabney v. Reagan, 542 F. Supp. 756, 760 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
Peter E. Quint, The Separation of Powers Under Nixon: Reflections on Constitutional
Liberties and the Rule of Law, 1981 DUKE L.J. 1, 14–15.
358 See 31 U.S.C. § 1402.
359 Id. Either House of Congress may also pass a resolution disapproving of any temporary
impoundments, in which case the monies must be spent as specified by statute. Id. § 1403.
360 In Dabney v. Reagan, 542 F. Supp. 756, for example, the court ordered President Reagan to
spend money that Congress had allocated to the Solar Energy and Energy Conservation Bank after
the President declined to do so. Abner J. Mikva, Deregulating Through the Back Door: The Hard
Way to Fight a Revolution, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 521, 526 (1990) (citing Dabney, 542 F. Supp. at 768).
361 Pasachoff, supra note 134, at 2231 (identifying this lever as a way for Presidents to control
agencies).
362 Gillian Metzger, Columbia L. Sch., The Administrative Procedure Act: An Introduction
1 (2017), https://prrac.org/pdf/APA.summary.ProfMetzger.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NBU-SV5E].
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the President. However, even where agencies, rather than the President,
take the ultimate actions we characterize as structural deregulation, the
APA is unlikely to provide an effective remedy. This incapacity is, first,
because the Act largely shields an agency’s managerial decisions from
public scrutiny, and, second, because courts are reluctant to police
agency inaction and delay. Moreover, because courts frequently accept
an agency’s claim of scarce resources as justification for the failure to
perform statutorily mandated actions by specified deadlines, structural
deregulation (for example, depriving an agency of resources) can reinforce substantive deregulation (for example, failing to meet congressional deadlines for issuing rules), perpetually.
1. Presidential Action. — In Franklin v. Massachusetts,363 the
Supreme Court held that presidential actions are not “agency action”
under the APA.364 Thus, presidential actions, such as executive orders,
are unreviewable for consistency with the APA’s procedural and substantive requirements.365 The same is true of appointments and removal
decisions. Such actions may still be challenged as inconsistent with the
Constitution or with substantive and procedural requirements in other
statutes. As discussed above, however, statutory claims may be difficult
to make because agency-enabling acts typically outline agency structures only in general terms.
The exemption of presidential action from any of the APA’s requirements of regularity or procedure has another important consequence for
structural deregulation: it facilitates presidential imposition of increasingly burdensome obligations on an already-stressed bureaucracy.
Every President since Reagan has imposed some version of cost-benefit
analysis on agencies to facilitate centralized review and coordination of
federal administrative action.366 Other Executive-created agency bur-

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
363
364

505 U.S. 788 (1992).
Id. at 796. Franklin concerned the decennial census and its effects on the allocation of congressional representatives to the states. Massachusetts challenged the census’s method of allocating
overseas military personnel among the states as arbitrary and capricious under the APA. Id. at
790–91. While the Secretary of Commerce oversees the census count and recommends apportionment of representatives, ultimately the President submits a statement to Congress entitling states to
a particular number of representatives. Id. at 792. Because the Secretary’s action had no effect
until the President issued his statement, and because the Secretary’s calculations generated no administrative record and were not made public, the Court deemed the relevant final action “presidential” and therefore unreviewable. Id. at 796–800. The Court’s decision was relatively terse, and
some have suggested that it is time to rethink its holding. See Kathryn E. Kovacs,
Constraining the Statutory President, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 63, 68 (2020).
365 However, agency action taken pursuant to such orders is subject to challenge so long as it
meets the APA’s other criteria for reviewability.
366 See Rena Steinzor, The Case for Abolishing Centralized White House Regulatory Review, 1
MICH. J. ENV’T & ADMIN. L. 209, 238–68 (2012).
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dens include required analyses of the effects of proposed rules on federalism,367 environmental health and safety risks for children,368 energy
supply,369 and environmental justice.370 As noted above, while many of
these requirements are entirely salutary, Presidents determined to do so
can abuse the regulatory review process to demand round after round
of additional analysis, overload agencies, and bury them in “sludge.”371
2. Excluding Managerial Decisions from Public Participation and
Disclosure. — Administrative law shields most internal agency management decisions from public participation and even from public scrutiny.
The APA requires that agencies give notice to the public of most proposed regulations and that members of the public have the opportunity
to comment on those proposals before a final rule issues.372 However,
“rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice” are exempt from
these requirements.373 There are few cases applying this exemption to
organizational rules as opposed to rules of practice and procedure. But
it seems clear that internal organizational rules affecting, for example,
personnel policies and resource distribution would not be subject to public scrutiny. Thus internal agency decisions about how to allocate resources, where to place employees, where to locate offices, how to spend
funds, and how to review allegations of wrongdoing are not subject to
public input under the APA.
The EPA recently claimed this exemption for its rule limiting the
scientific studies the Agency could rely on in its rulemaking.374 While
framed as a transparency measure, this rule would have the effect of
limiting agency reliance on important peer-reviewed studies due to their
use of health data with personal identifiers, which is shielded from disclosure by public health privacy laws.375 While claiming an exemption
from the requirements of APA § 553, however, the Agency voluntarily
engaged in a notice-and-comment process.376 The purpose of identifying
the rule as procedural seems to have been, instead, to locate the authority for its promulgation in the Federal Housekeeping Statute at 5 U.S.C.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374

See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,612, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,685 (Oct. 30, 1987).
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,045, 62 Fed. Reg. 19,885 (Apr. 23, 1997).
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,211, 66 Fed. Reg. 28,355 (May 22, 2001).
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7,629 (Feb. 16, 1994).
See Heinzerling, supra note 154, at 326, 365.
See 5 U.S.C. § 553.
Id. § 553(b)(3)(A).
Strengthening Transparency in Pivotal Science Underlying Significant Regulatory Actions
and Influential Scientific Information, 86 Fed. Reg. 469, 472 (Jan. 6, 2021) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 30).
375 See Lisa Friedman, A Plan Made to Shield Big Tobacco from Facts Is Now E.P.A. Policy,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/04/climate/trump-epa-science.html
[https://perma.cc/FD9T-PVUS].
376 Strengthening Transparency in Pivotal Science Underlying Significant Regulatory Actions
and Influential Scientific Information, 86 Fed. Reg. at 472.
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§ 301. Thus the procedural exemption can be helpful to an agency seeking to expand its policymaking authority as well as one seeking to circumvent public process.
The public may not even be aware of changes affecting internal
agency management. An agency must publish in the Federal Register
basic information such as its locations and key employee contacts, along
with “statements of the general course and method by which its
functions are channeled and determined, including the nature and requirements of all formal and informal procedures.”377 More detailed
information about the agency’s internal operations is shielded, however,
even from document requests under the Freedom of Information Act,
by an exception for matters “related solely to the internal personnel rules
and practices of an agency.”378
Thus, even where an agency documents policies such as a hiring
freeze or the decision to shift personnel from one area of agency operations to another, it can be hard for the public to access that information.
The most reliable method of public information about these decisions
may be leaks from the individuals involved, and indeed media accounts
suggest this is the primary means by which structural deregulatory actions come to public attention.379
3. Judicial Review of Inaction and Delay. — Federal court jurisprudence on review of agency inaction and delay also shows the limitations
of the APA for challenging structural deregulation. Many structural deregulation efforts present as a failure to act, including failures to hire,
failures to procure, failures to investigate alleged managerial or operational shortcomings, and refusals to spend. Agency inaction and delay
are difficult to challenge under the APA. The courts have been consistently deferential to agency inaction,380 and plaintiffs win only truly egregious cases of agency delay.381
Moreover, by exacerbating resource scarcity, structural deregulation
can produce judicial deference to instances of substantive deregulation
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
377
378
379

5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(A)–(B).
Id. § 552(b)(2).
See, e.g., Ken Dilanian, Under Trump, More Leaks — And More Leak Investigations, NBC
NEWS (Apr. 8, 2019, 3:14 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/justice-department/under-trumpmore-leaks-more-leak-investigations-n992121 [https://perma.cc/LTG9-C77C].
380 See, e.g., Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004) (finding that APA claims
could proceed only “where a plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to take a discrete agency action
that it is required to take,” which excluded “broad programmatic attack[s]” (emphasis omitted)).
381 See Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio, Agency Delays: How a Principal-Agent Approach Can Inform
Judicial and Executive Branch Review of Agency Foot-Dragging, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1381,
1404–14 (2011) (surveying cases suggesting that the Supreme Court has a “presumption against
reviewability of [agency] inaction” for several kinds of actions, id. at 1409, including decisions about
enforcement, and that the Court has never interpreted “action . . . unreasonably delayed” as used
in the APA, id. at 1411).
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that take the form of agency inaction or delay.382 As the Supreme Court
emphasized in Massachusetts v. EPA,383 “an agency has broad discretion
to choose how best to marshal its limited resources and personnel to
carry out its delegated responsibilities.”384
Jurisprudence on review of agency inaction and delay therefore
throws up a double barrier to confronting structural deregulation. First,
it is difficult to challenge structural deregulation itself where it takes the
form of inaction or delay. Second, structural deregulation can make it
more difficult to challenge failures to promulgate substantive rules or to
take enforcement action by worsening the problem of agency resource
scarcity.
IV. EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESSIONAL REMEDIES
Structural deregulation in its most extreme form is far-reaching,
comprehensive, and radical.385 Yet its insidiousness lies in its incremental nature. In this Part, we briefly describe some short-term measures
an incoming President might take to rebuild agency capacity, and then
turn to tools Congress might use to guard against structural deregulation
over the longer term. Congress could adopt provisions to force greater
transparency, impose constraints on agency managerial decisions, or exert greater budgetary controls. Yet we readily concede that such
measures also come with significant downsides and may create more
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
382 Professor Eric Biber has written persuasively that at the core of the federal courts’ deference
to agency inaction is their recognition that agencies do not have the resources to implement their
statutory responsibilities to anything like the fullest extent. See Eric Biber, The Importance of
Resource Allocation in Administrative Law, 60 ADMIN L. REV. 1, 17 (2008) [hereinafter Biber,
Resource Allocation] (“[T]he analysis of whether an agency must act . . . often turns on whether the
courts have concluded that the case involves important resource allocation issues.”); see also Eric
Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin: Judicial Review of Administrative Agency Action and Inaction,
26 VA. ENV’T L.J. 461, 467–68 (2008) [hereinafter Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin] (“An agency’s
decision about how to allocate its resources among competing priorities is at the core of the policymaking discretion that the executive branch of government and any administrative agency must
have.”). Biber understands court decisions on agency inaction as balancing deference to agency
resource-allocation decisions with the courts’ constitutional duty to ensure agencies adhere to their
statutory mandates. Biber, Resource Allocation, supra, at 4. In this balancing test, Biber continues:
“[R]esource allocation is sometimes outcome-determinative.” Id.
383 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
384 Id. at 527. Courts have not been specific about the precise meaning of “resource.” This
vagueness can be problematic, especially where agencies are able to strategically invoke the “talismanic” idea of “limited resources” to justify failures to execute statutory responsibilities. See Biber,
Resource Allocation, supra note 382, at 27; see also Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin, supra note
382, at 468–69.
385 See, e.g., Lisa Rein et al., Trump’s Historic Assault on the Civil Service Was Four Years in the
Making, WASH. POST (Oct. 23, 2020, 8:30 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trumpfederal-civil-service/2020/10/23/02fbf05c-1549-11eb-ba42-ec6a580836ed_story.html [https://perma.
cc/L3H5-VGR3].
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problems than they solve. Congress might also play a more active oversight role with the aim of checking presidential overreach. Such oversight is more likely to occur in periods of divided government, and we
are mindful that the hyperpartisanship and dysfunction in the contemporary Congress makes meaningful oversight hard to conduct.
A. Short-Term Rebuilding
After a period of structural deregulation, a new President cannot restore agency capacity with the stroke of a pen; he must do it brick by
brick.386 The immediate task is to rebuild and strengthen agencies to
ensure they are adequately staffed, sufficiently resourced, and appropriately empowered to fulfill their statutory tasks. In some instances, it
will be obvious which agencies require bolstering. To the extent their
condition may not be clear, independent assessments by nonpartisan
agencies like the GAO, or the National Academy of Public
Administration, can suggest areas of greatest need.387
During the presidential transition period, an incoming administration is authorized to consult with agency officals, and it normally works
with senior civil service at each agency to identify priorities for restoring
budget, staffing, and the like.388 In instances where agencies have been
badly weakened, the incoming team can draw up plans to move swiftly
to shore up staff. The White House would take steps to rebuild both
internal and external expertise by, for example, staffing key expert positions that had been eliminated or left unfilled by the prior administration; restoring reassigned or relocated officials to their prior jobs if doing
so would advance the agency’s mission; and reestablishing or strengthening statutorily mandated advisory committees.389 To support this
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
386 See Nicholas Confessore, Mick Mulvaney’s Master Class in Destroying a Bureaucracy from
Within, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/16/magazine/
consumer-financial-protection-bureau-trump.html [https://perma.cc/4CVN-4SM3] (chronicling the
example of Acting Director Mick Mulvaney weakening the CFPB “brick by brick”); see also
Catherine Rampell, Opinion, How Mick Mulvaney Is Dismantling a Federal Agency, WASH. POST
(Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/mick-mulvaney-cant-legally-kill-thecfpb-so-hes-starving-it-instead/2018/01/25/4481d2ce-0216-11e8-8acf-ad2991367d9d_story.html
[https://perma.cc/B5Y8-LBES].
387 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-205, ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH:
HIGH-LEVEL STRATEGY AND LEADERSHIP NEEDED TO CONTINUE PROGRESS TOWARD
PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS 34 (2010) (concluding that the
EPA’s Children’s Health programs are underfunded and understaffed).
388 See, e.g., MARTHA JOYNT KUMAR, BEFORE THE OATH: HOW GEORGE W. BUSH AND
BARACK OBAMA MANAGED A TRANSFER OF POWER 113–15 (2015) (describing the role and
work of agency review teams); P’SHIP FOR PUB. SERV. & BOS. CONSULTING GRP.,
PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION GUIDE 143–56 (2020), https://presidentialtransition.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/6/2018/01/Presidential-Transition-Guide-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZW22S77] (same).
389 For example, to restaff agencies like the State Department and the Defense Department,
which were badly weakened by President Trump’s staff attrition and erosion policies, President
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work, it would be necessary to properly staff and equip the key personnel agencies, such as the Office of Personnel Management and Office of
Federal Procurement Policy, something Presidents from both parties
have failed to do in the past.390 An incoming administration might also
prioritize appointing internal agency watchdogs such as IGs,391 who,
while not critical to an agency’s regulatory capacity per se, help to promote transparency and accountability.392
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Biden moved quickly in 2021 to fill subcabinet positions that do not require Senate confirmation.
See Nahal Toosi et al., Anticipating Senate Bottlenecks, Biden Races to Fill Agency Jobs, POLITICO
(Dec. 2, 2020, 4:30 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/12/02/biden-nominations-transition442046 [https://perma.cc/KQK4-UFS3].
390 See Cooper, supra note 212, at 12–13 (discussing the Obama Administration’s delay in filling
these key posts). Anne O’Connell emphasizes that “[s]tability in the [White House Presidential
Personnel Office] is critical to agency staffing.” ANNE JOSEPH O’CONNELL, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS, WAITING FOR LEADERSHIP: PRESIDENT OBAMA’S RECORD IN STAFFING KEY
AGENCY POSITIONS AND HOW TO IMPROVE THE APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 4 (2010).
391 Approximately thirty IGs, generally those associated with the larger government agencies,
must be nominated by the President before they can be confirmed by the Senate. See KATHRYN
FRANCIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45450, STATUTORY INSPECTORS GENERAL IN THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: A PRIMER 11, 12 tbl.5 (2019) (reporting that thirty-six IGs must be
nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, and that thirty-three of these are establishment IGs). Toward the end of the Trump Administration, fifteen IG positions were vacant. See
COUNCIL OF THE INSPECTORS GEN. ON INTEGRITY & EFFICIENCY, PRESIDENTIAL
TRANSITION HANDBOOK 17 (2020), https://www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/files/CIGIEPresidential-Transition-Handbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZUP-DP8S]. Of these, four were awaiting a presidential nomination and three were awaiting nomination by an agency head. Of the
vacant positions with candidates pending confirmation, all but one were nominated in 2020, even
though seven of the offices were vacated in 2019 or earlier. See Bill Theobald, Federal Waste
Watchdogs, Undermined by Trump, Get Some GOP Backing, THE FULCRUM (June 25, 2020),
https://thefulcrum.us/inspector-general-trump-gop [https://perma.cc/C32D-24ZN]. For example,
the CIA IG position became vacant in 2015, but the President did not nominate a replacement until
April 2020. See Julian E. Barnes, Senate Questions C.I.A. Watchdog Nominee over Independence,
N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/24/us/politics/cia-watchdog-peterthomson.html [https://perma.cc/A46E-TYK6]. Earlier, the State Department IG slot was vacant
for over five years, from 2008 until a permanent replacement was confirmed in 2013. See Joseph
E. Schmitz, Opinion, Obama’s Inspector General Negligence, WALL ST. J. (June 4, 2013, 7:02 PM),
https://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324063304578520952503319368.html
[https://
perma.cc/TBJ9-9LQQ]; Domani Spero, Senate Confirms Steve Linick; State Dept Finally Gets an
Inspector General After 2,066 Days, DIPLOPUNDIT (Sept. 30, 2013), https://
diplopundit.net/2013/09/30/senate-confirms-steve-linick-state-dept-finally-gets-an-inspectorgeneral-after-2066-days [https://perma.cc/PZB5-2BG3].
392 IGs are one of the primary avenues by which Congress oversees agencies; they are internal
watchdogs who investigate agency waste, fraud, and other misconduct. IGs are independent by
design. They choose which matters to audit and investigate without agency interference, and report
their findings to both the agency and Congress. Both Metzger and Professor Neal Katyal have
highlighted the role of IGs in the “administrative” separation of powers — the system of internal
checks and balances within the executive branch. See Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent
Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423, 429–30
(2009); Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous
Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2347 (2006); see also Pozen, supra note 151, at 1143 &
n.270 (citing IGs as one of several important checks on government misbehavior); Where Are All
the Watchdogs? Addressing Inspector General Vacancies: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight
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In addition, an incoming President’s first annual budget could propose that Congress refund agencies that have suffered significant budget
reductions, or which have had their allocated funds reassigned in the
prior administration.393 The President’s budget is developed by the
OMB in collaboration with federal agencies; among other things, it
establishes the administration’s priorities for federal programs and regulatory policies.394 While just the first step in a long congressional appropriations process, the budget presents an early opportunity for a new
administration to signal — to Congress, the agencies, and the public —
that it plans to remediate structural deregulation by rebuilding agency
capacity.395
While the President nominates and awaits confirmation of new
agency leadership, he can direct senior acting officials to cancel or suspend time-consuming busy work and refocus agencies on their statutory
priorities. Presidents can do this informally, but they can also announce
their intentions more publicly, through memos from the Chief of Staff,
or executive orders and presidential memoranda directing agencies to
take certain actions. Presidents can also prioritize certain regulatory
matters by specific deadlines.396
Finally, in order to help reverse the damaging effects of reputational
undermining, an incoming President could set a tone of treating agency
personnel with respect,397 and appoint senior agency leaders who both
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
& Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. 2 (2012), https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.
oversight.house.gov/files/documents/5-10-12-Wiens-Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/DZG7-AGVG]
(statement of Jake Wiens, Investigator, Project on Government Oversight).
393 For example, President Biden’s first budget proposed substantial funding increases for many
agencies that had suffered reductions during the prior administration, including the Education
Department, Health and Human Services Department, and Environmental Protection Agency.
Tony Romm, Biden Seeks Huge Funding Increases for Education, Health Care and Environmental
Protection in First Budget Request to Congress, WASH. POST (Apr. 9, 2021, 5:17 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2021/04/09/biden-2022-budget [https://perma.cc/RF8DH3YV].
394 See Pasachoff, supra note 134, at 2194 (describing the role that the office plays in developing
the President’s budget).
395 For an overview of the budget process, see CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES,
POLICY BASICS: INTRODUCTION TO THE FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS (2020),
https://www.cbpp.org/research/introduction-to-the-federal-budget-process
[https://perma.cc/
FM6C-W4L2].
396 For example, President Biden’s “Executive Order on Protecting Public Health and the
Environment and Restoring Science to Tackle the Climate Crisis” tasked EPA and other agencies
with a variety of substantive policy tasks, and included deadlines for action. Exec. Order No.
13,990, 86 Fed. Reg. 7,037 (Jan. 20, 2021).
397 See, for example, President Biden’s commitment in a letter to a member of Congress during
the campaign that he would treat federal workers with “the utmost dignity and respect.” Eric Katz,
Biden Promises Pay Raises for Feds, Vows to Rely on Civil Servants’ Expertise, GOV’T EXEC.
(Mar. 2, 2020), https://www.govexec.com/workforce/2020/03/biden-promises-pay-raises-feds-vowsrely-civil-servants-expertise/163451 [https://perma.cc/N4EB-DBHZ]; see also Eric Katz, The Rival:
Rebuilding the Bureaucracy, GOV’T EXEC. (Sept. 21, 2020), https://www.govexec.com/
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possess, and are seen to possess, relevant expertise and experience.398
Those leaders, in turn, could make an effort to revitalize demoralized
career staff by rallying them around the agency’s mission.399 Such steps
may sound basic, or even quaint, but they are essential to rebuilding
morale and integrity.400
B. Longer-Term Measures to Fortify Agency Capacity
Thus far we have described the things an incoming Chief Executive
can do relatively quickly and unilaterally to rebuild agency capacity after a period of structural deregulation. But what might be done proactively to guard against it? The key actor here must be Congress, which
has the power to structure, empower, fund, and oversee administrative
agencies, and to push back against presidential overreach. Below, we
discuss steps Congress might take to limit presidential discretion over
the administrative state ex ante, or conduct oversight ex post, to shore
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
management/2020/09/rival-rebuilding-bureaucracy/168571 [https://perma.cc/NFM3-WJGX] (discussing President Biden’s plans for ethics reforms). President Biden took immediate steps to restore
civil service protections, issuing an “Executive Order on Protecting the Federal Workforce”
revoking President Trump’s executive order creating a new Schedule F service category exempting
employees offering policy advice from service job protections; the order also revoked measures designed to limit union activity and make it easier to fire federal employees. See Exec. Order No.
14,003, 86 Fed. Reg. 7,231 (Jan. 22, 2021); Elaine Knutt, Role Reversal: Biden Rolls Back Trump’s
GOV’T
F.
(Jan.
27,
2021),
https://www.
Civil
Service
Directives,
GLOB.
globalgovernmentforum.com/round-up-biden-moves-support-federal-workers
[https://perma.cc/
J699-CH2N]. The order also stated the President’s commitment to pursue a higher minimum wage
of $15 per hour for federal employees. Id.
398 Several of President Trump’s cabinet appointees were criticized for, among other things, lacking expertise and being opposed to their agency’s mission. See Paul Waldman, Opinion, Donald
Trump Has Assembled the Worst Cabinet in American History, WASH. POST (Jan. 19, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2017/01/19/donald-trump-has-assembledthe-worst-cabinet-in-american-history [https://perma.cc/GDF4-3JFT]. These appointees were seen
as disrupters, however, by the President and his allies. See Heidi M. Przybyla, Trump’s Cabinet Is
His Team of Disrupters at Agencies They’ve Battled, USA TODAY (Jan. 12, 2017, 10:28 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/01/12/some-trump-cabinet-picks-skepticaltheir-agencies-missions/96417756 [https://perma.cc/HP26-PKT5]. Other Presidents have been
faulted for not prioritizing competence in their senior political appointments. See, e.g., Donald P.
Moynihan & Alasdair S. Roberts, The Triumph of Loyalty over Competence: The Bush
Administration and the Exhaustion of the Politicized Presidency, 70 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 572, 574–
75 (2010) (criticizing the Bush Administration’s appointees for their lack of experience).
399 See, e.g., Scott Gottlieb, Comm’r, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., First Remarks to FDA Staff
(May 15, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/speeches-fda-officials/first-remarks-fda-staff05152017 [https://perma.cc/7RJM-6WVV]. While the State Department is not a regulatory agency,
the remarks of Secretary of State Antony Blinken to State Department employees also provide a
good example of how incoming agency heads can seek to rally disheartened career staff. See Antony
J. Blinken, Sec’y of State, First Remarks to State Department Employees (Jan. 27, 2021),
https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-to-state-department-employees [https://perma.cc/
J37P-75CC].
400 Cf. Matthew C. Stephenson, The Qualities of Public Servants Determine the Quality of Public
Service, 2019 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1177, 1197–204 (discussing both the direct, tangible factors and
indirect, intangible factors that influence civil service morale and prestige).
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up agency capacity. We hasten to add that these measures, while imaginable, likely would face numerous political and practical hurdles to
adoption. They could also contribute to bureaucratic ossification, and
politicize agency decisionmaking to a greater extent, by involving
Congress too extensively in day-to-day management.
1. Limiting Ex Ante the President’s Discretion to Manage. — In the
past, in the wake of presidential abuses, Congress has sought to insulate
administrative personnel, funding, and oversight from presidential interference. A Congress that was so inclined could build on these precedents. For example, Congress could require minimum staffing levels
and specify staff composition to a greater extent in legislation. As noted
above, authorizing acts do not typically include information about
agency staffing beyond leadership structure. While we recognize that
higher numbers of staff do not guarantee agency competence or effectiveness, it may be worthwhile for Congress to designate certain minimum thresholds below which an agency’s capacity to accomplish its
mission would be assumed to be compromised, and to require that, if
staffing levels fall below that threshold, the agency do something to enhance transparency, such as report to Congress or submit its staffing
plan for public comment. There are obvious downsides to this idea,
however — it would be time- and resource-intensive for Congress to
stay abreast of agency staffing at this level of detail, and presumably
Congress would have to update the numbers over time. Such specifications could also backfire: administrations might treat the minimum
thresholds as ceilings rather than floors, refusing to add staff even if the
agency workload required it.401
Congress could also impose transparency-enhancing requirements on
agency decisions to manipulate staff. As an example, the Department
of Energy Act of 1978 – Civilian Applications402 (DOECA) mandates
that the Secretary of Energy transmit any proposal to terminate or
change the activities of the national laboratories to the House
Committee on Science and Technology and wait thirty days before
implementing those changes.403 Congress could follow this model and
require agencies to report to the relevant oversight committees before
relocating their offices or reassigning certain categories of agency staff,
such as scientists.404 Such measures, like minimum staffing thresholds,
have significant downsides. They could slow and encumber legitimate
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
401 On anchoring generally, see Adrian Furnham & Hua Chu Boo, A Literature Review of the
Anchoring Effect, 40 J. SOCIO-ECON. 35 (2011), which surveys the robust literature on anchoring
effects.
402 Pub. L. No. 95-238, 92 Stat. 47 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
403 Id. § 104(c) (42 U.S.C. § 7257 note).
404 On the benefits and costs of relocating agencies or agency offices, see Jeff Neal, Commentary,
Move Agency Headquarters Out of DC? Only if You Want Them to Fail, FED. NEWS NETWORK
(Oct. 31, 2019, 10:03 AM), https://federalnewsnetwork.com/commentary/2019/10/move-agencyheadquarters-out-of-dc-only-if-you-want-them-to-fail [https://perma.cc/L5ET-WHEH].
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agency reorganization efforts. Rather than promote good governance,
they might create new opportunities for political interference by members of Congress in decisions that are better left to the agencies.
Still, such transparency requirements have undeniable benefits and
will tend to increase accountability. Agency leadership may think twice
if they have to publicize decisions that could undermine staff. And even
if agency heads persevere, members of Congress will be in a better position to take corrective measures, by either pressuring the agency to
refrain or reversing its decision, if necessary, through an appropriations
rider or separate legislation. Of course the success of reporting requirements presumes that Congress will perform its oversight function diligently — a significant assumption that may be wrong, especially during
periods of one-party rule. Nevertheless, transparency requirements at a
minimum give internal staff additional leverage and signal to the public
that something may be amiss.
Another possibility is that Congress adopt explicit reorganization authority, defining and limiting it, for department heads.405 Currently, this
authority varies considerably by agency. Some department heads have
plenary power to reorganize their departments or transfer personnel and
funds between programs.406 Others may rely on their more nebulous or
indirect authority to prescribe regulations governing internal
department affairs to effect reorganizations.407 By speaking directly to
reorganization authority, Congress can avoid either agency or judicial
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
405 For an analogous proposal in the context of the dispensation and suspension powers, see
Zachary S. Price, Funding Restrictions and Separation of Powers, 71 VAND. L. REV. 357, 417–20
(2018).
406 See, e.g., 6 U.S.C. § 452(a)(2) (giving the Secretary of Homeland Security authority to “allocate
or reallocate functions among the officers” and to “consolidate, alter, or discontinue organizational
units within the Department” sixty days after providing notice to the relevant congressional committees along with an explanation of the rationale for the action); 43 U.S.C. § 1451 note (granting
the Secretary of the Interior authority to “effect such transfers within the Department of the Interior
of any of the records, property, personnel, and unexpended balances (available or to be made available) of appropriations, allocations, and other funds of such Department”). While agencies are
generally prohibited from reprogramming appropriated funds, individual statutes create exceptions.
The Department of Homeland Security, for example, may reprogram funds up to $500,000, or ten
percent of a program’s funds, whichever is less, without congressional authorization. Michelle
Mrdeza & Kenneth Gold, Reprogramming Funds: Understanding the Appropriators’ Perspective,
GEO. UNIV. GOV’T AFFS. INST., https://gai.georgetown.edu/reprogramming-funds-understanding
[https://perma.cc/T2XK-3YK7]. And the Department of Defense may reprogram funds up to $20
million, or twenty percent of a program’s funds, whichever is greater. Id.
407 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 301 (“The head of an Executive department or military department may
prescribe regulations for the government of his department, the conduct of its employees, the distribution and performance of its business, and the custody, use, and preservation of its records,
papers, and property.”). Courts have approved the use of this authority, for example, by the
Secretary of Labor to create the Labor Department’s Administrative Review Board. See Willy v.
Admin. Rev. Bd., 423 F.3d 483, 491–92 (5th Cir. 2005); see also 3 U.S.C. § 301 (authorizing the
President to delegate to agency heads in writing, after publication in the Federal Register, any
function vested in the President by law).
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interpretation of statutory silence as license to manipulate agency
structure.
Congress could also specify qualifications for executive branch appointments more frequently, in an effort to ensure that nominees have
baseline experience or expertise. There is a debate over Congress’s constitutional authority to establish statutory qualifications for executive
branch appointees incident to its power to create executive branch offices.408 Historically, Congress has specified qualifications sparingly,409
no doubt out of reluctance to interfere with the President’s constitutional
appointment power. But such requirements do exist.410 In response to
structural deregulation, Congress could impose experience or expertise
criteria more often, and strategically, in a manner designed not to encroach too much on the President’s power to select his preferred nominees. The biggest downside to this strategy is that it might not work.
Faced with legislation purporting to limit his appointment power, a
President might veto the bill (forcing a two-thirds override, which may
be difficult), or issue a signing statement signaling his disagreement on
constitutional grounds. Or he might simply ignore the limitation.411
There may be other ways to bolster agencies against structural deregulation, for example by increasing the independence of internal
agency watchdogs, like IGs, who serve an important accountability
function. Even though IGs investigate agency waste, fraud, and other
misconduct412 and are not, strictly speaking, overseers of the regulatory
process, their presence might inhibit Presidents from pursuing nontransparent strategies to erode agency capacity.413 Failing to appoint IGs, or
firing them without replacement, is analogous to shooting out the lights
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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See HENRY B. HOGUE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33886, STATUTORY QUALIFICATIONS
EXECUTIVE BRANCH POSITIONS 3–7 (2015) (discussing the history of interbranch conflict
over whether Congress may establish such qualifications incident to its constitutional authority to
establish executive branch offices).
409 Id. at 7.
410 See, e.g., Brian D. Feinstein, Identity-Conscious Administrative Law: Lessons from Financial
Regulators, GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 21–27) (on file with Harvard Law
School Library), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3787704 [https://perma.cc/
UEM3-3RAR] (surveying existing requirements for agency heads and other leaders).
411 HOGUE, supra note 408, at 1–2, 4 (noting that President George W. Bush did just that when
Congress for the first time specified qualifications for the FEMA Administrator in the Post-Katrina
Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1394, following the
Agency’s inadequate response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005).
412 Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app. § 2(2), § 4(a).
413 Inspectors general choose which matters to audit and investigate without agency interference,
and they report their findings to both agency leadership and Congress. See Pozen, supra note 151,
at 1143–44 (citing inspectors general as one of several important checks on government misbehavior). In addition, inspectors general are exempt from the rule that agencies may not dissent from
the President’s budget proposals; they are explicitly authorized to argue that such proposals “would
substantially inhibit the Inspector General from performing the duties of the office.” Pasachoff,
supra note 134, at 2226 (quoting 5 U.S.C. app. § 6(g)(3)).
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before a burglary: by removing an internal watchdog not beholden to
him, a President can obscure misbehavior.414 Congress already protects
the independence of IGs, but still greater protections may be necessary.415 And Congress may also consider extending similar protections
to certain other categories of agency personnel, like scientists.416
Another way to increase transparency is to strengthen internal complaint processes that permit employees to report unethical behavior or
raise other concerns about agency action.417 Reinforcing confidence in
these channels and protecting those who use them by strictly enforcing
retaliation bans may embolden staff who might otherwise remain silent
to expose instances of structural deregulation.
Congress might also consider strengthening civil service protections,
for example by revisiting whether Presidents should retain the power to
establish new civil service classifications with fewer-than-normal protections,418 an authority that, in any event, appears to conflict with the
Pendleton Act’s original emphasis on a professional civil service free
from political influence.419
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
414 Over seventy federal IGs are creatures of statute, and those statutes make many IGs subject
to the Article II, Section 2 appointments process. See FRANCIS, supra note 391, at 11. Thirty-six
IGs, generally those associated with the larger government agencies, must be nominated by the
President before they can be confirmed by the Senate. See id. Toward the end of the Trump
Administration, fifteen IG positions were vacant. See COUNCIL OF THE INSPECTORS
The State
GEN. ON INTEGRITY & EFFICIENCY, supra note 391, at 17.
Department IG slot was vacant for over five years, from 2008 until a permanent replacement was
confirmed in 2013. See Schmitz, supra note 391; Spero, supra note 391. That inspector general
then served until 2020, when he was fired by President Trump and replaced with an acting IG. See
Meridith McGraw & Nahal Toosi, Trump Ousts State Department Watchdog, POLITICO (May 15,
2020, 11:21 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/05/15/state-department-inspector-generalfired-261536 [https://perma.cc/UGU3-Z6WD].
415 See, e.g., BEN WILHELM, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11546, REMOVAL OF INSPECTORS
GENERAL: RULES, PRACTICE, AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESS 2 (2020); Danielle
Brian, It’s More Clear Now Than Ever: Inspectors General Need Stronger Protections, PROJECT
ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT (Apr. 13, 2020), https://www.pogo.org/analysis/2020/04/its-more-clearnow-than-ever-inspectors-general-need-stronger-protections
[https://perma.cc/9NWC-DSV2];
Danielle Brian & Liz Hempowicz, Good Governance Paper No. 11: Strengthening Inspectors
General, JUST SEC. (Oct. 27, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/73075/good-governance-paper-no11-strengthening-inspectors-general [https://perma.cc/5YJU-Z3YE]; Press Release, Sen. Chuck
Grassley, Grassley Leads Bipartisan Bill to Bolster Inspector General Protections (June 18, 2020),
https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-leads-bipartisan-bill-bolster-inspector-general-protections [https://perma.cc/6CHY-QHGT].
416 See WILHELM, supra note 415, at 2 (noting potential challenges to such protections under
the separation of powers).
417 See Joe Davidson, Perspective, Some Federal Agencies Have Dissent Channels. A Report Says
They Aren’t Working, WASH. POST (July 31, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/some-federal-agencies-have-dissent-channels-a-report-says-they-arent-working/2020/07/30/
d242a114-d29e-11ea-af07-1d058ca137ae_story.html [https://perma.cc/F67V-F2PC].
418 See supra section III.B.2.a, pp. 644–46.
419 See, e.g., Sean M. Theriault, Patronage, the Pendleton Act, and the Power of the People, 65 J.
POL. 50, 54–57 (2003) (overviewing the history of civil service reform of the spoils system as had
been popularized by Andrew Jackson).
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Finally, Congress might appropriate agency funds with greater specificity and impose more conditions on agency spending, which would
limit the President’s ability to delay, divert, and otherwise impact
agency budgets.420 However, the U.S. Congress already appropriates in
a far more prescriptive manner than the governments of many other
developed countries, and greater specificity might produce more
ossification.421
2. Stronger Oversight Ex Post. — The ex ante measures described
above could help to impede structural deregulation, but they are not
without drawbacks and could go too far in limiting administrative flexibility. They may also enhance congressional influence in ways that
might further politicize agency decisionmaking, enabling members of
Congress to interfere more readily in day-to-day agency management.
It may be preferable then, to rely to a greater extent on ex post oversight measures that do not intrude excessively on agency discretion, as
a check on structural deregulation. Oversight is designed to encourage
good behavior and promote political accountability. The Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993422 (GPRA) already helps to keep
Congress abreast of agency performance, but it does not focus specifically on the incapacitation we are worried about, and the President has
too much influence over its implementation. As amended by the GPRA
Modernization Act of 2010,423 this law requires agencies to consult with
Congress and other stakeholders to develop four-year strategic plans, set
long-term goals for their major functions, establish performance
measures, and report results.424
In addition to multiyear strategic plans, agencies must produce annual performance plans with fiscal year performance goals, objectives
on how to achieve these goals, and an explanation of how performance
is measured and verified.425 Agencies must also post annual updates on
performance on their websites. And a subset of executive branch agencies must establish “priority goals” for which they must conduct quarterly reviews. The OMB plays a central role in administering the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
420 Cf. Joachim Wehner, The Case for Congressional Budgeting, 71 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 349, 350–
51 (2011) (questioning the capacity of Presidents to be fiscal stewards and arguing for a stronger
congressional role).
421 Most other leading jurisdictions, by contrast, set objective budgets rather than the line-item
budget accounts that have evolved in this country. See id. at 349 (comparing appropriations process
in the United States to those in other developed countries).
422 Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285. For an overview summarizing the reforms, see CLINTON
T. BRASS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42379, CHANGES TO THE GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE
AND RESULTS ACT (GPRA) (2012).
423 Pub. L. No. 111-352, 124 Stat. 3866.
424 See id. § 2, 124 Stat. 3866–67.
425 See Alfred Ho, GPRA After a Decade: Lessons from the Government Performance and Results
Act and Related Federal Forms: Introduction, 30 PUB. PERFORMANCE & MGMT. REV. 307, 307
(2007).
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GPRA.426 For example, OMB must determine whether agencies meet
the performance goals in their Agency Performance Plans, and if not,
OMB and the agencies must produce various reports and plans to address any unmet goals.427
We cannot do justice to the GPRA’s complex scheme here. It is, to
be sure, highly bureaucratic and burdensome for agencies. More problematic for our purposes is that this elaborate goal-setting, performance
review, and reporting scheme — while requiring agencies to consult with
various congressional committees and generating numerous products on
agency performance for Congress to review — is largely overseen and
implemented by the OMB, which means, ultimately, that it falls significantly under presidential control and direction.428 But a similar set of
requirements less subject to presidential interference could bring instances of structural deregulation (or at least their consequences) to light.
Congress could also enable stronger oversight by engaging nonpartisan agencies, such as the GAO, the National Academy of Public
Administration, and the Administrative Conference of the United States
in monitoring agencies to ensure that they are adequately staffed and
capacitated to perform their statutory functions. While the GAO already performs assessments of agency performance,429 it could be
charged specifically with investigating whether agencies are subject to
presidential undermining using the tools we have described as structural
deregulation, and reporting those findings to Congress and the public.
Another possibility is for Congress to expand the purview of the IGs
beyond ensuring whether agency officials are complying with legal requirements to include responsibility for evaluating presidential interference of the sort we have described.
All of this monitoring, investigating, reporting, and publicizing may
not amount to much if Congress is unwilling to act on the information
by holding oversight hearings, calling agency and White House officials
to testify, and using all of the other instruments at its disposal, including
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426 See BRASS, supra note 422, at 7; WALTER GROSZYK, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS ACT OF 1993, at ¶ 26 (1995), https://govinfo.
library.unt.edu/npr/library/omb/gpra.html [https://perma.cc/W9LQ-CWXQ] (examining the experience of the U.S. government two years after the GPRA was implemented).
427 See BRASS, supra note 422, at 8. See generally EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT & OFF.
OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR NO. A–11: PREPARATION, SUBMISSION, AND EXECUTION
OF
THE
BUDGET
(2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/
assets/a11_current_year/a11_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XXB-LYT7] (providing an overview of
the federal performance framework related to agencies’ Strategic Plans, Annual Performance Plans,
and Annual Performance Reports requirements).
428 BRASS, supra note 422, at 18–19.
429 Id. at 20–21.
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its lawmaking and appropriations powers. But at least greater transparency about structural deregulation would better enable the public to
hold the President and Congress, both, to account.
3. Administrative Law Remedies. — As noted above, the legal and
procedural requirements of the APA have been held not to apply to presidential action.430 Still, many instances of structural deregulation that
originate with the President but are in practice carried out by the agencies — such as hiring freezes, agency reorganizations, and funding reallocations — should be subject to the APA. Nevertheless, many such
actions might escape judicial review if courts deem them to be “committed to agency discretion by law.”431 Congress could address this problem
by imposing guidelines for such actions in particular agency statutes.
Revisions to the APA might also specify that major managerial actions
are reviewable under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review
in § 706(2)(A).432
Rather than waiting for Congress to promulgate statutory criteria,
agencies could fortify themselves against structural deregulation. One
way they could do so is by establishing, through regulation, the “law”
against which subsequent managerial actions could be measured. In
Physicians for Social Responsibility v. Wheeler,433 the D.C. Circuit concluded that structural changes by agency heads were reviewable so long
as there was a meaningful legal standard to guide that review.434 That
meaningful standard need not be expressed in legislation, the court held,
but could take the form of an agency regulation or even a policy statement.435 Therefore, agencies could themselves promulgate the criteria
against which subsequent structural changes like the transfer of personnel, the treatment of whistleblowers, and the composition of advisory
committees could be measured.
Courts should also reconsider their deference to agency inaction and
delay due to scarce resources where those resources intentionally were
made scarce. Administrations should not be able to incapacitate agencies and then later claim incapacitation as grounds for inaction. Courts’
general reluctance to intervene in agency priority setting is understandable as a matter of comparative institutional competence.436 However,
where parties have presented compelling evidence of structural deregulation, that deference is less appropriate. Professor Eric Biber has suggested that courts reviewing agency delay take into account whether the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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See supra section III.C.1, pp. 648–49.
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agency is acting in good faith in asserting that it has insufficient resources to take the action at issue.437 Evaluating evidence of structural
deregulation could be part of this good faith assessment.
Agencies should also make managerial decisions more transparent so
the public can discern when political appointees are making decisions
with serious consequences for the structural integrity of their agencies.
A subset of managerial decisions might merit not just publication but
public participation. Congress could reconsider the scope of the APA’s
exclusion of rules directed at “agency management or personnel” from
notice-and-comment requirements. Policies important enough to meet
the definition of a rule should not automatically be exempt from comment. To avoid unnecessary delay, most management policies could be
promulgated as direct final rules, which go into effect on a specified date
if the agency receives no substantial adverse comments.438 This approach would provide opportunity for comment on controversial
changes without unduly increasing ossification or stymieing routine
adjustments.
CONCLUSION
The main purpose of this Article is to identify and label structural
deregulation, and to argue that it is a serious problem with significant
implications for American democratic governance. For several decades
now, with the approval of the Supreme Court, the American presidency
has amassed expansive powers, and Presidents have exerted increasingly
tight control over the administrative state. For the most part, scholars
have portrayed this development favorably, imagining that good faith
chief executives aim to place their stamp on the bureaucracy and take
credit for its achievements. As we have explained, however, this portrayal overlooks the dangerous potential of a powerful President bent
on undermining the government’s core capacities.
We have defined structural deregulation to include those things a
President can do that systematically erode and undermine agency staff,
limit or sideline expertise, constrict resources, and destroy morale — the
foundational capacities on which agencies rely to perform their statutory
duties. Structural deregulation causes damage cumulatively and incrementally, relatively invisibly, and largely unaccountably. We have distinguished these measures from what we call substantive deregulation,
which consists of more narrowly targeted regulatory rollbacks that use
transparent legal procedures, are typically subject to judicial review, and
are fairly easily reversed.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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Structural deregulation has troubling long-term implications for the
constitutional separation of powers. We have argued that Presidents
who embark on a campaign of undermining agency capacity are acting
in a manner inconsistent with their constitutional duty to take care to
execute the laws faithfully, and they may encroach on Congress’s lawmaking power by disabling agencies from accomplishing their lawfully
delegated tasks.
Structural deregulation also contravenes wellestablished administrative law norms such as transparency and accountability, which remain important to a well-functioning democracy that
depends on bureaucratic management. Finally, the “stickiness” of structural deregulation challenges democratic norms that disfavor binding
the hands of political successors.
We have shown that public law, on the whole, provides few opportunities to redress or prevent structural deregulation. Constitutional law
and administrative law both have blind spots when it comes to presidential management of the bureaucracy, especially when the President’s
mission is incapacitation. Specific statutes meant to protect the civil
service or inoculate agency budgets from presidential control do not help
much either — they are vulnerable to workarounds. These blind spots
and workarounds have allowed structural deregulation to flourish, a situation which we believe requires a political solution that only Congress
can provide.

